Designed to fail: EU Foreign Policy vis-à-vis Israel’s encroachment on the Occupied Palestinian Territories
This is a chapter for a forthcoming e-book by the Global Governance Research Group of the UNA Europa network, entitled ‘The European Union in an Illiberal World’. Bruno Jäntti discusses EU policy towards Palestine, before the 7th October 2023 Hamas attack. He notes that while the EEC/EU’s official position has been to support a two-state solution, in practice, its interactions with Israel have failed to sustain Israeli democracy and so peace.
In 1980, the European Economic Community (EEC) issued the historic Venice Declaration articulating its key positions on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). The declaration put forth two salient positions: i) the recognition of the need to enforce Palestinian self-determination, and ii) the non-recognition of the Israeli settlement enterprise in the OPT (EEC 1980). In 1993, the two positions were passed on to the EU, which has officially upheld them ever since. The two positions form the core of the official EU approach to Israel-Palestine, which also includes the more specific goal of realising Palestinian self-determination via an independent and sovereign Palestinian state and facilitating in bringing about a lasting peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.
As Israel's leading trading partner and the most significant contributor of aid to the OPT, the EU has been an involved outside actor that has yielded substantial leverage on Israel and the OPT since the Maastricht Treaty. While it is evident that EU foreign policy toward Israel-Palestine has yet to amount to a successful conflict resolution approach, this contribution touches on two questions with less obvious answers. First, does EU foreign policy toward Israel have conflict resolution potential in light of findings on the relationship between the degree of democracy within a state entity and the probability of armed conflict? Second, have the policy measures implemented by the EEC and the EU after the Venice Declaration contained the potential to achieve the two critical EU objectives concerning Israel-Palestine?
The time period under scrutiny in this article exludes questions related to the current EU foreign policy, such as EU stance to Israel's criminal conduct in the OPT post-October 7, 2023, as well as the internal divisions among EU member states regarding their perspectives on Israel-Palestine. Instead, this work addresses the inherent contradictions and shortcomings in the EU's external engagement concerning Israel-Palestine over a timeline of nearly four decades, from 1980 to the early 2020s.
Prone to armed conflict: regimes that blend democracy and autocracy
The first result of a Google search in 2024 for ‘EU and Israel’ is the official website of the European External Action Service (EEAS). Under the heading ‘The European Union and Israel’ and before the main body of the text (including links to EU-Israel agreements), the highlighted lead in an aesthetically appealing blue EU layout states the following:
The European Union and Israel share a long common history, marked by growing interdependence and cooperation. Both share the same values of democracy, respect for freedom and rule of law and are committed to an open international economic system based on market principles. Over five decades of trade, cultural exchanges, political cooperation and a developed system of agreements have cemented these relations. (EEAS 2021)
While the EU and Israel do indeed share ‘a long common history’, the fact that Israel enforces a military dictatorship in the West Bank (HRW 2019) and restricts civil and political rights of its citizens of Paletinian background (Shafir 2018) falsifies the notion that Israel and the EU ‘share the same values of democracy, respect for freedom and rule of law’. The characterisation of Israel as a functioning democracy is not merely an innocuous or trivial misrepresentation; it raises concerns regarding the long-term conflict resolution potential of the EU approach for regimes that amalgamate democratic and authoritarian institutions (such as Israel), and which exhibit a heightened risk of armed conflict.
The political and legal institutions in fully authoritarian states, by design, disallow independent democratic organisation and participation, making many such systems somewhat protected from internal armed conflict. Most immune to armed hostilities, including civil wars or armed coups d'état, are societies with deeply entrenched democratic mechanisms and a high human rights and rule of law performance. That armed conflict is a rarity in stable democracies can be attributed to the political, legal, and social institutions present in these societies, which facilitate a platform for the peaceful expression and discussion of dissent, dissatisfaction, and differing viewpoints.
In contrast, the form of government particularly susceptible to armed instability is anocracy, a hybrid of authoritarian and democratic institutions, specifically partial democracy with factionalism (Goldstone et al., 2010). The politico-legal system enforced by Israel in Israel-OPT constitutes a partial democracy with factionalism (Khokhlov and Korotayev, 2022: 406).
The original model by Goldstone et al. went beyond theoretical exploration of the relationship between various types of regime institutions and societal instability, explicitly identifying common characteristics behind the onset of conflict and the striving for predictive power. The model has been reassessed and retested more recently. Bowlsby et al. (2020) argue that the accuracy of the predictions of the model is not fixed but reached its high point in the out-of-sample validation period (1995-2004), yet became less accurate in the subsequent time frame of 2004-2014. Bowlsby D. et al. (2020) argue that the drivers of political upheaval and armed conflict are intrinsically time-variant.
