Democracy in a Global Age? Just Maybe

Luke Millar examines how Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assemblies can contribute toward addressing the global democratic deficit.

The Problem of Democracy in a Global Age

Globalization has brought a marked shift in how politics is practised and at what levels. This change, broadly characterized as the increasingly global character of political decision-making, challenges a democratic standard previously secured within a sovereign nation-state model of power. This is the model, of course, common to an international relations understanding of the world. Few, if any, would argue that in globalizing areas of policy-making, there now exists corresponding inclusive mechanisms to ensure democratic legitimacy.

Global politics, such as that pursued through cooperation in inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) in areas of security, the environment and finance, for example, means that it is the global system that decides on many policy issues directly affecting citizens of nations around the world. Specific examples of this include how trade regimes can result in job losses within certain countries or how the World Trade Organization overrides state-prescribed protections such as the European ban on hormone-fed beef (Falk and Strauss, 2001, p. 1).

So what are we to do about this global democratic deficit? In other words, how can democracy work in global times?

A Deliberative Democratic System for a Global Age

The theory of deliberative democracy is ‘grounded in an assumption about individuals that stresses their capacity to reflect upon their own preferences, values and judgements in light of their participation in political dialogue with other individuals’ (Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009, p. 216). Donatella della Porter (2005, p. 340) defines deliberative democracy as something that occurs ‘under conditions of equality, inclusiveness and transparency… where a communicative process based on reason… is able to transform individual preferences’. Aiming to ameliorate the quality of democracy, deliberative democrats ‘champion… informed debate, the public use of reason and the impartial pursuit of truth’ (Held, 2006, p. 232). Accordingly, political judgements are not seen as fixed but rather are placed within a communicative, learning process that ‘alter(s) radically the perspective common to liberal theories and democratic thought... (and posits that) the source of legitimacy is not the pre-determined will of individuals, but rather the process of its formation, that is, deliberation itself’ (Manin, 1987, p. 351).

One could characterize the aim of deliberative democracy as something that works to re-energize the distinction between ‘consumer choice’ and ‘political choice’. Arguably conflated in modern-day electoral politics, the two kinds of choices bear important differences (Elster cited in Held, 2006, p. 235). While consumption as a choice is purely self-regarding, political choice should be, as John Stuart Mill argued, other regarding because it ‘shape(s) and affect(s) the preferences and life opportunities of others’ (Held, 2006, p. 235). As Bohman (2000, p. 237) persuasively argues, the goal of deliberation at a global level presents an insurmountable obstacle to communitarian approaches to increasing citizen participation because a pluralist global society destroys any possibility of a singular will or conception of public good upon which the theory of civic republicanism depends. What is needed, therefore, is a deliberative system that can accommodate, even encourage, a suitably transnational character.

A Global Democratic Model to Address the Global Democratic Deficit

The Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly (DGCA) is a model that would see citizens of the world randomly selected to engage in an objectively informed and moderated deliberative process. This deliberative democratic innovation stands as a direct alternative to models based on elected politicians. As deliberative democrats, DGCA authors, Dryzek et al. (2011), argue against electoral politics taken to a global scale (such as a ‘World Government’) on a number of fronts. The most compelling argument, I believe, is their questioning of the grounds on which a citizen would be voting for a representative, asserting that supporters of a Global Government model are being overly optimistic in thinking citizens would vote without reference to domestic concerns or perhaps simply in reaction to existing domestic policies with which they do not agree (2011, p. 35).

By simply recreating liberal electoral democracy at the global level we would fail in divorcing representatives from what I term the ‘accountability trap’, and consequently founder in creating a space within which authentic deliberation can occur. The concept of the ‘accountability trap’ is informed by Fishkin’s (1991) work with deliberative polling, and in particular, his treatment of the relationship between ‘political equality’ and ‘political deliberation’. Political equality refers to ‘the equal consideration of everyone’s preferences, where ‘everyone’ refers to some relevant population or demos, and ‘equal consideration’ means a process of equal counting so that everyone has the same voting power’ (Fishkin and Luskin, 2005, p. 2). By political deliberation, Fishkin and Luskin (2005, p. 285) are referring to ‘the weighing of competing considerations through discussion that is… informed… balanced… conscientious… substantive… (and) comprehensive’. What is being argued here is that with the rise of political equality one finds a corresponding decline in political deliberation (Fishkin, 1991). The idea is that in increasing equality by extending decision-making to the public at large through electoral mechanisms one creates ‘accountability traps’ for representatives who have been elected to represent people’s positions on issues.

