Recognition and Influence: Lessons from Honduras
Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos argues that Honduras’ diplomatic shift from Taiwan to China offers Europe a cautionary lesson: formal recognition does not automatically translate into durable influence when structural economic dependencies remain unchanged.
European debates about China’s expanding diplomatic footprint in the Global South often assume a simple equation: once diplomatic recognition is granted, political alignment follows. Since 2016, the steady reduction of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners has reinforced the idea that recognition produces durable influence at relatively low cost. This assumption increasingly shapes how European policymakers interpret China’s growing presence in Latin America. Recent developments in Central America, however, suggest that this logic risks overstating what diplomatic recognition actually delivers.
Honduras offers a particularly instructive case. When Tegucigalpa severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2023 and recognized the People’s Republic of China, the move was widely read in Europe as confirmation that Beijing’s recognition-first strategy was working as intended. What has unfolded since points to a more conditional reality. Recognition altered formal alignment, but it did not fundamentally change the structural constraints shaping Honduran policy.
The trade record illustrates why. According to data from the Central Bank of Honduras, imports from China increased sharply following recognition, rising from approximately US$2.0 billion in 2023 to US$2.63 billion in 2025, while Honduran exports to China rose only marginally, from US$12.9 million to US$44.7 million.
Rather than diversifying Honduras’ export base, these flows deepened trade asymmetry. For European observers accustomed to equating market access with influence, the Honduran case shows how trade expansion alone does not translate into political insulation if domestic sectors experience concentrated losses.
At the same time, the rupture with Taiwan produced immediate costs. According to Honduran export data reported by the Central Bank, exports to Taiwan fell to US$26.4 million through October 2025, a sharp decline for sectors that had relied on preferential access. Shrimp producers were among the hardest hit, turning what had been framed as a geopolitical realignment into a domestic political issue.
These losses ensured the China decision remained politically salient. During the presidential campaign, President Nasry Asfura publicly stated that he would seek to restore relations with Taiwan while maintaining commercial exchanges with China, a balancing act that has proven difficult elsewhere in Central America.
Recent remarks by Vice President María Antonieta Mejía further underscore the conditional nature of Honduras’ post-recognition alignment. Mejía stated publicly that Honduras would “gradually resume relations with Taiwan” following the rupture under the previous administration, while emphasizing that the government is reviewing the 16 agreements signed with China to assess their economic impact. She cautioned that if loans are embedded in those agreements, “it will be the Honduran people who must repay them through their taxes,” stressing that no decision should “further harm the country’s economy.”
Significantly, Mejía framed a potential re-engagement with Taiwan not as an ideological reversal but as a matter of economic prudence and campaign continuity, noting that restoring ties had been a promise of President Asfura. She also highlighted efforts to strengthen relations with the United States, Israel, and the European Union, reinforcing the impression that diplomatic positioning is being recalibrated within a broader Western-facing economic framework rather than through binary alignment.
A counterargument is that Honduras does not represent a structural limit to China’s diplomatic strategy, but rather a transitional adjustment. Recognition shifts rarely produce immediate economic transformation, and Beijing’s approach is typically long-term, combining infrastructure finance, market access negotiations, and political engagement that may take years to consolidate. From this perspective, short-term trade imbalances or political debate do not necessarily signal strategic failure.
Yet Honduras’ case suggests that recognition alone cannot override entrenched economic dependencies.
Externally, China’s diplomatic posture appeared stable. Beijing’s ambassador attended Asfura’s inauguration, and Chinese official messaging reaffirmed cooperation under the One China principle. Inside Honduras, however, expectations were more restrained. The new administration began reviewing agreements signed by its predecessor, many of which had been negotiated with limited transparency. No abrupt diplomatic shift was expected during the transition period.
The clearest insight into Honduran decision-making has come from how the Asfura administration has framed external vulnerability. According to President Asfura in a nationally televised interview on the program “Hoy Mismo,” foreign policy choices must prioritize Honduras’ relationship with the United States due to trade, migration, and employment exposure.
Asfura cited approximately 55,000 Hondurans living in the United States under Temporary Protected Status, many since Hurricane Mitch in 1998, and nearly two million Hondurans whose remittances account for roughly 26 percent of GDP. He also highlighted more than 200,000 manufacturing jobs linked directly to exports to the US market.
Trade policy reinforces this constraint. According to US tariff schedules and reporting on ongoing negotiations, Honduras currently faces a 10 percent tariff on several export categories and a 25 percent tariff affecting segments of its automotive supply chain.
Moreover, the presidential campaign itself demonstrated that recognition did not settle the issue domestically, as the restoration of ties with Taiwan became a central political promise.
These exposure points sit largely outside Beijing’s control. Recognition, in this context, functioned more as symbolic alignment than as a transfer of strategic autonomy.
For Europe, the Honduran case exposes a recurring blind spot. Diplomatic recognition can change formal alignments, but it does not override structural dependencies embedded in trade regimes, migration exposure, and financial flows. As the European Union expands initiatives such as Global Gateway and reassesses its China policy, Honduras serves as a cautionary example: influence remains conditional where economic survival is anchored elsewhere.
Recognition may change the flag outside an embassy, but it does not automatically mean a transfer of power. Honduras demonstrates that China’s diplomatic gains, while real, remain vulnerable where material dependence persists.
Juan Fernando Herrera Ramos is an international journalist and geopolitical analyst based in Taiwan, focusing on Asia–Latin America relations, great-power competition and the political economy of supply chains. His work has appeared in The Diplomat, Nikkei Asia, The Strategist (ASPI), Taipei Times, and Ketagalan Media.
Photo by Khoa Võ
