Gen Z Movements: A Cure against Rising Autocratization?
Jasmin Lorch argues that while Gen Z movements can be successful in ousting autocratic and corrupt governments, the establishment of strong democratic state institutions also rests on several additional factors.
Over the past years, Gen Z protests have left their imprints on many countries in the Global South. Despite the diversity of contexts in which they have occurred, these movements have often been remarkably similar in their demands for enhanced economic and political inclusion and their rejection of corruption and entrenched elite structures. Many Gen Z movements have occurred in autocratic or autocratizing contexts, defying surveillance and state repression. Consequently, it is worth asking to what extent they are capable of driving democracy and acting as a cure against the global trend of rising autocratization.
While Gen Z movements have been repressed or contained, at least temporarily, in countries such as Morocco and Uganda, protests initiated by youth brought down autocratic regimes in Bangladesh (2024) and Madagascar (2025) and ousted governments viewed as dynastic and corrupt in Sri Lanka (2022) and Nepal (2024). In Myanmar, Gen Z protests and armed resistance groups have prevented the military (Tatmadaw) from establishing full-fledged political and territorial control after the 2021 coup. The ability of Gen Z movements to contribute to the establishment of strong democratic state institutions, however, often seems to be more circumscribed, owing to both entrenched existing power structures and their own organizational characteristics.
In Bangladesh, broad-based popular protests initiated by students toppled the autocratic Awami League (AL) regime in August 2024, despite brutal crackdowns by the security forces that killed up to 1,400 people. The army ultimately refused to shoot protesters in large numbers and negotiated with various stakeholders, leading to the establishment of an interim government headed by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus. Student leaders were represented in the interim administration that governed the country for one-and-a-half years. Moreover, some sections of the student movement formed the National Citizen Party (NCP). However, the army played an important role in internal security and further extended its already substantial influence behind the political scenes during the interim period. The elections of 12 February 2026 were swept by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the AL’s traditional rival that disposes of vast patron-client networks, while the NCP bagged only six out of 299 seats and only around three percent of the popular vote.
In Nepal, Gen Z protests against nepotism, corruption, and a government-imposed social media ban forced Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli to resign. The army re-established law and order after several protestors had been killed in brutal security crackdowns and severe incidents of mob violence had occurred. Following Oli’s fall, the military also acted as an arbitrator, holding talks with protestors and other stakeholders and initiating the formation of an interim government. As elections, scheduled for 5 March 2026, near, the government has deployed the army to ensure election security. While the Nepalese military has historically mostly refrained from directly involving in politics, it has been criticized for not always recognizing civilian supremacy. Moreover, it has been accused of human rights violations during the civil war and has a legacy of economic involvement and exerting influence at historical junctures, as well as behind the scenes.
In Madagascar too, the military’s refusal to fire on the protestors was crucial in allowing the Gen Z protests to topple President Andry Rajoelina. Following Rajoelina’s departure, however, the military stepped into the political vacuum, assuming power in a coup. While the military-led interim government has promised to hand back power to civilians after a transition period, Madagascar’s political future remains uncertain. To sum up, in both Bangladesh and Madagascar, the military has thus significantly enhanced its political influence during the transition period, and, to a lesser extent, the same appears to be true for Nepal too.
In Myanmar, where the military was itself the primary autocratizer – and the prime adversary of the country’s Gen Z movement – from the beginning, civil war has escalated in the past years. The Tatmadaw’s coup against the elected government of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in February 2021 spurred a largescale, non-violent Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), initiated predominantly by Gen Z activists. When the military brutally cracked down on the CDM, parts of it went underground. People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), staffed predominantly by young people, have since joined forces with some of the country’s Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs). The armed resistance has prevented the military from establishing full territorial control but remains far from controlling the country itself, owing to both the military’s superior airpower and the fragmentation of the resistance.
These examples show that wider power structures play a key role in determining what happens after Gen Z mobilizations – even where they are successful in ousting autocratic or corrupt governments or preventing them from establishing full control. Accordingly, while Gen Z and other mass movements can be impactful in countering autocratization, expecting them to directly bring about strong democratic state institutions seems unrealistic. This is not only because building strong institutions rests on several additional factors too, including the existence of a certain elite consensus and strategic alliances between civil society and political actors, but also because of the structural characteristics of Gen Z movements. Specifically, these movements are often viewed as “leaderless”. While this depiction might be too simplistic, their amorphous, fluid and decentralized structures have often allowed Gen Z movements to build vast and diverse followings and survive state repression. However, these same organizational features can also prevent Gen Z movements from aggregating interests and exerting sustained political influence. Similarly, their heterogeneous character can make it difficult for Gen Z movements to formulate clear and coherent agendas and roadmaps for political reform. Where no other organized democratic actors, such as democratic political parties, exist, this may leave a void that traditional and autocratic actors, including the military, can fill after previous corrupt or autocratic governments are gone. Where autocratic forces are uncompromising and brutal, such as the Myanmar military, some sections of formerly non-violent Gen-Z movements may also opt for more radical means.
Nevertheless, Gen-Z movements can also contribute to long-term democratic change. A recent study on Sri Lanka, where the Aragalaya movement in 2022 ousted the political dynasty of the Rajapaksas, argues that while the movement “did not have the leadership or organizational wherewithal needed to influence the process by which new leadership was chosen“, it still “demonstrated the potential power of collective action”, a finding that holds for other contexts too.
Dr. Jasmin Lorch, Senior Researcher, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), Research Department "Transformation of political (dis-)order: Institutions, values & peace".
Photo by Bako Harry R
