Taiwan and the Decade of Living Dangerously

Alfredo Toro Hardy analyses the risks of war between China and the U.S. over Taiwan.

For several decades, America’s policy towards Taiwan was based on so called “strategic ambiguity”. That implied a deliberate imprecision with respect to the U.S.’ disposition to defend the island in case of an invasion by Beijing. 

The benefits of ambiguousness 

On the one hand, the 1972 joint communique between Washington and Beijing stated that “The United States acknowledges that (…) there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States does not challenge that position”. Moreover, since the 1979 expiration of the Reciprocal Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan, the former has no obligation to go in defense of the island in case of invasion. On top, 1998 Clinton’s “three no’s” policy stated: “we don’t support independence of Taiwan, or ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one Taiwan, one China’ [and] we don’t believe that Taiwan should have membership in any organization for which statehood is a requirement”. 

On the other hand, though, the U.S.’ 1979 Taiwan Relations Act establishes America’s commitment to furnish arms to the island, and to consider any non-pacific attempt to shape its future as a direct threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific, an area considered as vital by United States. As a result, in Jude Blanchette and Ryan Hass words: “The U.S. military is bound by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to (…) resist the use of force or coercion against Taiwan”.  (Mahbubani, 2020, p. 95; Skylar Mastro, 2021; Blanchette and Hass, 2022).

Shifting to clarity

Any firm reading is impossible from the above, which served well for deterring Beijing without explicitly committing the U.S. in the defense of Taiwan. This ambiguity, though, is rapidly evaporating. The Trump and Biden administrations have been instrumental in this policy shift. Moreover, through the 2019 Taiwan Assurance Act, unanimously approved by the House of Representatives and still pending in the Senate, the U.S. should support Taiwan’s membership in international organizations. Two successive speakers of the House have met with the President of Taiwan, with the first of them making a historical official visit to Taipei in 2022. In Blanchette and Hass words: “The United States’ focus has shift to countering the threat China poses to Taiwan. Reflecting this shift, U.S. President Joe Biden has repeatedly said that the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan in a cross-strait conflict”. (Blanchette and Hass, 2022). 

But in addition to this increasingly unambiguous symbolic support to Taiwan, the Pentagon has formulated a military doctrine for going in its defense in case of invasion. The same not only envisions the positioning of American troops close to the island, but emphasizes a so called “distributed lethality” in case of conflict. The latter implies “the scattering and constant movement of forces to avoid becoming easy targets, while maintaining the capacity to gather or co-ordinate attacks. This will rely on an unprecedent degree on America’s experience of fighting as a ‘joint force’, in which separate military branches and weapons systems reinforce each other (…) One aim of this ‘agile combat employment’ is to force China to expend its large but finite stock of missiles”. In other words, America’s military is preparing for war in defense of Taiwan. (The Economist, 2023, A).

Why the shift?

This shift towards an increasingly strategic clarity in relation to Taiwan, has many causes. Among them the following: 

First, a dynamic that has led to a hardening of Beijing’s position towards Taiwan seems to leave invasion as the only reunification option. Pacific reunification, indeed, seems to be off the table. Events in Hong Kong, which ended up with the imposition of the so-called National Security Law, and the termination the autonomically oriented Basic Law of Hong Kong, discredited the notion of “a country, two systems” in the eyes of the Taiwanese. This, in turn, had profound electoral and political implications in the country. As a result, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began to ignore the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which it had respected for decades. Frequent and increasingly bold incursions within Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone, and reiterated calls to the PLA to prepare for the invasion of Taiwan, have become the new normal.

Second, as a Cold War between the U.S. and China has taken shape, a zero-sum perception of their relations transforms Taiwan in a key geostrategic piece for both. From a geostrategic point of view, indeed, the island has a double meaning. Notably, because of its localization within the so called First Island Chain. As such, it can alternatively act as a barrier to enter into the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea, or as a bottleneck hampering exit towards the Pacific Ocean. The former would benefit Beijing as the island becomes a barrier to the U.S., whereas the latter helps bottlenecking China. In addition, a Taiwan under Washington’s “de facto” control becomes a spear that points into mainland China, whereas under Beijing’s control points towards the West Pacific, a vital area for the United States.  

