Deciphering Contestation of the Liberal International Order

Jing-Syuan Wong analyses the four most important aspects of the endogenous contestation of the Liberal International Order (LIO), and their implications for representation in power relationships. The text is part of a forthcoming e-book by the Global Governance Research Group of the UNA Europa network, entitled ‘The European Union in an Illiberal World’.

Following the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump in 2016, lamentations over the decline of the Liberal International Order (LIO) became increasingly vocal. With the most recent Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the gradually closer alignment between the leaders of Russia, China, and North Korea, it is tempting to link the decline of LIO with the rise of alternative models of global governance. In other words, exogenous factors have been spotlighted as obvious reasons behind the contestation of LIO. Less attention, however, has been paid to the endogenous factors of such contestation, pointed out notably by the special forum on Contestation in a World of Liberal Orders (2024) led by Goddard et al., and the special issue Challenges to the Liberal International Order: International Organization at 75 (2021) edited by Lake, Martin, and Risse. Building on these works, this chapter aims to decipher the endogenous factors contributing to and shaping the contestation of the LIO.

The contribution stems from the theoretical assumption that the LIO, like any other order, experiences a constant dialectical process characterised by contestation, reconstruction, and transformation. There has, therefore, never been a single and coherent LIO as such, but contested norms and customary practices fostered by American leadership instead.

In such dialectical ordering processes (Hofmann 2024), several principles may be developed by different actors with various visions of the world. According to Zürn (2024) and Hofmann (2024), as none of the principles dominate the others permanently, such dynamic forms are “entangled and simultaneous (re)ordering processes within and across organisations that contest and contradict one another” (Hofmann 2024, 2). In this view, contestation and dialogue are the norms rather than exception in the ordering processes. In other words, contestation characterises the ordering processes by actors with various and sometimes competing visions. In such a process, contestation does not necessarily weaken the norms. On the contrary, with rounds of negotiations and repeated practices, the legitimacy of orders can be consolidated because change actually shows that they can stand the test of contestation (Lavenex 2024).

Based therefore on the assumption of dialectical change, this chapter deciphers the four most important aspects of the endogenous contestation of the LIO: I) inherent “liberal” ambiguity; II) the power relations that the LIO is embedded in; III) the input and output legitimacy of the LIO; and IV) the rise of the BRICS+ and the struggle for recognition. The chapter then goes on to analyse the connection between these four aspects of contestation and the question of representation in power relationships.

1.  Inherent “liberal” ambiguity 

According to Lake, Martin, and Risse (2021), the adjective “liberal” is the most controversial subject in LIO. This is largely due to its multiple meanings and interpretations. The principles and practices characterised as “liberal” contradict one another at times, further exacerbating the term’s ambiguity and contestation.

“At its (philosophical and normative) core, ‘liberal’ connotes a belief in the universal equality of individuals and posits freedom as well as individual and collective self-determination as the highest human aspirations” (Lake, Martin, and Risse 2021: 229). Liberalism has taken on the political forms of representative democracy, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights. It also has economic subcomponents such as “neoliberalism”, as identified in Susan Strange’s The Retreat of the State (1996), and Embedded Liberalism (Ruggie 1982), that latter being originally constructed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (Lake, Martin, and Risse 2021). Gradually from the 1970s, trade and rising inflation brought down the Bretton Woods monetary system, leading further to the increased liberalisation of the movement of goods, services, people, and then capital, trends that were the basis for globalisation – the economic expression of The End of History, as posited by Francis Fukuyama (1992).

In fact, as Strange had noted, there is an inherent tension between state sovereignty and free capital movement, while Clift and Woll (2013) rightly point out that there exists an intrinsic paradox in state interventions as they pertain to territorial units while the capital flows have become global. Concomitant to the expansion of international capital flows that accelerated after the first oil shock (1973-1974), a paradigm shift began in the 1970s, away from the Keynesianism and welfare policies of the post-World War II era that had characterised the “Fordist” model of standardised production and consumption. In its place, a “Schumpeterian neoliberal framework” (Jessop 1993) began to emerge, based on supply-side polices and the rise of tertiary activities and the knowledge economy. While many of these trends have been common to the advanced capitalist societies, ultimately leading to the inequalities and political polarisations we see today, countries nevertheless chose different paths to restructure their states (Streeck 2003) in the face globalisation and post-industrialisation. In doing so, state-market-society relations were reconfigured, but different national paths did lead to long-term policy legacies (Boyer 2005). 

