Amid the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, middle powers, especially those from the global south, are often portrayed in IR literature as strategic hedgers, expected to balance between major powers to preserve regional autonomy and stability. Yet many, like Indonesia, display contradictory foreign policy behaviour by rhetorically championing inclusive engagement while increasingly courting China through selective alignments. This article challenges such realist interpretations by arguing that Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour cannot be understood solely through external balancing logics that assume a unitary state responding to external pressures. This article proposes an alternative explanation: layered incoherence that refers to a structural condition rooted in the interplay of ideational contestation, institutional fragmentation and informal governance. Rather than treating inconsistency as the product of changes in the government's perception of threats, it argues that these contradictions are embedded features of the state itself. Through an analysis of Indonesia's response to Chinese maritime assertiveness and the implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), this article demonstrates how competing strategic visions, bureaucratic silos, and informal networks interact to produce an ambivalent foreign policy. The article offers a more grounded understanding of middle powers, highlighting how domestic structures mediate external pressures and constrain strategic coherence.
Policy implications
- Middle powers must address institutional fragmentation by developing formal coordination structures such as cross-agency task forces or strategic councils that align foreign, economic, and security policy. In Indonesia's case, clearer coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other state actors would strengthen strategic coherence.
- Legacy doctrines like Indonesia's free and active policy may require reinterpretation or strategic revision to remain relevant. Middle powers should periodically review such frameworks to ensure alignment between long-standing principles (e.g., non-alignment or neutrality) and contemporary economic and geopolitical realities.
- Informal diplomacy offers flexibility, especially in contexts where state capacity is limited or institutional trust is uneven. However, as Indonesia shows, such informality must be embedded within a clear overarching strategy. Middle powers should formalise decision-making where possible while preserving informal tools as tactical instruments, especially for negotiations rather than allowing them to define strategic direction.
- Initiatives like ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) show the potential for middle powers to shape regional architecture. However, implementation remains key. Middle powers should ensure such frameworks are backed by institutional capacity, member state alignment, and concrete follow-up mechanisms to avoid rhetorical inflation and geopolitical irrelevance.
- Middle powers should avoid overdependence on any one major power by cultivating diversified relationships. As Indonesia's case demonstrates, economic pragmatism can tilt strategic alignment unless carefully managed. Expanding ties with other regional actors such as India, the EU, or Japan can help maintain autonomy and bargaining power.
Photo by Tom Fisk