Imposing Sanctions: Assessing Methods to Improve International Sanctions Regimes
Michael Tierney reviews the patchy record of international sanctions regimes and proposes a way forward.
Since the end of the Cold War, the West has increasingly utilized economic sanctions as an alternative to military coercion to correct the behaviour of belligerent international actors. Recent developments such as the Iran Nuclear Deal have been upheld as examples of the effectiveness of sanctions efforts. However, ongoing sanctions against countries such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Russia, and Syria have proven much less successful. In this manner, there is a need to review current international sanctions regimes, in order to determine how these measures can be designed as more useful to change belligerent behaviour across the global system.
Scholars and practitioners alike have attempted to assess the actual effectiveness of sanctions regimes for some time. Many academics have found that there is disconnect between the study and implementation of sanctions however, and that it is highly difficult to assess the real impact that sanctions have on international security efforts. In theory, states will sanction non-compliant actors in an effort to alter their behaviour, and eventually force them to become re-compliant with international norms or the sanctioning state’s values. The idea behind these measures are that sanctions will negatively impact a country’s economy and society so greatly, that public opinion will shift against the governing regime, and eventually lead to policy or regime change.
Yet in reality, it has been found that sanctions are most often imposed on states which are less connected to the global economy. Therefore, is it unclear whether sanctions produce their intended impact, as countries with less globalized economies will be more resilient in the face of international economic constraints. In general, sanctions have also been assessed as less than effective for actually affecting policy or regime change. For instance, North Korea has been sanctioned since 2006, and continues to rank as one of the most oppressive totalitarian regimes in the world. Similarly, Syria has been sanctioned since 2004, and there seems to be little evidence that the regime will change its behaviour in the near future. Even in Iran, there are now issues surrounding the de-sanctioning of certain segments of the country’s economy, regardless of the recent nuclear accord which was reached in 2015. Therefore, further emphasis needs to be placed on the options available to policy makers to create more effective sanctions regimes, in order to improve international security without the use of military force.
The first, and likely most effective option, is for targeted actions to take a more prominent role in international sanctions regimes. As witnessed in places such as Syria and Iran, comprehensive sanctions lead to significant economic turmoil. The turmoil then leads to the emergence and strengthening of underground economies, which make financial activities and criminal behaviours more difficult to monitor and prevent. While comprehensive sanctions are certainly put in place to promote wide ranging and far reaching policy changes, there are also many drawbacks to this endeavour. In Syria for instance, the lack of revenue available to the government, which resulted from the sanctions placed upon that country, ultimately forced the Assad regime to move most of its resources to security forces in order to combat rebels and terrorist groups across the country. In the end, the Assad regime still stands, while ordinary Syrians starve due to the lack of foodstuffs available to them. Similarly, the Iranian government signed a nuclear deal in 2015 to ease sanctions. Yet for years, the embargoes placed on oil and foreign currency exchanges forced the government to subsidize certain sectors of the economy, including medicines and medical supplies. This not only made it more difficult for Iranians to access sufficient healthcare, but also increased corruption in the country. Importers of medical supplies took advantage of the subsidized exchange rates, and sold needed medicines to individuals residing outside of Iran at an increased profit. The sanctions also bolstered underground economies, including human and drug trafficking networks, as they become more economically viable. In countries such as Syria and Iran, the enhancement of underground economies is especially problematic, as these channels are often used by terrorist elements to finance their own activities and attacks. In this manner, targeted sanctions are a better policy option as they are more likely to punish the real belligerent actors while diminishing the impact upon ordinary citizens.
Sanctioning states must also focus on building international consensus when implementing a new sanctions regime. As witnessed in the case of Iran, China’s reluctance to impose sanctions, particularly on Iran’s valuable oil sector, allowed the Iranian economy to stay afloat amidst economic turmoil. While pressure was placed upon the Iranian economy, and by extension society, under the original sanctions regime involving the West, Iran was still able to find an outlet for the pressure in China. Therefore, the sanctions were much less effective. Moving forward, a more successful approach would likely include some kind of international agreement discussed prior to sanctions being imposed, which includes all major international players. While this option may be somewhat unrealistic given the competing interests of the states involved in the United Nations Security Council, this endeavour would still act as best practice to make sanctions as effective as possible.
Similarly, North Korea continues to enjoy support from the Chinese government. As a matter of strategy, China is unwilling to place the same amount of economic pressure upon its totalitarian neighbour as countries such as the United States. Simply put, China does not want to destabilize the Kim dynastic rule in the DPRK as it would likely result in war, and possibly a new Western-leaning regime in Pyongyang which could act against China’s international interests. In this manner, it is unlikely that sanctions will have a real impact upon North Korean policy in the near future without broader international participation. As a matter of policy, it is therefore prescient for sanctioning states to build global consensus on the nature and implementation of sanctions in order to have the greatest impact on belligerent actors.
Finally, sanctioning states must craft strategies to effectively limit the ability of sanctioned state leaders to maintain wealth and control. In the DPRK, Kim Jong-il implemented a Royal Court Economy system, where he siphoned state resources into personal accounts to be used for gift politics and security spending. In essence, the civilians of North Korea became further impoverished under international sanctions while Kim used state wealth to enrich political allies, thereby bolstering power, and fund defence programs to maintain control. While there is some evidence to suggest that his predecessor, Kim Jong-un, has struggled to maintain this same system, the case still provides important lessons for the execution of sanctions. To be more effective, sanctions must be able to reach the political leadership of any given country. In this manner, more effective intelligence programs are also required to track and identify the leadership’s wealth. The Kim family has used international business partners, front companies, and smuggling in order to move funds across the international system while avoiding detection and asset freezing. The example suggests that building international partnerships and implementing effective targeted sanctions are needed. However, it also indicates that sanctioning states must know how and where the leadership structure moves its wealth, in order to retain access and control. By building intelligence capacity to track funds in contravention of international sanctions, and subsequently preventing the movement of those funds, the sanctioned regime will have little other option than to comply with global resolutions. The ability to actually constrain political leaders’ wealth is a tool required to make international sanctions regimes more effective.
Sanctions have increasingly been used as an alternative to military action in global conflict resolution over the last several decades. However, there continues to be a murky track record with regards to how effective these measures actually are for changing belligerent behaviour across the international system. Despite some successes by way of sanctions, difficulties remain in bringing states such as Syria and the DPRK to comply with international laws and norms. Therefore, further assessment of international sanctions regimes is required to improve these actions moving ahead. The implementation of more targeted sanctions, improved international consensus building, and enhanced monitoring and limiting of political leaders’ wealth would be effective policy options for improving international sanctions regimes moving forward. As a starting point – and further study in this area will be needed as well – these options will likely create more successful sanctions efforts and give the international community better opportunities to reduce conflict while avoiding unnecessary military confrontation. While sanctions may be an effective method for international conflict resolution, there certainly needs to be some work done to achieve their intended result in reality.
Michael Tierney holds an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Waterloo. He is currently a Senior Investigator specializing in money laundering, terrorist financing, and international sanctions avoidance.
