The Coming Rift: Why the De Facto Israel-Turkey Alliance on Syria Will Collapse
Mohsen Solhdoost argues that what was once a marriage of convenience against Assad and Iran is dissolving into strategic rivalry over the spoils and direction of post-Assad Syria.
In the fragmented geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, alliances are often tactical, temporary, and transactional. The recent alignment between Israel and Turkey over the Syrian crisis, especially their converging interest in undermining Iran’s presence and toppling Bashar al-Assad's regime, might seem to suggest a new regional axis. However, this de facto alliance is not built on shared values, long-term strategic visions, or even mutual trust. Instead, it is a fragile convergence of convenience, destined to collapse under the weight of historical baggage, diverging regional ambitions, domestic political imperatives, and fundamentally conflicting strategic calculations.
Both Israel and Turkey had ample reasons to want Assad removed from power. For Israel, the Syrian regime had long served as a conduit for Iranian influence, particularly through Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran’s entrenchment in Syria represented a strategic nightmare for Tel Aviv as it allowed Tehran to establish a land corridor to the Mediterranean and position military assets uncomfortably close to Israel’s northern border. For Turkey, Assad represented both a political and humanitarian quagmire. The Syrian war has destabilized its border, flooded it with millions of refugees, and empowered Kurdish militias that Ankara considers existential threats. A regime change in Damascus could, from Turkey’s perspective, marginalize the Kurdish factions, reset the refugee burden, and open the door for Turkish political influence in post-conflict Syria.
Given this overlap in interests, Israel and Turkey, despite their tense bilateral history, have found themselves on parallel tracks in Syria since the outbreak of the 2011 civil war. Recently, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed that there have been contacts between Israel and Turkey for operational coordination in Syria. In other words, the shared objective of pushing Iran out and undermining Assad’s hold on power brought the two into a quiet, informal alignment.
However, as their diverging endgames have surfaced clearly, this short-lived partnership is beginning to unravel.
Israel’s long-term interest in Syria is clear: it wants to degrade Iran’s military presence, prevent Hezbollah from obtaining advanced weaponry, and preserve the strategic status quo that ensures its continued operational freedom in Syrian airspace. Tel Aviv has reaffirmed its intention to to maintain control over a swath of Syrian territory beyond contested borders, signaling it views this occupation as a long-term strategic buffer rather than a temporary security measure.
Turkey, conversely, harbors ambitious, arguably expansionist, objectives. Ankara seeks to shape Syria’s political future, prevent an autonomous Kurdish zone, and entrench Turkish influence in northern Syria. President Erdoğan’s neo-Ottoman vision involves cultural, political, and economic penetration into former Ottoman territories, positioning Turkey as a regional hegemon in direct competition with other powers, notably Israel.
However, this divergence is profound. After Assad was removed and Iran’s significant withdrawal from Syria, the common ground between Israel and Turkey began to erode, giving way to the reemergence of historical mistrust and political tensions. In other words, the disappearance of their shared adversary removed the central rationale for cooperation, exposing deeper strategic contradictions.
At the heart of their friction is Turkey’s push for a political solution incorporating Islamist factions and Sunni Arab proxies aligned with Ankara. This approach has drawn sharp criticisms from Israel, which staunchly opposes any outcome empowering groups sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, with whom Hamas retains strong ideological affinity.
Israel wasted little time pressing its military advantages after Damascus fell. Its warplanes have sharply escalated airstrikes across Syria since late 2024, targeting remaining Iran-linked depots and bases. Israeli officials framed these strikes as preemptive security measures, a warning to Syria’s new rulers not to allow an Iranian resurgence or jihadist threats to fester. In one clear signal, Israeli jets even struck near the presidential palace in Damascus in May 2025, underscoring Tel Aviv’s readiness to act decisively against any emerging threat. On the ground, Israel has deployed limited forces in Syria’s southwestern corner to shield allied minority communities, notably the Druze, and to prevent hostile militias from massing near the Golan frontier. From Israel’s perspective, these actions are prudent hedges against the uncertainty posed by a post-Assad landscape dominated by Turkey-backed Islamist rebels.
Meanwhile, Turkey has rapidly expanded its military and political footprint in northern Syria. Even before Assad’s ouster, Turkish forces controlled significant border territory; now Ankara is doubling down as the chief patron of Syria’s new Sunni Islamist-led government. Turkish military teams reportedly scoped out airbases deep inside Syria as potential deployment sites to consolidate Turkey’s influence and support the nascent regime’s security. Simultaneously Ankara brokered a joint defense pact with Damascus, effectively turning Syria’s devastated army into a subsidiary partner of the Turkish Armed Forces. De facto, Turkey envisions a friendly buffer state in Syria’s north, securing its borders from Kurdish insurgents and enabling Erdoğan to play a pivotal role in Syria’s reconstruction.
Initially, to manage tensions, Israeli and Turkish officials established ‘technical talks’ in early 2025 aiming at deconflicting parallel military activities in Syria. The coordination has been limited but telling: it underscores that despite deepening distrust, neither Turkey nor Israel seeks a direct armed confrontation in Syria. Nevertheless, their dialogue masks a broader deterioration. Israeli defense officials privately bristle at Turkey’s assertive moves, accusing Ankara of trying to turn post-war Syria into ‘a Turkish protectorate’ under Islamist tutelage. Turkish authorities condemn Israel’s unrestrained air campaigns as ‘unacceptable provocations' undermining Syria’s sovereignty and unity. Each perceives the other as overstepping: Israel believes Turkey is carving out undue dominance in Arab lands, while Turkey views Israel’s incursions as destabilizing meddling in Syria’s fragile transition. These accusations underline the fraying threads of cooperation, now strained by mutual suspicion.
It should be noted that the deterioration of diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey was brought to the fore in the wake of the 2023 Gaza war. Erdoğan’s fierce condemnation of Israel’s actions in Gaza as ‘war crimes’ resulted in Turkey recalling its ambassador, effectively freezing high-level dialogue. These developments underscore deepening ideological divides. Ankara’s backing for Sunni Islamist groups, particularly Syria’s HTS-led government, intensifies Israeli security concerns. Tel Aviv fears these factions, previously linked to al-Qaeda, may establish a militant haven on its border, threatening Israeli security interests. Conversely, Erdoğan’s support for Palestinian and broader Islamic causes positions Turkey in direct opposition to Israel’s regional security-driven agenda.
This ideological and diplomatic rift is further deepened by their starkly conflicting visions for Syria’s future governance. Turkey favors a centralized Syrian government closely aligned with Ankara, explicitly rejecting any form of decentralization that could empower Kurdish autonomy. Erdoğan’s government has actively integrated Kurdish-held regions and militias into a centralized Syrian state structure, intending to eliminate potential Kurdish threats along its border.
Israel, conversely, seeks a decentralized, weak, and fragmented Syria, lobbying against the resurgence of a robust central authority. Tel Aviv views Turkey’s dominance in Damascus as equally alarming as Iran’s previous influence, even advocating for continued Russian military presence as a strategic counterbalance. The Kurdish issue encapsulates these competing visions: Turkey demands full dismantling of Kurdish militias, while Israel prefers retaining some Kurdish autonomy as a strategic buffer against Sunni extremists and Iranian remnants. These divergent positions reflect profound strategic mistrust and signal a widening schism over Syria’s post-war order.
This growing discord between Israel and Turkey reshapes regional dynamics significantly. Iran, though weakened by Assad’s fall, observes these developments with strategic interest. Reports suggest Turkey might tacitly allow Iran-backed groups like Hezbollah to regroup in Syria, reflecting potential pragmatic alignments between Tehran and Ankara against Israel. Russia, despite diminished influence after Assad’s ouster, skillfully positions itself as mediator, exploiting Israeli-Turkish tensions. Arab states, wary of Turkey’s Islamist-backed regime in Damascus, cautiously re-engage Syria, hoping to moderate Islamist influences and counterbalance Turkish dominance through economic aid and diplomatic outreach. Thus, the emerging Turkey–Israel rift deepens regional polarization, reshuffling alignments along ideological and strategic fault lines.
Ultimately, the demise of the Israel-Turkey alignment has profound implications. What was once a marriage of convenience against Assad and Iran is dissolving into strategic rivalry over the spoils and direction of post-Assad Syria. The stakes are high: a cooperative Israel–Turkey approach might have stabilized Syria and contained common threats, but that prospect appears increasingly out of reach. Instead, the coming rift promises a more polarized Middle East, where Syria’s fate becomes a tug-of-war, risking new conflicts in a region already yearning for peace and reconstruction. Both Ankara and Tel Aviv will now have to navigate this complex divergence carefully, lest their collision course in Syria ignite unintended consequences neither can control. The demise of their brief alignment serves as a cautionary tale: even convergent interests can be fleeting when long-term visions diverge so dramatically. Their alliance on Syria may have been de facto; its collapse, however, will be de jure in effect, reshaping alignments and rivalries across the Middle East for years to come.
Mohsen Solhdoost, Assistant Professor in International Relations, Department of International Studies, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU).
Photo by iam hogir
