Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) have the potential to dramatically alter modern warfare and reshape global power differentials. Despite the strong rationale for negotiating global rules, consensus on whether and how to regulate LAWS has yet to be reached. This article explains multilateral bargaining over global LAWS regulation. Theoretically, it draws on rational choice institutionalism to develop an argument about the temporal dynamics of the negotiations over LAWS regulation. I emphasize the role of great power preferences and coalition formation in impeding preference convergence. Empirically, it focuses on the principal forum discussing LAWS regulation—the Group on Governmental Experts (GGE) under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)—and uses a novel dataset, complemented with text analysis methods to test the theoretical framework. The findings are threefold. First, several great powers consistently oppose new regulations on LAWS, distinguishing them from most other negotiating parties advocating for stricter rules. Second, weaker states turn to coalition formation as a strategy to augment their power. Third, these two factors jointly hinder the concession-convergence dynamic typically expected under consensus decision rules. This article has implications for debates on the regulation of LAWS, arms control negotiations, and the global governance of AI.
Policy implications
- Decision rules shape the prospects of an agreement: Consensus-based rules elevate all actors' preferences in determining the outcome. This study sheds light on the stalled progress within the CCW, which stems from the conflicting preferences of powerful negotiators and weaker state parties. As institutional reform remains unlikely, accommodating the preferences of powerful and weaker states will be paramount.
- Coalition formation matters: Coalition formation has hindered reaching an agreement. This analysis demonstrates that coalition formation has been detrimental to the establishment of a zone of possible agreement. For coalition formation to advance negotiations, blocking coalitions must evolve into crosscutting ones that bring competing interests together and enable the trading of concessions.
- The EU as a foreign policy actor: This article underscores findings from previous research that preference heterogeneity within the EU weakens its ability as a relevant foreign policy actor. The removal of points of contestation between member states could signal to the forum as a whole how progress might be achieved.
- A path forward on major issues of contestation: This analysis highlights how a handful of core issues continue to impede progress. The UN's 2026 deadline for an agreement on regulatory measures emphasizes the urgency of directing attention to these core issues.
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