The European Union's Challenges in Human Rights Promotion in an Illiberal World

Hanna Tuominen examines the challenges the EU faces in its norm advocacy at the UN Human Rights Council. This text is part of a forthcoming e-book by the Global Governance Research Group of the UNA Europa network, entitled ‘The European Union in an Illiberal World’.

The European Union (EU) is committed to promoting the global human rights system as the cornerstone of its external policies. The EU also supports multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations (UN) and its bodies and representatives (EEAS 2024). However, this multilateral order and its norms are challenged by authoritarian, illiberal and populist opponents. The contention polarises the UN system as several illiberal states, often led by China and Russia, increasingly contest and reframe existing human rights norms. Consequently, the global rise of illiberalism undermines the legitimacy of human rights and erodes existing norms and institutions (Frick 2021). This complicates the EU’s human rights advocacy and influences its ambitions and instruments. 

This chapter addresses the challenges the EU faces in the Human Rights Council (HRC), the key UN body for the protection and promotion of human rights. The key outputs of the HRC include non-binding resolutions, government statements and reports. The resolutions develop norms and can call for investigations or create a mechanism. Importantly, the adopted resolutions represent the position of the HRC members (or the majority of them) on human rights issues or situations. States are responsible for implementing the resolutions, and hence, they are effective for pressuring states to act.  

Several illiberal states seek membership in the Council to keep their records out of the spotlight, undermine state-specific scrutiny and decelerate or even block the development of human rights or democracy-related norms. Instead, they frame human rights in authoritarian-friendly and competitive ways by using methods of persuasion, co-optation, coercion, deception and repression of critical voices. This diminishes the effectiveness of the Council and its ability to act in urgent human rights situations (Dukalskis 2023). Illiberal states also actively work to prevent the participation of civil society and individuals in the HRC proceedings. Hence, the HRC serves as an excellent case study in discussing the challenges the rise of illiberalism means for the EU’s norm advocacy. 

As the chapter demonstrates, normative contestation focuses on long-term thematic EU priorities, such as advancing gender equality, rights of sexual and gender minorities and defending human rights defenders.[1] These divisive topics appeared in the UN agenda in the mid-2000s. Moreover, the recent remarkable controversy between more liberal and conservative positions provides reason to focus especially on these themes.

There are also broader challenges related to the status and working methods of the EU. Other actors may not accept the EU’s position, human rights ambitions or agenda (Tuominen 2024). Indeed, in the eyes of others, the UN is mainly an arena for member states. Consequently, the demanding context shapes the contents and strategies of the EU. Secondly, illiberal and populist governments in the EU contest coherence, procedural norms and substantive positions, weakening the collective position and power of the Union in human rights (Monteleone et al. 2024). I conclude by discussing alternative, more effective EU measures and possibilities to promote human rights in an increasingly illiberal world.

Norm advocacy and resistance in the Human Rights Council

States use the Human Rights Council to advance their specific human rights agenda and priorities for several reasons. In the research literature, a difference is made between norm advocates and norm antipreneurs or spoilers (Bloomfield and Scott 2017; Sanders 2018). These reflect the attitudes and activities of states and other organisations towards the diffusion of human rights norms. The Western liberal democracies have historically been considered norm advocates and enforcers in the Council. However, several states from the Global South have used the Council to advance their own agendas and thematic resolutions. Hence, the advocates include actors beyond the Western world. The current backlash against human rights is not limited to repressive authoritarian governments. It is also a reality in many Western liberal states as populist governments contest and politicise human rights norms.

There is a longstanding cleavage in norm promotion and acceptance between political blocs. Global North or Western states emphasise the individuality of rights and see investigations and pressure for human rights violators as essential. For the Global South, solidarity rights and cooperative practices with states are more important (Voss 2020). Furthermore, there is a tension between universal and particularistic, relative interpretations of rights. States from Asia, Africa and the Middle East emphasise the cultural, religious and political contextualisation of rights and aim to limit universality. Authoritarian states, such as Russia and China, mobilise support for their views from the Global South by presenting anti-Western rhetoric and positions. However, in April 2022, Russia was suspended from the HRC and failed to rejoin the Council in 2023. 

