Who Sets the Rules of Eurasian Connectivity?
Elkhan Nuriyev argues that emerging trade corridors across Eurasia are no longer defined solely by infrastructure — they are increasingly shaped by the rules that govern them.
As competition over trade corridors intensifies across Eurasia, the South Caucasus and Central Asia are becoming pivotal arenas where the governance of regional connectivity is increasingly contested. In this evolving landscape, proposals emerging from the Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process highlight a broader shift: connectivity is no longer just about building railways and highways — it is about regulatory alignment, operational standards, and political credibility.
One such proposal is the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), formally referenced in the U.S.-brokered Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement witnessed by President Donald Trump. It envisions a transit corridor linking Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenian territory as part of a post-conflict settlement framework. While not a megaproject in financial terms, the corridor carries strategic significance. Properly structured, it could turn diplomatic normalization into economic interdependence — linking political progress to customs harmonization, transit guarantees, and private-sector participation.
If implemented effectively, such a corridor could eventually connect across the Caspian Sea toward Central Asia, where Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are actively seeking to diversify trade routes and external partnerships. For these states, connectivity is no longer simply about geography; it is about strategic balance. Governments across the region are navigating Chinese infrastructure financing, Russian logistical influence, European markets, and expanding U.S. economic engagement — while seeking to avoid overdependence on any single power.
In this context, new transit links through the South Caucasus could complement the Middle Corridor and broader trans-Caspian initiatives, providing additional pathways that reduce reliance on northern routes historically shaped by Russian infrastructure and regulatory frameworks. The strategic question is not merely whether corridors exist, but whose standards and governance practices define how they function.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative remains the most significant force shaping physical connectivity across Eurasia. Beijing has financed railways, ports, and logistics hubs throughout Central Asia and the South Caucasus, embedding Chinese firms and financing mechanisms into regional supply chains. Yet the evolving contest is increasingly about operational rules: customs interoperability, procurement transparency, dispute resolution, debt sustainability, and insurance mechanisms that mitigate political risk.
A corridor emerging from Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization could introduce a governance–centred model into this landscape. Its credibility would depend less on construction volume and more on implementation discipline — harmonized customs procedures, digital cargo tracking, interoperable transit documentation, and regulatory predictability that reassures investors. Sequencing matters: operational performance should precede any scaling of the corridor.
Selective complementarity is also possible. Chinese-backed infrastructure may continue to underpin major transport arteries, while Western-backed or multilateral initiatives emphasize regulatory reform, transparency standards, and institutional capacity-building. Co-financing by international financial institutions could strengthen oversight and reduce geopolitical signalling. Pilot projects focused on electronic documentation or insurance interoperability could reduce friction between networks shaped by different powers.
Washington’s influence in this process is likely to remain indirect. The United States cannot impose reconciliation in the South Caucasus nor dictate Central Asia’s strategic orientation. Its leverage lies instead in economic statecraft — encouraging governance reforms, supporting private-sector confidence, and linking deeper integration to demonstrated compliance with international standards.
The broader takeaway is that Eurasian connectivity is becoming less about steel and concrete and more about rule-setting authority. Trade corridors now serve as platforms for projecting regulatory models and institutional norms. The decisive factor may not be who builds the most infrastructure, but who defines how that infrastructure operates.
If consolidated, normalization in the South Caucasus offers an opportunity to test this governance–centered approach. Its ultimate significance will not rest solely on transit volumes, but on whether it contributes to a more predictable, diversified, and rules-based connectivity architecture across Eurasia.
Elkhan Nuriyev is a Senior Fellow with the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Berlin. He previously served as a Fulbright Scholar at The George Washington University and has held senior positions at leading think tanks and research positions across the United States and Europe. His academic work has been published by Routledge, LIT, Outre-Terre, and other prominent international publishers.
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