Against EUrocentrism I: The need for a new European Union strategy towards regional integration all around the world
The first part of former Argentine MP Fernando Iglesias’ examination of the mistakes of the EU’s foreign strategy and proposal for a new way forward for Latin-American integration.
For decades, the European strategy of support for the development of regional integration processes throughout the world was as follows: “We have the model. It is not only about economic integration but also about democracy, citizenship, human rights, the welfare state and supranational institutional building, it is also a combination of federalist goals and functionalist approach, and it works! You must only copy our model and everything will be OK”. Right. It did not only work for Europe, a continent which shifted from hosting the worst tragedies in human history to being a place where human civilization reached its pinnacle. It also worked for Latin-America, where many international organizations and institutions were born and developed under European inspiration, such as the Andean Community and the MERCOSUR (Mercado del Sur).
It worked, but it worked for a while. History is not that simple, and the Latin-American integration process faced different and increasing difficulties that have subsequently blocked it. Maybe the main obstacle was the lack of the propellant reasons for European integration: the necessity of avoiding a new war in European territory, and the menacing proximity of the U.S.S.R. There were also many others: first, the absence of advanced Latin-American industrial economies that could make a continental common market compulsory; second, the geographic proximity of the USA that led Mexico to prefer NAFTA agreements to any Latin-American option; third, the resulting disproportion in terms of size of the Brazilian territory, economy and population compared to the rest of the region; fourth, the proliferation of overlapping and uncoordinated initiatives (the Latin-American Parliament (Parlatino), the Centro-American Parliament, the Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC), the Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), the Andean Community, the Alianza del Pacífico, the MERCOSUR, and so on); and –last but not least- the traditional Latin-American tendency of resonating words coupled with minimal action.
The source of the Chavism and the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA), of course, made everything more tortuous by adding an ideological bias to the list of complications. It reduced the dimension of the process to Bolivarian countries, stopped MERCOSURs development and limited UNASUR to a series of meetings in which the South-American Heads of State love to exchange hugs and bravos with no further actions in favor of economic integration nor institutional building. Today, with the only exception of the Pacific Alliance (which does not follow the EU model but merely economic approach), the commercial exchanges within the region tend to diminish as fast as the power and influence of regional institutions. Finally, the EU financial crisis put an end to the European “It works!” that had been decisive for the creation of the MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and the UNASUR. The goals of reaching a Latin-American version of common regional customs, common trade market, common currency, and institutional integration (which had been part of an almost unanimous consensus for decades) lost any attraction, and a new wave of nationalism raised all over the region, led by the inclusion of Brazil among the BRICS and the Itamaraty’s ambition of transforming Brazil into a global player, including a seat at the UN Security Council.
In a nutshell: the European strategy in favor of regional integration abroad worked for a while; it was far from being sufficient to replicate the EU model in Latin-American lands, and it is not working anymore. Alongside the EU attitude towards Latin-America changing from an illusory “You do the same we did and everything will be OK” to an even more pessimistic “Nothing works. Let us leave Latin-America alone”. Thus, the European Union strategy changed from a EUrocentric approach (You just do the same) to another EUrocentric one (It only works here. Whatever you do, we don’t care). As the president of Democracia Global and director of the Altiero Spinelli Cathedra for regional integration, I had direct verification of this change from irrational optimism to irritating pessimism. For instance, every time I contacted EU authorities (meaning the Commission, the Parliament and the European External Action Service) in order to explore financial aid possibilities for academic and political activities in favor of regional integration at Buenos Aires the answer was the same: “We are sorry, but the European Union has no funds for that”. Sometimes, I obtained a meaningful addition: “Why not try to present your program as a project in favor of democracy, human rights, gender equality or something, instead of insisting on regional integration?” But if regional integration is not supported by the most advanced experience of regional integration, then, by whom?
European Successes and Failures: A New Viewpoint
So was the EU strategy favoring regional integration throughout the world complete nonsense? If not, what was its central mistake? And therefore, what can we take from it in order not to throw the baby out with the dirty bath water?
My answer to the first questions is NO, the EU strategy in favor of regional integration all around the world was not nonsense, as the development of advanced technologies and a globally integrated economy turns supranational integration based on political institutions more necessary than ever. In this sense, the EU model and –more importantly- the experience that Europe developed from the times of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) constitute a valid model both for other regional integration processes and for the world itself. If so, what were the mistakes? In my opinion, the crucial mistake was the attempt of exporting a model instead of suggesting a method, moreover: without a clear reflection on the fundamentals on which the model was founded.
Indeed, as long as we look at the evolution of European integration and its procedure, the majority of us will diverge on many of the results but agree on recognizing two constitutive items: a goal and a method for reaching it. Which was the basic goal of European integration? The basis of European integration was fixing the main problem that affected the development of Europe since –at least- 1871, I mean: war. Which was the method chosen by clever European leaders such as Monnet and Schuman to do so? The method chosen by European leaders was focusing all their efforts in the achievement of that goal, by sharing the natural resources (coal) that were the basic fuel of the dispute and by identifying a ‘coalition of the willing’ as large as possible but solid enough in order to move forward. These were the pillars on which the European process of regional integration was founded on, and the European model of democracy plus citizenship, human rights, welfare state and supranational institutional building was an effect –and a very appealing and successful model for regional integration- but not a cause. To put it in a more modern vocabulary, the European integration was a model of preventing conflict, the most successful of model of conflict prevention in the History of humankind. It is active and working until now.
Therefore, instead of forcing the EU model in Latin-America, what should we take from the European efforts of supporting regional integration processes in other continents? Secondly, better than abandoning Latin-American forces that fight for integration and the overcoming of nationalism, what about applying the EU experience in order to analyze Latin-American reality? Subsequently, third: which is the main problem that Latin-America is facing now? And fourth: is it connected in some way to the prevention of conflicts? Finally, fifth: which are the countries and social forces which are able to push effectively such an agenda?
