Unlikely Bedfellows: US and Iranian Shared Positions on the Emerging Global Laws of War
In this post Matthew Bolton introduces his recent co-authored article “Globalization and the Kalashnikov”, which is available here.
Negotiations for a global Arms Trade Treaty almost imploded last week under the weight of objections from the US, Iran, China, Russia, and Syria. This group of strange bedfellows, facing strenuous objections from human rights groups and states championing the treaty, wanted any decisions about the treaty’s provisions to be decided unanimously, effectively giving every country a veto over the final text.
The process was saved by an agreement to make decisions by consensus at the upcoming drafting conference in July, which will draw up global regulations on the trade and transfer of conventional weapons.
For all their recent public posturing on nuclear weapons, the US and Iran share remarkably similar positions on a variety of international treaties governing the conduct of war. The US and Iran have both refused to join the antipersonnel landmine ban, cluster munitions ban, 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court.
The “with us or against us” rhetoric of US foreign policy following 9/11 has drawn attention away the fact that a country can be both “with us” and “against us” at the same time. An alternative way of looking at global politics is to highlight a less publicized struggle, between an emerging group of middle powers states on one side and, on the other, a disparate group of great and regional military powers that jealously guard their sovereignty.
Middle powers – relatively wealthy small to medium-sized countries with no nuclear weapons and no Security Council veto – had little independent voice during the Cold War, marginalized and dominated by the USA and USSR. However, in the 1990s and 2000s, a core group of middle powers – including the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand and South Africa – became increasingly more vocal.
Unable to impose policies on the world, middle powers usually rely on ‘soft power’ to get their way and share an interest in developing global institutions and norms that tie down great powers and belligerent countries to stable commitments and behaviors.
Often teaming up with international NGOs to project their influence, middle powers have had a remarkable degree of global policy success recently, outmaneuvering objections from great and regional powers in establishing norms on landmines, cluster munitions, child soldiers, conflict diamonds, the International Criminal Court, the rights of persons with disabilities and environmental sustainability. For a detailed case study of the emerging role of middle power-NGO coalitions, see my 2010 article in Global Policy, co-authored with humanitarian law activist Thomas Nash.
Not everyone is happy with this group of vocal upstarts. US State Department officials have complained to me that these middle powers were upsetting tried and tested modes of international diplomacy and, by supporting public NGO campaigns in the US, intervening in America’s internal politics. But their careful guarding of sovereignty actually means the US finds itself taking the similar positions as Iran and a variety of other authoritarian states in undercutting the development of many global institutions.
How does a country that has such a strong tradition of promoting democracy and human rights end up in such embarrassing company? In his presidential campaign, Obama said, “I strongly support international initiatives to limit harm to civilians caused by conventional weapons” and that “As president, I will help lead the way on these issues.” What happened?
Back in 1988, Jan Egeland observed that despite a commitment to human rights among American political leaders, the US ended up supporting regressive authoritarian regimes. He argued that America’s extensive global security and commercial interests hamstrung genuine attempts to create a coherent human rights foreign policy. By possessing dominance in certain kinds of military and economic power, the US actually reduces its own normative power to project its democratic values into the international arena. In protecting its military from global restrictions, the US undercuts its progressive image by voting with Iran, Burma and North Korea instead of its democratic allies.
For a detailed look at the politics of the Arms Trade Treaty process, read my Global Policy article “Globalization and the Kalashnikov”, recently posted on Early View and co-authored with Eiko Elize Sakamoto of the London School of Economics and Hugh Griffiths at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
Matthew Bolton, Department of Political Science, Dyson College of Arts and Sciences, Pace University New York City.