When voter deliberation is limited within the electorate because of apathy, misinformation, or unchallenged bias for example, and then deliberation is again marginalised within the realm of political representatives because of accountability mechanisms such as opinion polls and future elections, quality democratic deliberation does not take place to any significant extent anywhere.

For Dryzeck et al., by inducing a ‘facile invocation of electoral democracy at the global level’ (2011, p. 34), a ‘Global Citizens’ Government’ would amount to nothing more than liberal electoral democracy writ large and as such, become beset by the same failings plaguing representative democracy within divided nation states (take the US for example). In other words, a representative ‘World Government’ may meet the equality standard but it fails, however, to promote the kind of deliberation that makes democracy worthwhile in the first place.

DGCA meets the equality test and the deliberative test

DGCA achieves political equality through quality random selections of citizens. Random selection ensures representation – so long as it is done well. The issue of political deliberation, on the other hand, is worthy of greater investigation. To demonstrate the DGCA model’s deliberative strength, outlining the results of the Euro Polis is helpful.

The Euro Polis experiment randomly selected 348 European citizens, in proportions representative of the 27-nation European community, to participate in a three-day deliberative event aiming to answer the question: ‘what kind of parliament would Europeans elect if they knew, thought, and talked much more about the issues?’ (Europolis, 2009, p. 1). Participants deliberating on issues of immigration and climate change underwent a process that involved discussions, the reading of balanced briefing material, and the opportunity to question experts and politicians on the issues. Statistically significant changes to the participant’s knowledge and position on the issues were recorded. Accordingly, statistically significant change to the voting intentions of the participants also occurred wherein the Greens Party made dramatic gains.

In Conclusion

The above empirical results support the thesis put forward by Dryzek et al., (2011, p. 37) that ‘the random selection and deliberative aspects… are mutually reinforcing’. Unlike electoral democracy’s polluting effects on deliberation, ‘random selection means that most participants will not be strong partisans at the outset – and so are more amenable to reflection of the sort of central to deliberation, and changing their minds as a result’ (Dryzek et al., 2011, p. 37).

Deliberative, representative citizen panels can assist to bring the people’s voice to the decisions that affect their lives. By forming DGCA’s to compliment other political institutions operating at the global level, democratic credibility could be extended to the global sphere. I believe the case is strong for the continued and scaled-up testing of the DGCA model’s possible contribution to democratizing the practice of politics at the global level.

Luke is currently an International Program Coordinator for Habitat for Humanity Australia.

Bibliography

Bohman, J. (2000) Public Deliberation: Pluralism Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, The MIT Press).
della Porter, D. (2005) ‘Deliberation in Movement: Why and How to Study Deliberative Democracy and Social Movements’ Acta Politica 40, pp 336-350.
Dryzek, J., Bachtiger, A., and Milewicz, K. (2011) ‘Toward a Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly’ Global Policy 2, pp 33-42.
Dryzek, J., and Dunleavy, P. (2009) Theories of the Democratic State (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan).
Europolis Project (2009) ‘More Informed Voters Select a Parliament in Unprecedented Experiment’ December 4. http://europolis-project.eu/media/21/europolis-proves-that-debate-does-change-european-citizens-attitudes (June 3, 2009).
Fishkin, J., and Luskin, R. (2005) ‘Experimenting with a Democratic Ideal: Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion’ Acta Politca 40, pp 284-298.
Fishkin, J. (1991) Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven CT, Yale University Press).
Held, D. (2006) Models of Democracy Third Edition, (Stanford, Stanford University Press).
Manin, B. (1987) ‘On Legitimacy and Deliberation’ Political Theory 15(3).