Despite the clear and often foreseeable differences, there is no self-evident group position on specific human rights matters. Despite strong South-South solidarity, there is diversity in the Global South and regional groups, for example, in the African group.[2] Individual states have also demonstrated a willingness to break with the group positions (Sweeney 2023). Secondly, the HRC accepts most of its resolutions by consensus. Hence, the division between blocs should not be exaggerated. Only one-third of the HRC resolutions are accepted by vote, and many of them concern controversial country situations. Overall, states in the Global North and civil society promote state-specific scrutiny. By contrast, a group of like-minded states from the Global South, with Russia, oppose these measures. Many authoritarian, illiberal states want to protect state sovereignty and resist international scrutiny of their human rights situation. However, regional groups do not represent homogeneous positions. For example, many states from the Latin American GRULAC group consistently support state-specific investigations.

In this chapter, I focus on three thematic issues: gender equality, sexual orientation and human rights defenders. These have become the key points of contest in the Council between liberal and illiberal states. In the HRC, states build support for issues by making statements, organising side events and sponsoring resolutions. States seek to influence by acting through like-minded formal and informal groups, which increases polarisation and controversies in the Council (Smith 2017). The EU’s norm advocacy in gender equality and human rights defenders protection is contested predominantly by the initiatives of the regional African group, the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). 

Gender Equality

Gender equality is a basic EU value outlined in its treaties, and promoting it externally is one of the EU’s key objectives. Gender equality refers to interconnected norms, such as sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR), women’s full economic and social parity, and distinction between biological sex and socially constructed gender roles (Sanders ibid). These norms have been contested in the HRC by anti-gender actors; especially, conservative and religious states led by Russia promote a traditionalist agenda, which focuses on the advancement of traditional values and the protection of the patriarchal family. These efforts could be interpreted as a contextualist opposition to human rights universalism, but also as norm advocacy by illiberal states (Stoeckl and Medvedeva 2018). Their activism challenges the liberal interpretation of gender equality and puts the EU on the defensive. According to the EU’s interpretation, traditional values and practices can be used to legitimise harmful action against women and girls.

The HRC focuses on the rights of women and girls and gender equality during its June sessions. Discussing and promoting various women’s rights issues is a shared objective of a diverse group of states. However, current pushback over women’s and girls' rights influences the Council’s work, and the polarisation of many debates is the new normal. In particular, there is a division in discussions concerning sexual and reproductive health and rights. A broader network of well-funded and organised anti-gender actors, including conservative NGOs, has strategically aimed to undermine women’s reproductive rights in the UN. The topic has also challenged the EU’s normative community internally, as Poland and Hungary have resisted progressive EU positions (Badell 2024). Furthermore, the anti-gender and illiberal coalition has widened and strengthened, supported by the actions of the Trump administration. The partners in this coalition are united mainly, and often only, by their opposition to the ‘radical feminist agenda’.

In the case of gender equality, contestation and norm spoiling are pursued, for example, by manipulating word choices in the HRC documents. By excluding references to ‘comprehensive sexual education’ or ‘bodily integrity’, the spoilers manage to weaken hard-won progress in women’s rights. The illiberal actors also aim to spoil the norm by proposing hostile amendments to the resolution texts, and if unsuccessful, voting against the adoption. Secondly, states promote adverse norms and resolutions on traditional values and conservative family conceptions. This is done by forming coalitions and funding the network of conservative associations. In 2015, Belarus, Egypt and Qatar launched the Group of Friends of the Family (GoFF), which promotes discourse on the role of ‘traditional’ or ‘natural family’ at the UN. Hence, it advocates for conservative family and marriage conceptions as well as stereotypical gender roles. These alternative interpretations of rights may limit women’s rights and exclude and violate the rights of sexual and gender minorities.

Rights of sexual and gender minorities

The conservative, illiberal states are especially hostile towards the sexual orientation and gender identity agenda (SOGI). According to them, the West is trying to create new rights and impose them on others. The first UN resolution on sexual orientation was accepted in the HRC in 2011. Following South African advocacy, the Latin American states have acted as the main sponsors of the resolution. Non-Western states often sponsor the resolution due to claims of norm imposition (Jordaan 2016; Voss 2018). Most of the Western European and Other States Group  (WEOG) in the UN, and Eastern European EU member states support the main sponsors. The mandate of the Independent Expert on sexual orientation and gender identity was created in the HRC in 2016, with the support of only a small coalition of states. The mandate holder reports to the HRC and General Assembly, makes statements and carries out country visits (OHCHR). However, the resolution negotiations that founded the expert, and its later renewals (2019, 2022) have included several amendment proposals, and the final votes have divided HRC member states.