With domestic deregulation, international trade liberalisation and technological advancement, the competition for labour, capital, and goods rose dramatically. Coupled with the aging populations and rising wages, supply chains shifted from national economies to the global networks, pursuing a logic of complementary specialisation (Boyer 2005) and comparative advantage, while specifically exploiting cheap labour and loose labour protection schemes outside the advanced capitalist economies (Rudra 2002) to maximise profits. Broadly speaking, the competitive internationalisation and financialisation of the growth regime gradually become the norm (Boyer 2005), in turn paving the way to growth based on “overstimulation and overconsumption by debt-financing, which ultimately proved unsustainable” (Hemerijck 2013: 338). The accumulated contradictions of this model were then revealed violently by the Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession (2007- 2008).

In parallel, the structural adjustment programs promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in the 1980s in developing countries – especially in Latin America and Africa – contributed to a “lost decade” of growth in these continents; while the Asian crisis of 1997 revealed the weaknesses of over-celebrating of liberalisation of trade and especially free capital movement. According to Chang (2002), forcing developing countries to open their markets and deregulate their economies in the name of efficiency (via a package of policies often referred to as the “Washington Consensus”) only kicked away their development ladder.

Meanwhile in the advanced capitalist economies, neoliberal policies exacerbated socioeconomic inequalities and political grievance, especially as politicians – both conservative and social democrat - abandoned unskilled lower and middle classes. This has led (in part) to right-winged populism and contestation of the LIO, which has been intrinsically associated with the neoliberal agenda and the “retreat” of the state.

2.  Inherent power relations 

One of the most important insights from Lake, Martin, and Risse (2021) is that “international orders are not neutral but embody a set of material, ideational, and normative interests congealed into institutions and practices” (p. 247). Non-Western states after independence, for their part, found themselves in a world with orders and institutions already established in their absence. Moreover, they were expected to give up some of their newly gained sovereignty to be part of the world order, more or less backed up by American power. This explains to some degree why they have always seen the LIO as an imperialist construct aiming to safeguard Western interests. Moreover, drawing on Porter (2018), Alaranta (2022) argues that “the American hegemon never shied away from using coercion against those who did not submit to its arrangements, nor did the liberal edifice obstruct the US in its support for all kinds of undemocratic, anti-liberal regimes and leaders whose domestic success it considered vital for the US national strategy” (p. 21). 

However, while American leadership was indeed crucial in the establishment of the multilateral framework for dialogue such as the United Nations (UN), all relevant actors have co-constructed the international legal regime. For Lake, Martin, and Risse (2021), “it is a historical myth that the most intrusive and distinctive parts of the LIO have all been introduced by Western democracies, let alone by US hegemony” (p. 233-234). They provide examples of the role of Latin American states in drafting the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the “invention” of the term “Responsibility to Protect” by political authorities in sub-Saharan Africa to illustrate this point (ibid.). Similarly, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into being thanks to the diplomatic efforts of Indonesia, the largest archipelagic state in the world, among others.

Realistically speaking, any attempts aiming to foster the justice and legitimacy of LIO can at best be partial. With the rise – or re-emergence depending on one’s perspectives – of powers like China with their own agendas and concepts of international cooperation, the blatant violations of international laws by Russia and Israel, and the waning of the United States following its military retreats from Afghanistan and Iraq (the latter war also being outside international law), both traditional and new actors are calling for a new global social contract for different reasons (Dijkstra et al. 2025). For the former, this requires reform, as the LIO is failing to deliver on the aspirations of global peace, stability, and justice. For the latter (the new actors), a renewed global social contract requires reconstruction, given the representative deficiency of international organisations – still dominated by the West. In the words of Türkiye’s President Erdoğan’s, for example, “the world is bigger than five” with regards to the privileges of veto power enjoyed by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, the parties in both groups are highly heterogenous: among the traditional actors, the United States under President Trump is taking an increasingly nationalist and hostile approach to global institutions, and as we shall see below, while the new actors also have diverging objectives. This makes decision-making increasingly difficult.