The Goldstone et al. model prompted researchers to investigate further into predictors of armed conflict. By disaggregating regime variables based on new data, Krishnarajan et al. (2016) found that specific democratic institutions, such as freedom of speech and assembly, fit the inverted U-curve model: i.e. the low probability of conflict onset at both ends of the autocracy-democracy continuum and a higher risk in the middle. By contrast, free and fair elections do not fit the model.
Research by Skarstad and Strand (2016) yielded somewhat different findings, i.e. that the likelihood of civil war is higher when the political system breaches physical integrity rights and subsistence rights, whereas the violation of civil and political rights has little impact (Skarstad and Strand, 2016). Piccone (2017) emphasises that prioritising the reinforcement of democratic institutions and human rights, as well as the inclusion of marginalised groups and actors in the political process, both minimise the likelihood of armed conflict within a country. Prior to the Goldstone et al. model, Rost et al. (2009) contended that the likelihood of civil war is higher in states with weak governance, political instability, economic fragility, dependence on oil exports, repression of human rights, and military-run leadership.
A democratic form of government tends to contribute to resolving both intrastate and interstate armed conflict (Kinsella and Rousseau, 2009). Perhaps more importantly, while outlining the framework in which conflicts can be resolved, the nexus between human rights and peace plays a critical role in facilitating societies to gradually emerge from armed instability towards steady peace and in fostering a new societal infrastructure that henceforth protects them from renewed hostilities (Juma, 2008).
For this contribution, the pertinent finding in conflict onset research revolves not around the methodological differences or subtle distinctions in findings, but the following broad agreement: fully democratic societies with strong human rights records contain the lowest likelihood of large-scale domestic armed conflict. In contrast, hybrid regimes with systemic rights violations feature a high probability of internal armed instability. Hence, EU insistence that Israel qualifies as a functioning democracy suggests a reluctance to formally acknowledge the scope of institutional reforms necessary for the country to achieve genuine democratisation—democracy ultimately being the safest form of government.
EU conflict resolution potential at an impasse
In addressing specifically self-determination conflicts, such as Israel-OPT, the positive impact of democracy and human rights has been extrapolated to the entire body of international law. In a publication on the prevention and resolution of conflicts revolving around self-determination issues, academics, mediators, diplomats, and experts issued guidelines that ‘reaffirm the importance of respect for international law in addressing self-determination conflicts as a foundation for long-term peace, stability, and security’ (Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, 2021).
Diplomatic debates revolving around self-determination conflicts may feature the argument, put forth by a party opposing the self-determination of another, that the latter lacks a national self (Neuberger 2010). If the party is not a people with distinct national awareness or cultural, lingual, and other characteristics, this argument contends, then the party is not and cannot be entitled to self-determination.
Sometimes the terminology employed is designed to deny the very existence of a national self having the right to self-determination. The designation of the Kurds in Turkey as ‘Mountain Turks’ by the Turkish government or the description of the Abkhaz as Georgians are good examples. Another example has been the refusal of the Israeli Right to talk about Palestinians. They preferred to talk about ‘Arabs of the Land of Israel’ in order to deny the existence of a Palestinian people with a right to national self-determination. (Neuberger 2010, 83)
The first pivotal step in resolving self-determination conflicts is the recognition of the jus cogens character of self-determination as a fundamental tenet of international law. Such an approach emphasises that abiding by international law in solving self-determination conflicts is decisive for successful conflict resolution and long-term stability (Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, 2021). Israel, however, denies that Israel-OPT qualifies as a self-determination conflict. As per Israeli law, specifically the Nation-State Law of 2018, the Palestinians do not have the right to self-determination, not even in principle (The Knesset, 2018). The EU has been reluctant to acknowledge adequately that the Nation-State Law directly contradicts the EU position that underscores the need to enforce Palestinian self-determination.
The EU can increase the probability of success in its conflict resolution strategy in the Israel-OPT region by addressing Israel's status as a hybrid of democratic and authoritarian political and legal institutions. If the current politico-legal structures of the Israel-OPT’s sovereign – namely the Israeli government – remain in place, there is a low likelihood of moving beyond large-scale violence. Hence, the Union's foreign policy will continue to lack conflict resolution impact unless it implements distinct measures whose outcomes are expected to bolster a gradual entrenchment of democratisation and human rights mechanisms.
Key EU positions on Palestinian self-determination and Israeli settlements in the OPT
The EU position on Palestinian self-determination precedes the Maastricht Treaty. Vocal and unequivocal EU support for both the existence of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the need to realise this right has its roots in the historic 1980 Venice Declaration, which articulated the EEC’s intention to become a more influential actor in the Israel-Palestine conflict (Harpaz and Shamis, 2010: 584–85). The declaration states that a ‘just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees’, adding that the ‘Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination’ (EEC 1980, italics added).
