Intervention: Prospects and Limitations
This column by Charles A. Kupchan is part of Global Policy’s e-book, ‘Lessons from Intervention in the 21st Century: Legality, Legitimacy and Feasibility', edited by David Held and Kyle McNally. Contributions from academics and practitioners will be serialised on Global Policy until the e-book’s release in the summer of 2014. Find out more here or join the debate on Twitter #GPintervention.
The United States has been involved in three major military interventions since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Two of them – Afghanistan and Iraq – were direct by-products of the events of September 11. The other – Libya – was a consequence of the political unrest spawned by the Arab Awakening.
A stock-taking of these three instances of military intervention leads to a rather sobering assessment. In all three cases, military operations attained their initial objectives. In Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda was largely dismantled and the Taliban took flight. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s regime collapsed and was replaced by a Shiite-led government supported by the United States and its international partners. In Libya, the rule of Muammar Qaddafi came to an abrupt end, toppled by a coalition of Libyan opponents backed by NATO.
In all three cases, however, these operational successes failed to produce desirable political outcomes. As the NATO mission in Afghanistan comes to an end, the Afghan government remains beset by corruption and dysfunction, and the Taliban is making a comeback. Iraq continues to be wracked by sectarian violence and its territorial integrity remains in question. In Libya, a weak and divided government has been unable to establish effective control over the country; Libya’s unity remains compromised by tribal and regional cleavages.
This essay reflects on the causes and implications of these outcomes. It begins by assessing the practicality of intervention, examining why interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have proved so frustrating. It then turns to the implications of these three cases for the legitimacy and legality of intervention. The essay ends by considering the prospects for intervention moving forward.
The Practicality of Intervention
In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, the odds were stacked against the success of military interventions. For four reasons, the broader Middle East represents a particularly inhospitable environment for outside military intervention.
First, regime change and regional instability are bringing to the surface sectarian and tribal cleavages long suppressed by coercive regimes. From Afghanistan to Libya, the governments that have taken office as the product of either Western intervention or the Arab Awakening, rather than nurturing a brand of consensual politics backstopped by a strong national identity, are beset by pervasive political fragmentation. A sense of national belonging is the twin sister of democracy; nationalism is the social glue that makes consensual politics work. Egypt, like Turkey and Iran, is fortunate to have a strong national identity dating back centuries. But Egypt has nonetheless been stumbling as it tries to put down democratic roots. Social cohesion will be even harder to come by in most of the region’s other states, which are contrived nations cobbled together by departing colonial powers. They risk being split asunder by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal cleavages.
Second, the power of political Islam represents an impediment to the emergence of pro-Western, secular regimes of the type hoped for by Western governments. Islam and democracy are by no means incompatible. However, religion and politics are intimately interwoven throughout the Middle East. Islamic tradition makes no distinction between mosque and state, helping Islamists win elections throughout the region. One result is a debilitating struggle between empowered Islamists and fractured secularists that is playing out in Egypt, Turkey, Syria and just about everywhere else. Absent the Western tradition of separating the sacred from the secular – which came about only after the bloody wars of the Protestant Reformation – pitched battles over the role of Islam in politics will bedevil aspiring Middle East democracies for generations to come.
Third, anti-colonial sentiment still runs strong throughout the broader Middle East. The United States and its partners underestimated the degree to which outside intervention, even if initially welcomed by a good number of Afghans, Iraqis, and Libyans, would soon be met by widespread opposition and resistance. The problem is not just hardened insurgents. The Afghan and Iraqi governments, both of which came to power as a consequence of the U.S. intervention and have enjoyed considerable U.S. largess, have very strained relationships with Washington. Benghazi, initially home to the Libyan opposition supported by NATO, became a center of anti-Western activism soon after the opposition took over power from the Qaddafi regime. On September 11, 2012, a large crowd attacked the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, killing the U.S. ambassador and other personnel. Lest it be seen as too close to Washington, the government in Tripoli has been sparing in its effort to help bring to justice the perpetrators.
Fourth, the region has been experiencing profound and deeply rooted shifts in its political landscape. The Arab Awakening and the social tumult associated with it, the broadening rift between the Shiite and Sunni communities, the unpredictable geopolitical realignments that are the consequence of regional turmoil – these factors limit the effective influence of outside actors. To be sure, the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq occurred well before the Arab Awakening began. But especially in Iraq, regional turmoil and the violence in Syria are exacerbating sectarian tensions and making political stability even more elusive. Whether through military force or less intrusive instruments, the United States and its partners have little purchase over the bottom-up, tectonic changes in the region’s social and political order.