3.  The dilemma of legitimacy: inclusion (input) vs. performance (output)

Heinkelmann-Wild, Kruck, and Zangl (2024) convincingly illustrate that there is a trade-off between inclusion and (hegemonic) control. They argue that there is an intrinsic trade-off between the lack of legitimacy due to exclusion of actors on the one hand, and the loss of effective control due to the inclusion of numerous and diverse actors, on the other. In both cases, the “performance” of an organisation can be called into question, where performance refers to the institutional capacity to reach a general consensus among members.

The institutional paralysis at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), starting with the Doha Round of trade negotiations since 2001, is a clear example of this dilemma. While its performance could have been expected to increase with the inclusion of major emerging countries such as China (in 2001) as well as Brazil and India (both in 1995), the three have distinct positions given their specific development models. For example, due to China’s exponential capacity of mass-production with economies of scale, it essentially favours free trade, thus diverging from the preferences of the other emerging and developing countries. At the same time, Hopewell (2016) argues that the rise in importance of Brazil, India, and China in the WTO was not only due to their market size, but also to their institutional power in forming coalitions of countries (mainly from the Global South), and sharing the same grievances against the domination of advanced capitalist countries in rulemaking. In particular, realising how these countries legitimise neoliberal orthodoxy in the name of economic efficiency to gain market access in emerging countries, India and Brazil formed a coalition of emerging/developing countries to defend their interests in the Doha Round and beyond.

In contrast to inclusion, the United States’ has more recently begun unpicking the ILO by withdrawing from key international organisations such as the UN Human Rights Council (Galbraith 2018), the Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation, and UNESCO, while also blocking of the WTO’s disputes settlement process. These too are clear manifestations of contestation. President Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs (announced on April 2, 2025) moreover flagrantly violate the principles of multilateral trade arrangements (notably the Most-Favoured Nation principle), thus further undermining, if not totally repudiating, US commitments to the WTO. As a result, the WTO risks being increasingly sidelined in the future developments of international trade, especially as China has been creating its own institutional infrastructure to support international trade and investment, through the Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013, and its growing involvement with the BRICS+ group of countries.

4.  The rise of BRICS+ and the struggle for recognition

In 2001, Jim O’Neill, then head of global economic research at Goldman Sachs, coined the term “BRIC” to describe the rapid economic development of Brazil, Russia, India, and China in terms of GDP growth rates, GDP per capita, and population size (Stuenkel 2015: 1). With the Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession (2007- 2008) that hit the advanced capitalist economies hard, the continued growth of emerging economies gradually captured the public attention beyond the financial world. In 2010, South Africa joined the BRIC, turning it into BRICS. According to Stuenkel (2015), this “fundamentally altered the nature of the BRICS group and gave it a more global structure” (p. 41).

The expansion of BRICS has gathered pace since, as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joined in 2024, while Indonesia became the tenth member of “BRICS+” in 2025 (BRICS 2025). Yet with enlargement, the dilemma of legitimacy discussed above has become gradually visible. While BRICS+ member states appear to be united by the struggle for recognition in delegitimizing the LIO, they have yet to articulate a clear framework for a new world order (Stuenkel 2015). Furthermore, due to varying levels of development and different sets of interests, BRICS+ countries often have divergent preferences in the architecture of the new global governance, as we already saw above concerning the Doha Round. India’s reservations about de-dollarisation (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2024) stand in sharp contrast to those of Russia and China, for example. For their part, China and Russia have competing objectives, seeking to challenge the LIO on the one hand, yet supporting the United Nations framework, given their privilege of being permanent members of the UNSC. 

The rise of BRICS+ and its contestation of the LIO has attracted wide attention. However, their attempts at delegitimizing LIO reflect more of their struggle for recognition than a concrete proposal of a paradigm shift in global governance. As hierarchy is inherent to all social relations, the questions of recognition and representation persist, to which we now turn. 

Representation in a power relationship 

Apart from their respective explanatory powers, the four aspects of endogenous contestation of the LIO also relate to one another. Among the four, the question of representation in a hierarchical global social structure conditioned by power appears to be the underlying cause of contestation.

