Elite Riches, Empty Pockets and 27th Amendment: What global experience teaches us?
Abdur Rehman Cheema argues that Pakistan must prioritise a shift from elite-centric power arrangements toward deep, structural domestic reforms.
On 12 November 2025, Pakistan’s parliament passed the controversial 27th Constitutional Amendment, handing lifelong legal immunity to the army chief — elevated to a constitutionally powerful “Field Marshal” and made the Chief of Defence Forces commanding all service branches.
Critics warn it undermines judicial independence by curbing the Supreme Court’s powers and replacing it with a new constitutional court whose judges will be appointed by the executive. Proponents argue it provides decisive leadership. But global experience suggests that concentration of power often delivers growth for the few — not broad-based prosperity.
The Illusion of Efficiency
Centralised rule is often defended on the grounds of rapid decision-making and strong economic direction. Indeed, several countries under consolidated leadership have posted striking headline growth:
- India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2014, has reported average annual GDP growth near 6.5%, along with expansive digital infrastructure (Aadhaar, UPI) and stepped-up public investment.
- China, under Xi Jinping’s unified control, sustained roughly 6.5% annual growth from 2013 through 2022, doubling the size of its economy over that period.
- Russia, during Vladimir Putin’s early 2000s era, nearly doubled real GDP; despite sanctions and geopolitical pressures, it recently reported growth of 4.1–4.3% in 2024.
- Under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership, Bangladesh sustained robust economic momentum — the World Bank estimates average annual real GDP growth at 6.3 percent between 2010 and 2023, reflecting strong macroeconomic performance even amid mounting social and fiscal challenges.
- Saudi Arabia, under Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030, has pushed non-oil sectors to account for over half of GDP, creating millions of jobs.
- Brazil, in Lula da Silva’s recent term, grew by 2.9% in 2023 and 3.4% in 2024, aided by social transfers and a tight labour market.
These outcomes are often cited to justify Pakistan’s move: centralized authority, it is argued, catalyses growth.
The Reality for Ordinary Citizens
Yet when one examines inequality, social mobility, and institutional strength, the story changes dramatically. Centralization erodes institutional accountability, polarizes societies, and prioritizes short-term metrics over equitable distribution, as evidenced by two-thirds of countries experiencing rising inequality that traps billions in vulnerability
The World Inequality Lab demonstrate the scale of income concentration in India, where the top 10 percent Indians capture 57 percent of national income, leaving the bottom half with just 13 percent. This imbalance has widened over the past three decades, driven by disproportionate gains among the richest groups and stagnant or declining real incomes for lower-income households.
Research highlights persistent urban–rural and regional income divides in China. For instance, in 2023, the per capita disposable income gap between the eastern region and the western region was ~18,722 yuan. These divides amplify inequality because they affect access to quality services, education, and economic opportunities.
Brazil under Lula has reduced poverty from 31.6 percent in 2022 to 27.4 percent in 2023 and lowered the Gini index to 0.518 in 2023, yet persistent high inequality. The top 10 percent earned on average 14.4 times more than the bottom 40 percent, with the top 1 percent earning 39 times more than the bottom 40, averaging R$ 20,664 in monthly household income. Gains remain uneven, leaving millions vulnerable despite social programs.
Tariffs implemented under the Trump administration would slash long-run GDP by 6% and wages by 5%. A middle-income American household stands to lose about $22,000 over its lifetime.
Coming back to the case in point, Pakistan's historical military-led periods from 1947 to the present demonstrate higher average annual GDP growth rates—almost twice those achieved under civilian rule during the 1961–2025 period—yet these gains rely heavily on external geopolitical aid, particularly from the United States, rather than sustainable domestic policies. The Pakistani rupee, valued at approximately 30 US cents in the 1950s, declined to around 20 cents in the 1960s, 10 cents in the 1970s, 5 cents in the 1980s, and 2 cents in the 1990s. It now stands at about 0.3 US cents in 2025 — retaining only 1 percent of its original value against the US dollar. This sharp devaluation, which should boost exports and curb imports to improve the trade balance, has failed to deliver these benefits in Pakistan's case. Remittances from overseas Pakistanis provide the primary mitigating factor amid ongoing trade deficits and reliance on external borrowing.
The 27th Amendment institutionalises unaccountable authority. The amendment grants the army chief permanent rank, lifetime immunity, and near-absolute legal protection. By amending Article 243, it also concentrates strategic, operational, and even nuclear command in a single office.
Why Centralisation Fails the Many
High GDP growth rates are meaningless if wealth and income remain excessively concentrated. In India and China, centralised decision-making has not prevented elite capture.
Centralized power often comes with weakened checks and balances. The 27th Amendment’s restructuring of the judiciary risks politicising constitutional adjudication and suppressing dissent.
Accountability matters more than speed. Economic policymaking unmoored from judicial or political oversight may boost short-term metrics but damages legitimacy and social cohesion in the long run.
What Pakistan Should Do Instead
Pakistan must prioritise a shift from elite-centric power arrangements toward deep, structural domestic reforms that have proven, across comparable emerging economies, to yield sustained and broad-based development gains. This requires strengthening the tax regime through wider base-broadening and compliance enforcement, correcting chronic distortions in the energy sector by rationalising tariffs and reducing circular debt, and empowering local governments with predictable fiscal transfers so they can deliver frontline social services effectively. It also demands confronting the long-standing challenge of an oversized and fragmented bureaucracy by streamlining ministries, reducing overlap, and modernising public administration to enhance regulatory quality.
At the same time, Pakistan needs to create a competitive environment for private sector investment, including reforms to land use, commercial regulation, and urban planning, enabling cities beyond Lahore and Karachi to function as genuine engines of productivity, employment, and innovation.
These reforms are politically difficult, but evidence shows that countries undertaking them witness more resilient growth, stronger social outcomes, and greater fiscal sustainability than those relying on centralised authority structures disconnected from economic fundamentals.
Dr Abdur Rehman Cheema is a policy practitioner focusing on economic and social development. All the opinions expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily relate to or represent positions, strategies, or opinions of his employer or affiliated organisations in any way. He can be reached at arehmancheema@gmail.com. LinkedIn ; Web of Science; Google Scholar
Photo by Ch Jawad