The Cardiff European Council of 1998 urged Israel to acknowledge the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and noted that Israel should recognise this right ‘without excluding the option of a State’ for the Palestinians (Persson, 2015: 81). Compared to the 1980 Venice Declaration, in 1999, the EU issued a stronger statement that came to be known as the Berlin Declaration in support of a Palestinian state, which was based on the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The following excerpt deserves to be quoted in full:
The European Union reaffirms the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including the option of a state and looks forward to the early fulfillment of this right. It appeals to the parties to strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any veto. The European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel’s security and Israel’s acceptance as an equal partner in the region. The European Union declares its readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles referred to above. (European Council 1999, as cited in Persson, 2015: 81-2, italics added)
Since this formal EU announcement, which was built on the letter and spirit of the Venice Declaration, the EU has been emphatic and consistent for over two decades on the paramount importance of recognising and enforcing Palestinian self-determination. Speaking in the 61st UNGA session in 2006, the Ambassador in the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations stated: ‘I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. […] The European Union would like to restate its firm commitment to enabling the Palestinian people to fulfil their unconditional right to self-determination, including the possibility of establishing a sovereign state’ (Huimasalo 2006, italics added).2
The European Parliament issued a similar resolution in 2011. The resolution reaffirms EU support for ‘State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine living side by side in peace and security’ and underlines that the EU will not recognise changes to the pre-1967 borders, including changes to the status of Jerusalem, unless said changes are agreed by both parties (European Parliament 2011). The then-High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton reiterated the position one year later: ‘We have always upheld the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people and it is best done through their own state. We have worked with the Palestinian Authority to build up the institutions of a future democratic, independent and viable Palestinian State. We will continue to support the Palestinian people towards this aim’ (Ashton 2012, italics added). In 2014, the European Parliament reiterated that the Union envisions the ‘State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian State living side by side in peace and security on the basis of the right of self-determination and full respect of international law’ (European Parliament 2014).
The official position of the EU has been equally consistent and explicit on the illegality of the Israeli policy of transferring its civilian population to the OPT. In 1980, the EEC expressed that it viewed Israel's settlement project as a breach of international law and an obstacle to peace. The EEC stated: ‘The nine [all members of the European Economic Community, editor's note] stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East’ (EEC, 1980). The EEC added that all nine members ‘consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law’ (EEC, 1980).
EU foreign policy undermines official EU goals and positions
The EEC and the EU have yielded considerable influence over the political trajectory of Israel-OPT since the Venice Declaration. After the Maastricht Treaty, no other outside actor has been as deeply entrenched in both the Israeli and Palestinian societies and economies as the EU. Officially, the EU has upheld the tenets of international law by calling for the realisation of Palestinian self-determination and maintaining a stance of nonrecognition of Israeli settlements in the OPT. Notwithstanding the Union's official commitments, however, examining EU policies reveals that the EU directly undermines its foreign policy objectives.
Pertaining to the research questions posed in the beginning of the contribution, the EU's misrepresentation of the Israeli political system as a democracy that respects the rule of law diminishes its likelihood of effectively pursuing a conflict resolution approach. A comprehensive conflict resolution strategy would recognise and confront Israel's unstable hybrid regime profile and directly advocate for democratisation, the rule of law, and the realisation of Palestinian self-determination.
Besides the inadequacies of EU foreign policy as conflict resolution elaborated above, four policy choices stand out as being detrimental to a constistent EU foreign policy: the EU conducts conventional trade with Israeli settlements, exports military equipment to Israel, has opted to neglect the human rights clauses of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and has not imposed or threatened sanctions on Israel. Due to a failure to align the official EU objectives with EU conduct, the Union continues to pursue policies that work against the Union's official goals.
Achieving a foreign policy strategy with conflict resolution potential and compatibility between official goals and policies entails an abrogation of the established EU approach of expediting the Israeli occupation and territorial expansionism and tacitly acquiescing to the absence of Palestinian human rights while paying lip service to the two-state solution. Crucially, EU policy measures have not merely failed to advance but cannot advance the official EU goal of realizing Palestinian self-determination or the official EU stance of non-recognition of Israel's settlements in the OPT. The expected outcomes of the five long-standing EU measures identified in this contribution undermine rather than further the Union's official objectives.
Bruno Jäntti is a Doctoral Researcher in Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki and a two-time Fulbright grantee. In 2021, he received a master's degree in social sciences at the University of Chicago as a Fulbright grantee. From August 2024 until February 2025, he worked at the Department of Government at Harvard University as a Fulbright Fellow. Jäntti’s research probes the advancement of democracy and human rights in EU foreign policy.
Photo by Efe Ersoy
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