Stemming from the theoretical assumption of this article, contestation is the normal dynamic process of any order. What is unique about the LIO is its claimed and perceived merits on representation, inclusion, and procedural legitimacy. Yet “precisely because it puts such emphasis on politics being based on notions of equality, rights, and rationality, the LIO is seen as hypocritical by those who are discontented with it” (Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2021: 615). Their resentment is compounded by the dilemma between seeking inclusion and the hegemonic control of the LIO discussed above. The negative perception of LIO in the Global South stems in its sense of exclusion in rulemaking, which appears dominated by Western powers. 

Drawing from insights of Lake, Martin, and Risse (2021), “orders are clubs that include as well as exclude” (p. 246), the excluded may join the order in search of symbolic capital, as well as material benefits for fear of being left out. For post-colonial states, after independence, they found themselves in a world with orders already constructed and negotiated in their absence. Moreover, they were expected to give up some of their newly gained sovereignty to be part of the LIO led largely by the US (especially from the 1990s onwards). This representational deficiency then undermined the legitimacy of such an order. Thus, from the beginning, these countries tended to perceive the LIO as an imperialist construct aiming to safeguard Western interests, at times at the expense of others.

The elephant in the room is the historical legacy of power dynamics and status hierarchy inherent in all social relations. With the repeated inconsistencies between discourse and actions associated with LIO, questions of legitimacy and representation become painfully visible, leading to greater tensions among actors. With the stagnation of progress in representation reflecting the dynamic transformation of the distribution of power, the “peripheral” states’ aspirations gradually turned into disappointment and disillusionment. At the same time, with the emergence of groups representing alternative visions of global governance (such as BRICS+), the “core” states feel their previously privileged position threatened and thus resent such transformation. As such, “the LIO is today being challenged from within and without in unprecedented ways” (Lake, Martin, and Risse 2021: 235-236).

The lack of representation in international organisations is both institutional (as in the UNSC) and perceived. “Although resentment toward Western domination is not new, what is novel is that current international challengers have in many ways been major beneficiaries of the LIO” (Adler-Nissen and Zarakol 2021: 624). While UNSC is indeed a historical legacy from WWII and highly hierarchical, other UN institutions and international laws have been co-constructed by states. Beyond the examples provided in Section II above, there are also nuanced ways to transform the functionality of the UN. For example, how a Chinese presidency at the UN Human Rights Council focuses more on socioeconomic rights over civil and political ones. And in doing so, it transforms the scope, conditions, and meaning of the protection of human rights (Larkin 2022). Indeed, power and representation can be defined and operationalised in various ways. Synthesising the above, the LIO is in constant evolution characterised by contestation and the negotiation of power.

Conclusion 

This chapter has engaged with the four most prominent endogenous factors contributing to and shaping the contestation of the LIO. It stems from the theoretical assumption that an order is a constant dialectical process, such that contestation is part of the very process of its reconstruction and transformation. In deciphering the contestation of the LIO, the text contributes to the understanding of the “liberal” ambiguity, inherent power relations that the LIO is embedded in, the input and output legitimacy of the LIO, as well as the rise of BRICS+ and the struggle for recognition. It has further analysed the ways in which these aspects are related, by highlighting the dynamic roles of representation and power in the permanent reconstruction of the LIO. Contestation over LIO is thus likely to stay as long as the order exists.

Jing-Syuan Wong is a PhD candidate in political and social science at Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), affiliated with the Centre d’Étude de la Vie Politique (Cevipol) and Institute of European Studies (IEE) and LUISS university. She is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie doctoral fellow of Globalisation, Europe, and Multilateralism (GEM)-Democratic Institutions, the rise of Alternative MOdels and mounting Normative Dissensus (DIAMOND) research project. Under the GEM-DIAMOND framework, she is writing a dissertation entitled How has in-betweenness characterisedIndonesian and Turkish foreign policies in the 2020s and how it has shaped relations with Japan and the EU respectively? (ESR 14) under the joint supervision of Prof. Luca Tomini from ULB, Brussels, Prof. Thomas Chrisiansen from LUISS, Rome, with support from Prof. Ken Miichi from Waseda University, Tokyo. She graduated from the School of Research at Sciences Po in 2022 with a master’s degree in political science (public policy). Her master’s thesis was supervised by Prof. Colin Hay and analysed the political economy of long-term care policy transformations in Taiwan with the angle of politicisation. She also holds a bachelor’s degree in politics and government from the Collège Universitaire of Sciences Po (2017-2020).

Photo by cottonbro studio

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