ASEAN’s Push to Finalize the South China Sea Code of Conduct places Indonesia in a Pivotal Role
Yeta Purnama and Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat argue that ASEAN remains Indonesia’s primary strategic platform for shaping regional norms and managing collective security challenges.
ASEAN’s renewed effort to finalize the South China Sea Code of Conduct places Indonesia at the center of a defining regional test. It also highlights the need for Jakarta to recalibrate its approach toward ASEAN at a moment when regional cohesion matters most.
At the 2026 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat in Cebu from January 28 to 30, ASEAN leaders reaffirmed their ambition to conclude the South China Sea Code of Conduct, or CoC. The statement came amid rising tensions at sea and growing concern about ASEAN’s ability to manage disputes. The CoC is intended to set agreed rules of behavior, reduce miscalculation, and prevent escalation in contested waters involving ASEAN member states and China.
The South China Sea sits at the crossroads of security and commerce. Several countries assert overlapping maritime claims. At the same time, the area functions as one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors. Around one third of global maritime trade passes through these waters, including the Malacca Strait, which links East Asia with markets in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. Instability in this space would have direct consequences for global supply chains, energy flows, and economic growth.
ASEAN and China agreed in 2002 to work toward a code of conduct. The expectation was that shared rules would promote predictability and restraint. More than two decades later, negotiations remain unfinished. The prolonged process reflects the limits of ASEAN’s consensus based diplomacy. While consensus protects unity, it also slows decision making when national interests diverge.
During this extended period, incidents at sea have continued. Fishing vessels encounter enforcement pressure. Coast guards operate aggressively. Naval forces maneuver in close proximity. Each incident raises the risk of escalation. The absence of binding and enforceable rules leaves crisis management dependent on political goodwill rather than clear procedures.
Internal divisions within ASEAN remain a major obstacle. Member states hold different threat perceptions and economic priorities. China is a central economic partner for many ASEAN countries, providing trade, investment, and infrastructure financing. These ties shape national positions and weaken ASEAN’s collective leverage during negotiations.
China’s maritime claims further complicate the picture. The so-called nine dash line overlaps with maritime zones claimed by several ASEAN states under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. UNCLOS sets the international legal framework for maritime entitlements. The lack of alignment between these claims sustains legal uncertainty and recurring friction.
China has repeatedly emphasized its support for dialogue and regional stability. Yet incidents continue to occur. This gap between diplomatic assurances and behavior at sea shows that dialogue alone is insufficient. It also exposes ASEAN’s own constraints. Without unity and resolve, external commitments carry limited weight.
Indonesia’s position in this context is often described as distinctive, but it is not detached from the dispute. Indonesia is not a formal claimant to the Spratly or Paracel Islands. However, it does have an ongoing maritime dispute with China in the North Natuna Sea, where China’s nine dash line overlaps with Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. This reality gives Indonesia both credibility and direct stake. Jakarta understands the costs of ambiguity and escalation firsthand.
Indonesia has consistently upheld UNCLOS as the legal basis for resolving maritime disputes. This legal stance anchors Indonesia’s diplomacy and strengthens its normative role. Rather than acting as a distant facilitator, Indonesia can draw on its own experience in the Natuna Sea to push for clearer rules, restraint, and respect for international law within the CoC framework.
This potential leadership role contrasts with recent political signals from Jakarta. Under President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s engagement with ASEAN has appeared muted. Public diplomacy has focused more on bilateral relations, defense modernization, and domestic priorities. ASEAN has featured less prominently in Indonesia’s foreign policy narrative.
This posture carries risks. ASEAN remains Indonesia’s primary strategic platform for shaping regional norms and managing collective security challenges. A perception of indifference weakens Indonesia’s influence at a time when leadership is needed. It also limits Jakarta’s ability to shape the final content and implementation of the CoC.
Prabowo’s approach should change. Indonesia cannot afford a passive stance toward ASEAN when maritime norms are under strain. Active leadership does not require confrontation. It requires presence, initiative, and sustained engagement. Indonesia’s experience in the North Natuna Sea gives it both motivation and authority to lead.
Economic strategy also shapes diplomatic outcomes. ASEAN’s reliance on a narrow set of partners constrains political flexibility. Indonesia should encourage broader economic engagement across ASEAN with partners from the Middle East, Africa, the European Union, and Latin America. Greater diversification would reduce vulnerability and support stronger collective decision making.
The CoC is more than a procedural document. It is a test of ASEAN’s ability to act as a cohesive political community. Finalizing it would demonstrate relevance and resilience. Failure would deepen doubts about ASEAN’s capacity to manage security challenges in its own region.
For Indonesia, the stakes are clear. Effective leadership would reinforce its credibility as a regional norm setter. Continued distance would risk portraying caution as complacency. Without an effective CoC, tensions in the North Natuna Sea will persist. The costs of delay are strategic and immediate.
Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat is the Director of the China–Indonesia and MENA–Indonesia Desks at CELIOS.
Photo by Da Na:
