Much of the subsea cable network, which carries the vast majority of global internet traffic, is developed, owned, and operated by private corporations. In an era of growing global tensions, states have come to view these cables as critical to their interests. The article addresses the disconnect between statecraft-centric explanations and the market-driven development of global networks. It introduces the concept of private network realignment: Political interventions aimed at retroactively reshaping infrastructures and adjacent markets by influencing the decisions of private corporations. After decades of neoliberal globalization, networks are often organized around large corporations that drive their development. In reaction, states employ varied realignment strategies, the choice of which depends on their position in the network as well as that of relevant corporate actors. Empirically, the article examines two instructive, prototypical cases: the US–China conflict over the SeaMeWe-6 subsea cable system, and France's nationalization of Alcatel Submarine Networks. The findings highlight the uneven effectiveness of great power interventions, which opens up space for other highly connected powers to pursue autonomous network realignment strategies. The article contributes to contemporary debates on network competition, providing a perspective on how market dynamics and state strategizing intersect in the development of global networks.
Policy implications
- Subsea cables carry the vast majority of global internet traffic. Policymakers and analysts should pay close attention to great power competition in these critical networks to identify network risks.
- State interventions in the subsea cable network represent efforts to realign it with government interests. These include industrial and regulative measures, but can also take more coercive forms such as sanctions or sabotage. In order to enhance the resilience of communications against disruptive measures, governments should prioritize creating cable redundancies and investing in deployment and maintenance capacities.
- The effectiveness of economic statecraft is constrained by market dynamics entrenched in many global networks. Large private corporations continue to shape the subsea cable sector. Simplified narratives portraying networks as neatly divided between United States and Chinese spheres of influence are thus inaccurate.
- Despite widespread discourses on “decoupling” or “deglobalization” we observe a continued expansion of the global communication network as a consequence of increasing public and private investments in parallel and overlapping cable systems.
- Strategic public investments and industrial policy can address systemic risks where private actors lack incentives to establish redundancies and ensure cable security. Middle powers and highly connected states have more room of maneuver available than often suggested to adopt proactive policies, although they might entail significant short-term costs.
- The protection of global communication networks depends not only on national capabilities but also on advancing global (or, if not viable, regional) governance frameworks that fill the global regulatory vacuum and ensure the integrity of the network.
Photo by Francesco Ungaro