Attitudes towards the rights of sexual minorities (LGBTI rights) divide the positions of liberal and illiberal states, and they tend to frame the topic differently. Support for sexual rights and decriminalisation of homosexuality has been the norm for liberal democratic states. For example, the EU accepted its guidelines on the rights of LGBTI persons in 2013. The EU has focused its UN policy on the prevention of discrimination and violence against LGBTI persons, especially in situations where the death penalty is in force. The EU has emphasised that the SOGI agenda does not create new rights but is part of prior international law. The aim is to ensure that the human rights of all are respected, irrespective of sexual identity or orientation (EEAS 2013).

The opponents, which consist of many African, Asian and Arab states, claim that international human rights law does not include the concepts of sexual orientation or gender identity. According to them, these concepts refer to private or individual conduct that falls outside of the agreed international legal framework. Furthermore, they refer to more particularist, relativist national and cultural values and conceptions of rights that must be respected. They contest the liberal universal human rights position in the name of religious morality or more contextual ‘Orthodox’, ‘Christian’, ‘Islamic’ and ‘African’ values (Symons and Altman 2015). Many opponents of the SOGI agenda may even signal their objection by leaving the HRC meeting room when such discussions start.

Human Rights Defenders

The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) in 1998 to develop a specific protection regime and underline the relevant rights of human rights defenders (OHCHR 1998). According to the UN definition, HRDs are persons who, individually or with others, act to promote or protect human rights peacefully. Often, they monitor, investigate and collect information on human rights violations and demand accountability. As such, they represent a challenge for illiberal, authoritarian states that do not respect human rights obligations. Hence, in an illiberal world, the HRDs are increasingly targeted, and they face harassment, threats and violence. The human rights defender theme is closely related to broader debates concerning shrinking space for civil society, freedom of the press and empowering individuals. 

The EU follows the UN framework and has been an important advocate in protecting human rights defenders. Support for defenders has been a long-term and central objective of the EU’s global human rights policy. The EU guidelines for human rights defenders focusing on external action were outlined in 2004 and later updated and revised to include more diverse groups of defenders (EEAS 2016). The guidelines steer the work of EU member states and EU Missions globally. Recently, the EU has focused on the support programmes offered to defenders, especially at risk.[3] The EU has adopted practical and concrete measures to support defenders, such as documenting violations, staying connected with local HRD, making their situation more visible, or participating in their trials.

The HRD theme is highly contested, and resolution negotiations take time in the HRC. Norway has been a leading advocate for defenders for many years by sponsoring HRD resolutions at the UN (Government of Norway 2025). These resolutions have had different thematic focuses, for example, emphasising women or environmental defenders, implications of technology for HRDs and defenders in conflict situations. For supporters and advocates, it is, for example, important to enable the participation of human rights defenders in UN proceedings as they bring visibility and testimony concerning serious human rights violations. However, opponents aim to hinder the participation of activists in the HRC meetings in many ways, for example, by travel bans, surveillance, arbitrary arrest and even physical violence. They may also punish HRDs for cooperating with UN bodies and mandate holders.

Those states that oppose the HRD theme in the HRC come mainly from a group of like-minded illiberal states, including, for example, Russia, China, Cuba, Egypt, Pakistan and Venezuela. They interpret the resolutions on human rights defenders as an effort to diminish state sovereignty and advance Western interests in the Council. Hence, they may use anti-colonial framing to legitimise their opposition and persuade other states to follow their position (Voss 2021). Many states from Latin America and Africa are trapped in the middle and often abstain from the voting processes concerning resolutions on HRDs. They may also be subject to pressure or even coercion to follow positions of strong states, such as China.

Overall, illiberal states claim that the actions of defenders are unlawful in the national context. Hence, they have often criminalised criticism and attacked HRDs domestically in various ways. They have restricted the funding opportunities of civil society and individual activists, especially from foreign sources. One example is the foreign agent law adopted in Russia, repressing several independent civil society and media organisations. It has influenced the other repressive jurisdictions in Europe (Human Rights Watch 2024). Illiberal authoritarian regimes have detained activists and closed discursive spaces and platforms for dissenting voices. This threatens the foundations of democracy, as defenders and a wider free civil society and media play an important role in societies. 

