This study examines how Iranian strategic thinkers conceptualise the country's ‘Look East’ policy (i.e., relations with China and Russia) and the GCC states. Using thematic qualitative content analysis of approximately 70 documents from Iranian state official, advisory and academic institutions (2015–2025), it reveals that Iran's eastward orientation is shaped by economic imperatives stemming from Western sanctions, dual security considerations encompassing power projection and defensive deterrence and aspirational positioning within an anticipated multipolar order. The analysis demonstrates that Iranian strategic narrative exhibits sophisticated cost–benefit calculations, acknowledging both opportunities and limitations of these partnerships. Recent events, particularly the 2023–2025 conflicts, have exposed critical vulnerabilities in Iran's strategic framework, raising questions about whether these partnerships can provide the strategic resilience Tehran anticipated.
Policy implications
- For the international community, particularly the West, it is essential to acknowledge the strategic durability of Iran's Eastern pivot. Iran's partnerships with China and Russia should not be treated as temporary tactical moves. Iran views these as foundational elements of a new world order. Western policies should account for this long-term strategic commitment rather than expecting sanctions alone to drive Iran back towards Western engagement.
- The international community must recognise the gap between Iran's strategic narrative and reality. The 2025 crisis demonstrated that Russia and China provide rhetorical backing but limited concrete support. Western policy could exploit this gap by demonstrating to Tehran that its Eastern pivot cannot substitute for the fundamental policy adjustments (nuclear negotiations, regional posture, domestic governance) required to escape strategic isolation.
- For the international community, it is crucial to expose the symbolic nature of trilateral naval cooperation. Iran's joint naval exercises with Russia and China serve primarily as diplomatic theatre rather than preparation for integrated military operations. Western naval presence and intelligence sharing with Gulf partners should systematically demonstrate that these symbolic partnerships provide Iran with strategic ambiguity but not actual operational capabilities or defence guarantees.
- Regional countries, especially Iran's Gulf neighbours, should recalibrate the Gulf security architecture. Iran's weakened regional posture creates an opportunity to restructure Gulf security arrangements. Rather than simply strengthening anti-Iran coalitions, new frameworks should be developed that could eventually accommodate an internationally constrained Iran.
- For Iran, leveraging China–Russia competition presents strategic opportunities. Russia and China compete as much as they cooperate. Tehran should recognise that these competitive dynamics may limit the reliability of its Eastern partnerships, particularly during moments of crisis when strategic ambiguity may not translate into concrete support.
Photo by Mohammad hassan Taheri