Obama's Syria Strategy?
100000 Syrians have so far been killed, at least 10000 of whom have likely been women and children. Although at one point in 2012 the rebels seemed to have gained momentum in their fight against Bashar al-Asad’s regime, the tables have now turned and an Asad victory now seems more likely short of U.S. intervention. Whoever prevails, Syria will probably be a failed state when the violence ends, and this will raise a spate of problems as different groups compete for influence.
It is tempting to compare Obama’s policy on Syria with that of Libya. In the latter, he decided fairly quickly to prevent what appeared to be the imminent slaughter of a large rebel group, many of whom were civilians, and quickly initiated a war only to then let the Europeans do the heavy lifting. If Libya was ‘leading from behind,’ one might think, Syria is ‘not leading.’ Obama exhibited sound strategy in Libya, this reasoning goes, but either the prospect of getting bogged down in yet another conflict in the Middle East as the U.S. pivots to Asia or the greater operational difficulties of removing Assad have made Obama do nothing while Syria burns. But the conclusion that this is not leading is wrong. In doing nothing Obama is doing something: he does have a Syria strategy.
Beyond the tragedy in Syria, Obama has bigger regional fish to fry. Iran has been the U.S.’s principal adversary in the region for over thirty years, and much of Obama’s policy in the Middle East is to both prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons and undermine Iranian power and influence. Very little short of attacking Iran will achieve the former, but allowing the Syrian conflict to continue helps achieve the latter and indeed provides other benefits. The logic is simple: Tehran has extensively attempted to consolidate its regional influence through sustaining Asad’s regime, but this political and military capital cannot be used to undermine U.S. influence elsewhere. As long as the Syrian civil war persists, Iranian resources that will be committed to supporting Assad cannot be invested elsewhere.
The Iranian security and intelligence services are advising and assisting the Syrian military, and these efforts have evolved into an expeditionary training mission using Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces (QF), Quds Force, intelligence services, and law enforcement forces to project military force beyond Iranian borders. Obama seems to have provided light weapons since Lebanese Hezballah entered the conflict on Assad’s side, but the President has carefully declined multiple rebel requests for more and heavier weapons, no-fly zones and aerial campaigns.
One could argue that Obama is providing enough support to the rebels to exhaust Iran but not enough to allow the rebels to prevail. An embattled Assad may impose greater limitations on Iranian regional influence than a post-Assad Syria. As long as Assad stays in power, Iranian resources are diverted from the proxies that Iran supports through Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, to Syria itself. The downfall of Assad would likely cause a proxy campaign against Syria’s new government and its foreign supporters, which might also involve a redeployment of IRGC and QF assets to other regional theaters against U.S. interests. Making Iran bleed in Syria presents a much greater strategic opportunity, relative to the risks involved, than a major military campaign to overthrow Assad and the uncertainty of post-Assad Syria.
Moreover, as long as the conflict continues, Russia and China will likely continue to support Assad. This maintains the Russian military base in Tartus which would surely go if Assad did, but undermines Moscow and Beijing’s global image. Nobody, with the possible exception of North Korea, wants to be associated with supporters of Bashar al-Assad. Most of the costs of supporting the rebels are being paid for by the Qataris and Saudis who have even more to gain from a depleted Tehran. As long as the conflict does not spread South, Israel prefers the devil it knows in Assad to whatever regime or more likely civil war might follow his downfall. Given these bleak alternatives, and assuming that undermining Iranian influence is a greater U.S. objective than saving Syrian lives, letting Syria burn makes strategic sense. This would not be the first time that Washington has put strategic incentives before humanitarian concerns. Obama has been faced with the choice between saving Syrian lives and undermining a regional adversary and chosen the latter. But he is hardly the first leader to do so, and will not be the last.
