The U.S. and Hispanic America: Power Asymmetry and Predation
Alfredo Toro Hardy explores the divergent paths of the two Americas.
"Trump is rapaciously exploiting the gigantic power asymmetries that exist within its hemisphere. Venezuela, a country that attained its independence more than two centuries ago - at the hands of Simón Bolívar nonetheless - has now become an American Protectorate. But how did these asymmetries come into being?"
According to Edward Wong, Trump represents a “resurrection of mission empire” and a “celebration of Western imperial histories” (Wong, 2026). His so-called Donroe Doctrine aims at forcefully controlling the Western Hemisphere. Within it, Brazil and Canada are in a stronger position to protect themselves than Hispanic America, which has historically been the weakest link.
Their countries were indeed the natural victims to the U.S.’ predation of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Now again, as shown by the Protectorate imposed by Washington over Venezuela, they represent the most obvious prey to Trump’s rapacious instincts. Understanding the reason behind this power asymmetry becomes more relevant than ever.
With a few decades of difference, the United States and Hispanic America obtained their independence from European powers during the so-called Age of Revolutions. Curiously enough, upon emerging to sovereign life each lacked what the other had in abundance.
Centralization and homogeneity
Centralization proved to be the defining characteristic of colonial Latin America, being more acute and long-lasting in Hispanic America than in Brazil. The overwhelming weight of rules and regulations defined the relationship between the Spanish Crown and its possessions across the Atlantic. By 1635, 400,000 decrees had been issued by the metropolis concerning these colonies. This amounted to an average of 2,500 per year since the moment in which Columbus had first set foot in the Americas (Veliz, 2016, p. 43).
Even the smallest decisions regarding the governance of the Spanish American colonies had to be referred to the metropolis. Ecclesiastical matters where no exception: No priest could cross the Atlantic without royal authorization (Veliz, 2016, p. 40). Only at the lowest level, represented by the colonial town councils, could the Spaniards born in the Americas have direct participation in their own affairs.
This centralizing obsession homogenized Spain’s possessions in the Americas. During colonial times, a gentleman from Mexico City visiting Lima, 2,600 miles to the south, would have felt completely at home. Indeed, not only were the civic institutions, the urban regulations or the social stratification the same, but so were the forms of worship. The Spanish drive for uniformity, which extended to the smallest detail, transformed its gigantic American empire into a sort of homogeneous community (Elliot, 2006, p. 177).
Mosaic of communities
The contrast with the English colonies of North America could not have been greater. There, extensive political and religious autonomy prevailed. The colonial assemblies, working in conjunction with a British governor whose salary they paid, had broad authority over public affairs and religious matters. Actually, the colonies competed among themselves in offering freedom of worship. Political, societal and administrative institutions in British America, far from being imposed from above, evolved from below (Elliot, 2006, p. 134).
During the hundred years that preceded the Seven Year’s War of 1755-1763, London granted colonist considerable political freedom. This, in exchange for their acceptance of the metropolis’ “light” control. As John Lewis Gaddis explained: “The violence [in England] multiplied reasons for emigration, as did the promise, upon arrival in America, of commercial opportunities, the toleration of multiple faiths, and the prospect of lighter-handed rule. Heavy-handed domestic distractions left little choice from London’s perspective but to allow a colonial ‘mosaic of communities’. By the time Charles II made lightness his path to ‘restoration’ in 1660, heterogeneity had established itself across the Atlantic” (Lewis Gaddis, 2018, p. 156).
This “lighter-handed rule”, that tolerated a high degree of self-government and religious freedom in the American colonies, got almost derailed. Indeed, if the so-called Glorious Revolution had not deposed James II (successor of Carles II), everything could have changed dramatically. James’ objective was to return Great Britain to the Catholic faith and to administer the country and its colonies according to the French centralist model of his uncle Louis XIV.
The early thwarting of James II’s ambitions ensured that the “mosaic of communities” in North America, continued undisturbed. Each colony had its own assemblies, its own laws, its own religious creed, and its own vision about the society they wanted to become. So much so that, if several decades later, a young John Adams - from Massachusetts - had visited the planters and slaveowners of Virginia or South Carolina, he would have experienced a cultural shock as profound as if he had been in another continent (Lewis Gaddis, 2018, p. 154). What a contrast with the Mexico City’s gentlemen visiting Lima!!
