Prabowo’s Climate Test at the UN: Can Indonesia Lead Where America Falters?

Bhima Yudhistira Adhinegara and Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat on why Indonesia’s President must resist the temptation to treat climate policy as a diplomatic talking point divorced from domestic struggle.
When President Prabowo Subianto took the podium at the United Nations General Assembly last week, he did more than outline Indonesia’s foreign policy. He staked a claim for Indonesia as a climate leader at a moment when the United States, long seen as indispensable to global climate action, is retreating under the weight of denial and political paralysis. The symbolism was unmistakable: in New York, a country long derided for its dependence on coal and palm oil announced it was ready to chart a new path.
Prabowo used the UN stage to strengthen Indonesia’s climate diplomacy, placing the world’s fourth most populous country at the center of a crucial conversation. For years, Jakarta’s approach was cautious, hedging between fossil fuel realities and green aspirations. But in an era where Washington is often missing in action, Indonesia’s voice matters more than ever. If the United States cannot commit to leading the energy transition, others must step in. And Prabowo is signaling that Indonesia can be that country.
The opportunity is real. Indonesia sits atop one of the richest reserves of renewable potential in the world: solar spread across its equatorial belt, hydropower in its river systems, and critical minerals like nickel that are essential for batteries. With a well-crafted green industrial policy, Indonesia could marry its domestic development agenda with the world’s decarbonization needs. That means not only building solar farms and hydropower dams but also developing a local component industry, expanding vocational schools to train the workforce of the future, and securing technology transfer deals that prevent Indonesia from being just a supplier of raw materials.
But ambition on paper is easy. Reality is harder. Prabowo has floated a bold target—100 percent renewable energy within ten years—that would, if realized, make Indonesia a global outlier in speed and scale. Yet his own technical ministries remain tied to a very different trajectory. The latest national electricity plan still envisions 6.3 gigawatts of new coal power and 10.3 gigawatts of gas plants by 2034. Those numbers are not compatible with a rapid transition. They reflect inertia in Indonesia’s energy bureaucracy, where State Electricity Company (PLN) and other agencies remain wedded to fossil projects that will lock in emissions for decades.
This contradiction threatens to undermine Indonesia’s credibility. A sweeping vision at the UN is not enough. The real test is whether daily policy decisions—over the next 12 months, not just the next 12 years—align with Prabowo’s words. Will PLN and Danantara, the state-backed green investment arm, actually prioritize low-carbon projects? Will coal retirements be accelerated rather than delayed? Will land be cleared for solar installations instead of new fossil plants? Without measurable progress soon, Prabowo’s pledge risks being dismissed as diplomatic theater.
Green industrial policy offers a way to translate ambition into action. It does not need to start with trillion-dollar schemes. A concrete example already exists: Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, Indonesia’s finance minister, has proposed channeling 200 trillion rupiah into renewable lending at interest rates as low as 2 percent annually. That kind of concessional financing, targeted at solar installations in villages, would not only cut emissions but also expand electrification across rural Indonesia. It would create demand for domestic solar panel manufacturing and provide real, tangible benefits to households who still face unreliable power.
The ripple effects could be profound. A subsidy for renewables today becomes the foundation for an industrial ecosystem tomorrow. Local firms learn to assemble, install, and maintain panels. Vocational schools begin producing electricians and engineers trained for the green economy. Technology transfer arrangements, if structured well, prevent Indonesia from importing everything and instead build capacity at home. This is how Germany created its wind industry, how China scaled solar—and how Indonesia can avoid being left behind.
At the same time, Prabowo must resist the temptation to treat climate policy as a diplomatic talking point divorced from domestic struggle. Indonesia’s credibility abroad depends on what it does at home. International partners, whether in the G7 or multilateral banks, are ready to fund ambitious green projects—but only if Jakarta proves it can deliver. The world will not underwrite coal expansions while listening to renewable promises.
The stakes are high. With America drifting and China consumed by its own domestic concerns, the developing world is searching for a voice to articulate what a fair and feasible energy transition looks like. Indonesia, a Muslim-majority democracy straddling the Indo-Pacific, has the weight and legitimacy to lead. But leadership is not proclaimed at the UN—it is built in the villages where panels are installed, in the factories where components are made, and in the ministries where budgets are written.
Prabowo has opened the door. The question now is whether he will walk through it. Indonesia does not lack potential. It lacks policy coherence, bureaucratic discipline, and the political will to move from speechmaking to implementation. If Prabowo can bridge that gap—if he can force his energy ministers, state utility executives, and financiers to align with his climate ambition—then his words in New York will be remembered as a turning point.
If he cannot, they will be forgotten as just another performance at the United Nations.
Bhima Yudhistira Adhinegara is the Executive Director of the Center of Economic and Law Studies (CELIOS). Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the Director of the China–Indonesia and MENA–Indonesia Desks at CELIOS.
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