Why We Must Prevent The Militarisation Of Outer Space: How To Reconcile National Interests with Transnational and Transplanetary Interests
Nayef Al-Rodhan argues that critical militarisation and binary zero-sum paradigms in space won’t make us safer – they will only increase our vulnerability.
As the United States and China escalate their rivalry across economic, technological, and military dimensions – including the latest tit-for-tat tariff increases that have reignited fears of a prolonged trade war – their competition risks evolving into a full-spectrum strategic confrontation. Outer space could be next. If left unchecked, the increased militarisation of outer space could have catastrophic consequences for global security and human progress. What does this mean for global efforts to shape a cooperative framework for space governance?
Historically, space has served as a domain of awe and ambition – where human ingenuity transcended borders. The International Space Station stands as a monument to what global cooperation can achieve. Today, the logic of terrestrial geopolitics is rapidly encroaching on this final frontier. At the heart of this drift lies the intensifying strategic competition between the United States, China and Russia, which have all invested heavily in space-based military capabilities. The establishment of the U.S. Space Force (USSF) in 2019 formalised the militarisation of space as a central component of national security. Other space-faring nations have mirrored these efforts and NATO has labeled space a warfighting domain. The US remains the unrivalled power in cosmos and has long held the upper hand in technological innovations.
However, the USSF's “Space Warfighting Framework” released last month has raised the stakes by declaring that “space superiority” and "control of space" are now the foundation of U.S. military power, not just a strategic advantage. In parallel, China and Russia have accelerated their space ambitions by expanding offensive and defensive counterspace measures including anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, jamming technologies, and dual-use satellite systems. U.S. officials claim Russia is developing a space-based nuclear anti-satellite weapon that could disrupt military and civilian systems alike. Moscow denies this, but vetoed a 2024 UN resolution reaffirming the Outer Space Treaty’s ban on nuclear weapons in orbit.
These developments are not isolated. They reflect a broader trend in which space is increasingly seen as a critical extension of military and economic power. Satellites now underpin everything from navigation and communications to surveillance and missile defence. As such, their strategic value has become immense – and so too their vulnerability. Herein lies the danger: the more reliant we become on space-based infrastructure, the more tempting it becomes for rival powers to target those systems in times of tension. A recent CSIS report warns that a space-based global strike would be a game-changer, offering unmatched speed and lethality. But even an accidental satellite mishap could trigger cascading effects, crippling communications and risking escalation. Worse still, kinetic ASAT weapons could create debris clouds, rendering orbits unusable for generations – a scenario known as the "Kessler Syndrome.”
As Brookings notes, despite the increasing reliance on space-based systems, the US (and the other global powers) still does not have a clearly defined strategy for deterring attacks in space – highlighting a dangerous gap between capability and doctrine in an era of escalating orbital threats. The logic of mutually assured destruction, which helped stabilise the nuclear balance during the Cold War, does not hold in space. The domain is asymmetric, poorly regulated, and alarmingly fragile. In the absence of robust norms, responsible behaviour and binding treaties, the potential for miscalculation is profound. Moreover, the spillover effects of an exponential space arms race will not be confined to the warring nations. A new global space compact is therefore urgently needed: one that bans the deployment of offensive weapons in orbit, establishes norms of responsible behaviour, and ensures equitable access to space for all humanity. All space-faring nations should be pushing hard for the revitalisation of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, whose noble principles now require modernisation.
Outer space is a shared "Global Commons", belonging to no nation but holding significance for all. We must therefore recognise that space security also has deeply ethical and philosophical dimensions, which reveal uncomfortable truths: as emotional, amoral egoists, states rarely show restraint without binding norms. Ultimately, this challenges our ability to act ethically and cooperatively on a planetary scale. That is why the future of space must be guided by what I call "Symbiotic Realism": an acknowledgment of the importance of healthy competition between states and the understanding that our interdependence, as states and species, must outweigh zero-sum competition. Non-conflictual competition, when fueled by transparency, accountability, dialogue, shared interests, ethical conduct and mutual respect can propel states toward collective prosperity while avoiding destructive rivalries. Above all, we must reconcile national interests with transnational and transplanetary interests by embracing a framework rooted in guaranteeing dignity, collective security, and sustainable prosperity for all.
Let us not repeat in space the errors we made on Earth. Critical militarisation and binary zero-sum paradigms in space won’t make us safer – they will only increase our vulnerability. Confidence-building measures, joint missions, and greater transparency in space operations are urgently needed. The three global powers need to lead by example and engage in direct dialogue on space security, safety and sustainability. This can only be done by adopting win-win symbiotic realist approaches, multi-sum security commitments and responsible restraint. Our collective human future depends on it. If space becomes unsafe, it will not be selectively unsafe, it will be unsafe for all states and corporations alike.
Professor Nayef Al-Rodhan is a philosopher, neuroscientist, geostrategist and futurologist. He is the Head of the Geopolitics and Global Futures Department, and head of the Outer Space Security Cluster, at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in Switzerland, and a Member of the Global Future Council on Complex Risks at the World Economic Forum. He is also an Honorary Fellow at Oxford University’s St. Antony’s College and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy at the University of London.
Photo by Kaique Rocha