Sectarian cleavages, political Islam, anti-Western sentiment, regional upheaval – these four conditions have denied the United States the ability to attain its political objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya. To be sure, Washington made tactical mistakes along the way. But the main impediment to success has been the nature of the mission itself. American military power has proved adept at achieving narrowly defined military objectives. But the region’s complex political and strategic landscape has made it impossible to translate military success into desirable political outcomes. The inconclusive and frustrating outcomes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have no doubt contributed to Washington’s reluctance to intervene in Syria.
The Legitimacy and Legality of Intervention
Interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have muddied the waters when it comes to the legitimacy and legality of military intervention. Each of these three instances of military intervention occurred under different circumstances, in the end offering more ambiguity than clarity as to the relationship between the rules governing intervention and international practice.
The United States responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001 by launching military operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Operation Enduring Freedom did not have the authorization of the UN Security Council. Supporters argued that the United States was acting in self-defense and did not need UN authorization. Critics objected, claiming that a non-state actor (Al-Qaeda), not Afghanistan, attacked the United States and that U.S. action constituted retaliation rather than self-defense. Regardless, the UN in December 2001 established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help advance stability in Afghanistan. NATO assumed operational command of ISAF in 2003, with some 50 countries eventually contributing troops to the mission. The international mission in Afghanistan thus enjoyed broad international support, limiting the extent to which U.S. intervention in the absence of UN authorization was seen as corrosive of a rules-based order. Without question, shortcomings in governance and ongoing violence have sapped international enthusiasm for the U.S.-led operation in Afghanistan – including in the United States. However, waning support is a product of the mission’s failure to achieve its more ambitious goals, not of broader questioning of its legality.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was far more controversial. Washington tried, but failed, to secure UN authorization. Indeed, traditional American allies, including Germany and France, openly opposed U.S. efforts to obtain UN authorization for military action in Iraq. A severe transatlantic rift ensued when Washington nonetheless proceeded to invade Iraq. Moreover, in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion, U.S. troops were unable to find weapons of mass destruction or links between Saddam Hussein’s regime and Al-Qaeda, undermining Washington’s justifications for military action. The UN late in 2003 did provide a legal framework for international efforts to advance security and stability in Iraq. Nonetheless, the intervention is broadly viewed as lacking both legitimacy and legality.
The NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 took place under UN authorization, with ten members of the Security Council approving action, and Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia abstaining. In the midst of growing violence between the Qaddafi regime and the opposition, the UN authorized a no-fly zone and “all necessary means” to prevent attacks on civilians. The intervention in Libya effectively took place under the auspices of the Responsibility to Protect, a framework for authorizing humanitarian intervention that enjoys broad support among UN members.
Widespread appreciation of the legality and legitimacy of the mission was, however, relatively short-lived. As the NATO mission proceeded, it began to focus on toppling the Qaddafi regime, not just on protecting civilians. Russia accused NATO of rewriting the rules of the road as it saw fit, and using the Responsibility to Protect as a pretext for launching a military operation aimed at regime change. Indeed, Russia has maintained that NATO’s alleged breach of its mandate in Libya is one of the main reasons that the Kremlin has staunchly resisted international intervention in Syria. NATO’s operation in Libya initially enjoyed legitimacy and legality, but ended up on contested ground, reinforcing the inescapable normative complexity surrounding intervention.
The Prospects for Intervention
Interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya offer sobering lessons. All three interventions have fallen short of their political objectives. Each has underscored the difficulties entailed in obtaining and sustaining legitimacy and legality. These outcomes have taken a toll on America’s appetite for projecting the nation’s power to the Middle East, one of the primary reasons that President Obama has been intent on reducing the U.S. footprint in the region. The Republican Party, long a stolid supporter of the assertive projection of American power, is having second thoughts; Republican internationalists such as Senator John McCain are now in regular battle with neo-isolationists and libertarians in his own party. When President Obama in the fall of 2013 prepared to carry out airstrikes against Syria in retaliation for the regime’s use of chemical weapons, he faced a near-revolt in Congress – a clear sign of the new political constraints on U.S. action.
Developments in Iran, as well as unforeseen events elsewhere in the region, have the potential to trigger further U.S. military intervention in the Middle East. However, the bar is considerably higher than it was previously. This is as it should be. Despite the noble intentions motivating U.S. interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, each has demonstrated the limitations of U.S. power and the risks associated with relying on military force to engineer political outcomes in troubled regions populated by deeply divided societies.
Charles A. Kupchan is a professor international affairs at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Transatlantic Academy. His most recent book is No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn.
