The false promise of air power

With the downfall of Gaddafi, many may conclude that this is a vindication of air power. In many ways, it is tempting to conclude that the Libyan operation provides a perfect template for intervention: NATO or some alliance of countries provides air support while local troops provide the footwork. Unfortunately, this has been tested before and found wanting. More often than not, other variables are far more decisive in the successful conclusion of wars. Three recent, and not so recent, conflicts provide cautionary tales.

First, throughout the U.S. war in Vietnam, the Air Force argued that just a little bit more air power could break the Vietcong’s resolve to fight. When that argument failed to deliver, the Nixon administration argued that it could enforce a stalemate, thus preserving the integrity of South Vietnam, through U.S. air power. The Nixon administration hailed the progress of Vietnamization as South Vietnamese troops fought campaigns, notably into Laos, backed by U.S. air support. Not only were those “victories” questionable but they also proved to be ephemeral since the balance of power was ultimately on the Vietcong’s side.

Over twenty-five years later, in 1999, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was also applauded by some as a vindication of air power, demonstrating how modern technology and precision had created a new era for the use of air capabilities complemented by local forces. Aside from dubious precision, and limited military outcomes, air power in Kosovo was not as decisive as diplomatic efforts to ending and then resolving the conflict there.

Finally, another template came in the shape of “shock and awe” in Iraq. Not only was the notion of overwhelming force legally questionable, it also proved ephemeral in winning the peace. In the end, air power could do very little against roadside bombs or sectarian violence. If anything, the more sophisticated technology becomes, the more likely it is that it will be met with the most basic, unsophisticated capabilities.

In Libya, it is early to tell what exactly happened but a long-term stalemate was looking likely if Gaddafi hadn’t been found. And finding Gaddafi relied more on intelligence than air power. Ultimately, air power can help shift battlefield realities but only if the balance of forces on the ground is already favorable. Furthermore, NATO allies are keen on impressing that winning the peace is a Libyan responsibility, because in that, air power is pretty useless.