Third, Taiwan plays a fundamental role within the global superconductor industry; key industry upon which countless other technological sectors depend. A single Taiwanese company, TSMC, has 65% of the semiconductors’ global market. More crucially, 92% of the most advanced world’s microchips are manufactured in Taiwan. This has given rise to the term “silicon shield”, alluding to the need for the U.S. to avoid that this strategic asset falls into Beijing’s hands. Conversely, it has become a major incentive for Beijing to invade the island, specially so after 2022 Washington’s blockade of Chinese access to last generation superconductors. (Brown, 2024; Hille and Savastopulo, 2022).

The risks involved

Passing from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity, in relation to Taiwan, poses important risks for Washington. Among them the following:

One: A thin line separates deterrence from provocation. If the U.S. doesn’t move with extreme care in its aim of dissuading invasion, it could unleash the kind of conflict that it wants to avoid. This, because every new action or declaration from Washington showing its firm support to Taiwan, can be interpreted as an additional threat by Beijing. 

Two: If a perception of inevitability regarding war with the U.S. over Taiwan takes hold in Beijing, a preemptive strike against it forces may ensue. A surprise attack able to degrade America’s capacity to wage war, becomes under those circumstances a reasonable strategic option for Beijing. 

Three: In its defense of Taiwan, the U.S. could incur in something akin to the juridical figure of “Ultra Petita”. Meaning, going beyond than was asked for. According to The Economist: “Taiwanese have no consensus on who they are, how they relate to China or if they should ever fight”. America’s position in relation to the island could surpass what the Taiwanese, with its imprecise identity and general reluctance for a destructive war, might be willing to risk. (The Economist, 2023, B).

Four: The U.S. and China have asymmetrical interests with regard to Taiwan. For Beijing, reunification with the island assumes an existential character. It would not only represent the final closure of its “century of humiliation” (1842-1945), but the realization of its “China Dream”. Not surprisingly, China’s 2015 Defense White Paper sees this historical restitution as the priority task of the PLA. What is at stake for the U.S. is far less than this. Hence, dying for this objective has not the same meaning for both, which would put Washington in manifest disadvantage.

Five: Notwithstanding America’s “distributed lethality” strategy, mentioned above, distance has a meaning. Indeed, the distance between California and Taiwan is almost 7,000 miles and 5,300 from Hawaii. Meanwhile, that between mainland China and Taiwan is just 90 miles. Even if what John Mearsheimer calls the stopping power of water would not be considered as a deterrent barrier for the United States, China’s missiles power and the flooding of the area by its war navy, the largest in the world, should be taken seriously. This generates an effective anti-access/area-denial strategy very difficult to overcome. (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 114-128; Fabey, 2018, p. 231).

The how

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has referred to the 2020’s as the “decade of living dangerously”. That, because in the current decade war between China and the United States will most probably erupt. According to him, both in Beijing and Washington war is perceived as unavoidable, and the remaining doubt is no longer about the “if” but about the “how”. How would it begin? (Rudd, 2022, chapter 16). Taiwan, it seems out, will be the place for war to begin.

Photo by Henry & Co.

References

Blanchette, J. and Hass, R. (2022). “The Taiwan Long Game”. Foreign Affairs, December.

Brown, D. (2024). “China and Taiwan: A really simple guide”. BBC News, March 1.

Fabey, M. (2018). Crashback. New York: Scribner.

Hille, K. and Sevastopulo, D. (2022). “TSMC: the Taiwanese chipmaker caught in the tech cold war”. Financial Times, October 23.

Mahbubani, K. (2020). Has China Won? New York: Public Affairs.

Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Powers Politics. New York: W.W. Norton.

Rudd, K. (2022). The Avoidable War. New York Public Affairs.

Skylar Mastro, O. (2021). “The Taiwan Temptation”. Foreign Affairs, July/August.

The Economist (2023, A). “Storm warning”, March 11th.

The Economist (2023, B). “A vital island”, March 11th.