The EU’s response to illiberal challengers

The EU needs to respond to the challenges set by illiberal actors internally and globally at the UN. The EU must improve its coherence and consistency to be influential. Internally, the EU should also find ways to work more flexibly to promote its key priorities despite some vocal opponents, such as the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The strong EU positions in the defence of gender equality, sexual and gender minorities and human rights defenders should not be compromised by such dissenting illiberal voices. One way to proceed is to work effectively through smaller and more flexible groups of like-minded states, such as the Nordic-Baltic group (Tuominen 2025). The member states have considerable expertise and networks to promote thematic and country issues with third states. These resources could be used more effectively in the “Team Europe” spirit to advance universal respect for human rights. This could improve the EU’s overall image as a human rights actor without endangering its commitment to unity.

Human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, human rights and the protection of minorities are the basic values of the EU. These should be protected and respected by all the EU member states. The right-wing populist movements across Europe provide a challenge to these values, as such groups openly advocate for anti-gender and discriminatory positions. The movement is strong and aims to appeal to broad audiences instead of mere conservative or religious groups (Kuhar 2023). Furthermore, there have been growing attacks against civil society and human rights defenders also in Europe in recent years. The EU needs to respond to these challenges, as its image in human rights matters is related to its successes and failures.

Externally, human rights are a stated priority in EU external action, and the EU is dedicated to countering the pushback against human rights and gender equality in international fora (Council 2025). The EU must first counter the tendency of authoritarian and illiberal governments to abuse and diminish the role of multilateral institutions. The global illiberal pushback requires ambitious and bold actions to uphold and advocate for international human rights norms and standards. Secondly, the EU needs to change the culture of impunity and demand accountability for extreme violations and gender-based discrimination, for example, in Afghanistan and Iran.

The EU must find allies and build better and deeper relations with states that are not always like-minded or that do not always vote with the EU in the UN. For example, the EU Action Plan for Human Rights 2020-2027 sets the aim of prioritising coalition building with regional and cross-regional groups. It also acknowledges the need to engage, especially with members of the HRC who hold different views from the EU on specific resolutions. Finding common ground is not always easy, and the EU needs to listen to others and acknowledge their concerns more carefully (Tuominen, ibid). The EU already has good relations with many Latin American countries and states in its neighbourhood. Increasing cooperation in thematic issues with African, Middle Eastern and Asian countries is highly important.

Secondly, the civil society organisations and human rights defenders need continuous and innovative supportive instruments in an increasingly illiberal world. These groups and individuals are essential allies for the EU, providing important information on local human rights situations and alerting actors at UN forums to serious emerging crises. Monitoring individual situations of human rights defenders and providing concrete help is highly needed in threatening situations

Conclusion

The constant normative competition in the global human rights regime influences EU action in the UN Human Rights Council. This chapter has highlighted the tension between some of the EU’s liberal human rights priorities and the global rise of illiberal attempts to undermine the development of and respect for these rights. I have also discussed how global illiberal influences are converging with local nationalist frameworks inside the EU, making its global ambitions less coherent and credible.

Despite these pressures, the EU must stay committed to supporting the UN, the rules-based international order and multilateral working methods. This is especially important as the United States is withdrawing from many multilateral forums, and the Trump administration is not a self-evident ally for the EU in defending human rights. Otherwise, illiberal actors will take over the UN human rights regime and redefine many of the universal rights achieved with considerable work and effort. 

Hanna Tuominen is a Jean Monnet (JM) Professor in the Centre for European Studies, University of Helsinki. Her current JM project focuses on the internal and external contestation of EU values. She works as the director of the master’s programme in European and Nordic studies. Her research interests include EU values, identity, external relations and Finnish foreign, EU and UN policy. She has published her research in journals such as JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Integration, Cooperation and Conflict, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy and Nordic Journal of Human Rights.

Photo by Tim Gouw

Notes

[1] For the priorities, see European Union human rights guidelines, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-human-rights-guidelines_en (accessed 7 May 2025).

[2] For example, South Africa often represents a dilemma as it is a liberal state that acts illiberally in the HRC, see Jordaan, E. (2020), South Africa and the UN Human Rights Council. The Fate of Liberal Order, Routledge.

[3] ProtectDefenders.eu is the European Union Human Rights Defenders mechanism, led by a Consortium of 12 NGOs active in the field of Human Rights, see its webpage: https://protectdefenders.eu/ (accessed 13 May 2025).

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