So successful was this mosaic of communities that, according to British historian Robert Harvey: “The thirteen colonies, far from behaving as subordinate to British rule, considered themselves on an equal footing with their mother country. They had their own parliaments and political systems. They elected their own officials. They were English-speaking freemen – much freer, indeed, than many of their peers in Britain” (Harvey, 2001, p. 43).
The Seven Years’ War
The colonists’ problems began when Great Britain won the Seven Years’ War against France. On the one hand, London faced a massive debt resulting from the conflict. On the other hand, it had acquired a vast empire in the Americas (all the former French possessions in Canada), which made the thirteen colonies far less relevant.
As a result, Britain not only pressured these colonies to finance part of the war debt but also sought to exert a more centralized control over them. The latter, not only because an expanded colonial sphere demanded greater political uniformity, but because without the French threat Britain was no longer in need of the military support provided by the colonies.
In John Lewis Gaddis’ words:
“The Peace of Paris of 1763 [that put an end to the Seven Years’ War] looked like an Anglo-American triumph, but in fact it drove the victors apart…Shouldn’t the Americans, by some calculations the least taxed of all people, pay more for the security they’d gained?…What good was it even to have an empire if you weren’t even running it? For Americans used to a light touch, however, such questions suggested a heavy hand, that once applied, might not be withdrawn” (Lewis Gaddis, 2018, p. 159).
A spiral of actions and reactions began to take shape as a result, with London increasing its control and the thirteen colonies increasing their defiance. In the same manner in which Britain felt that the elimination of the French threat put them more under its control, the colonists felt less needy of British protection. War, under these conditions, became inevitable. (Harvey, 2001, pp. 43,44).
Two experiences, two outcomes
Following a war from which the rebel colonists emerged victorious, the United States was birthed. Having long managed their own parliaments and societies, and made their own political decisions, the inhabitants of this new country were more than ready for their sovereign status.
Once again, the contrast with their Spanish-speaking neighbours to the south could not have been greater. When they achieved independence from Madrid a few decades later, they found themselves utterly unprepared for the challenges ahead. Having being infantilized for three hundred years, they felt overwhelmed by their change of status. Especially so as they lacked the institutional tools to manage it.
However, if self-governance was not a problem for the emerging United States, heterogeneity was. Forging a single nation out of this mosaic of communities was not easy. On the other hand, while the new Hispanic American states entirely lacked experience in self-government, they enjoyed of significant levels of uniformity. This would have allowed them, as Hispanic American liberator Simon Bolívar insisted, to find destiny in unity. Meaning, to overcome their weaknesses and common challenges by merging together through an array of institutional formulas and systems of alliance.
The region´s political infancy, however, proved to be an unavoidable obstacle in achieving this goal. Their lack of political maturity weighed more than their existing homogeneity. As a result, the proliferation of parochial visions and ambition carried the day, with the emergence of a plurality of states that had to find their own paths alone. Weakness would become their common denominator, thus leaving them easy prey for predators.
Thanks to their political maturity, in contrast, the inhabitants of the United States managed to achieve unity despite substantial diversity. Political maturity weighted more than their prevailing heterogeneity. However, their inability to resolve the problem of slavery left two opposing visions of society as a legacy for subsequent generations. Moreover, as a result of the Founding Father’s inability to strike a compromise, the boundaries between the authority of the states and that of the Union were kept deliberately vague. These intertwinings of heterogeneity led to a bloody civil war in the second half of the 19th century. One that almost broke the country.
Fact is, however, that the mosaic of Anglo-Saxon communities was able to merge into a strong unitary structure, while the homogenous community of Hispanic Americans gave rise to eighteen weak countries. Old and new U.S.’ predators have taken advantage of the resulting power asymmetry.
Alfredo Toro Hardy, PhD, is a retired Venezuelan career diplomat, scholar and author. Former Ambassador to the U.S., U.K., Spain, Brazil, Ireland, Chile and Singapore. Author or co-author of thirty-six books on international affairs (his latest individual book was published in 2022 by Springer). Former Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at Princeton and Brasilia universities. He is currently an Honorary Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and a member of the Review Panel of the Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center.
Photo by 대정 김
References
Elliot, J.H. (2006). Empires of the Atlantic. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Harvey, Robert (2001). A Few Bloody Noses. London: John Murray.
Lewis Gaddis, John (2018). On Grand Strategy. New York: Penguin Books.
Veliz, Claudio (2016). The Centralist Tradition of Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wong, Edward (2026). “Trump’s Foreign Policy: Resurrecting Empire”, The New York Times, February 27.
