Hybrid Governance Beyond the Liberal-Illiberal Dichotomy: EU–BRICS in Global Power Shifts
Francesco Petrone aims to move beyond the dichotomous view of global governance held by the EU and the BRICS, proposing instead a hybrid model where seemingly conflicting interests overlap. Drawing on Post-Western and Global South perspectives, the chapter also presents potential concrete examples of where such hybrid governance might emerge. It is part of a forthcoming e-book by the Global Governance Research Group of the UNA Europa network, entitled ‘The European Union in an Illiberal World’.
The European Union (EU) has traditionally positioned itself as a champion of liberal values, multilateralism, and a rules-based global governance system – often grounded in strict regulatory frameworks. In a certain sense, until various crises began to threaten the “European dream” (Rifkin 2004), the EU integration process stood as a sort of model for the rest of the world. The crises in more recent times that have undermined its foundations are numerous, including: the rise of populist and Eurosceptic movements, decision-making fragmentation among member states, the recent Covid-19 pandemic, and recurring economic crises. In short, there are a series of threats today that are seriously challenging the very survival of the EU.
Moreover, the emergence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as a geopolitical bloc has created new scenarios on the international chessboard. In particular, the BRICS challenge the Western-centric (i.e., European and Anglo-Saxon) orientation of international institutions, while also raising several issues for the global governance system (BRIC 2009). Furthermore, the BRICS’ global governance vision, though diverse in national characteristics, shares common principles such as respect for sovereignty, non-interference, multilateralism, and institutional flexibility. These principles stand in contrast to the EU’s emphasis on normative conditionality and rule-based governance. Rather than forming a coherent alternative, the BRICS promote a pluralist vision of governance rooted in South–South cooperation and developmental autonomy (Petrone 2025).
However, although often portrayed as a clash between opposing governance models (Hooijmaaijers and Keukeleire 2014), EU–BRICS dynamics should not be framed as inherently rival or antagonistic. Instead, they should be understood and approached as a process of hybridization, in which overlapping and competing norms interact to shape global governance structures. This approach is especially relevant today: global challenges require common ground, yet diverging worldviews must still find shared solutions to address them effectively.
This article compares the EU and the BRICS as two distinct yet increasingly interconnected actors within the shifting landscape of global governance. The EU, historically aligned with the US and shaped by its post–World War II transatlantic identity, is now facing a deepening rift with Washington. These tensions not only weaken the transatlantic partnership but also cast doubt on the EU’s ability to uphold and project its own vision of global governance. At the same time, the current situation suggests that the Western-centric order the EU once embraced – anchored in a close alliance with the US – is now working against it, as recent 'America First' policies undermine the EU’s resilience and its ability to face current and future global challenges (Greubel, Kuiper and Maurice 2025). In contrast, the BRICS represent a coalition of emerging powers actively working to reform global governance structures. Their efforts are driven by a shared critique of an outdated and Western-centric international order, which they seek to make more inclusive and representative.
Against this backdrop, the article explores how interaction between the EU and the BRICS could contribute to reshaping global governance through hybridization – understood as the blending of different institutional logics and normative approaches. In a global context marked by uncertainty and institutional stagnation (Hale, Held, and Young 2013), the return of Donald Trump to the White House further complicates the international landscape. Renewed trade tensions, such as tariffs targeting both the EU and BRICS countries (Shakil 2025), underscore the urgency of building new, alternative partnerships. These evolving dynamics call for innovative forms of cooperation better suited to the realities of a multipolar and rapidly changing world.
Theoretical framework: hybridization, multiplexity, and global IR as key concepts for post-Western global governance
Some scholars speak of a new phase of hybridization (Kutlay and Öniş 2020), meaning that the current international order is being reshaped through a process of normative hybridization, in which norms of different origins – liberal, statist, authoritarian, nationalist-populist – coexist, interact, and often clash. At the same time, in recent years, a new concept has emerged within international studies: the idea of a “multiplex world order,” coined by Amitav Acharya (2017). This refers to a global order in which multiple narratives, economic approaches, and political visions coexist, overlap, and generate competing networks of power and influence. More precisely, Acharya argues that the emerging world is not multipolar, but multiplex – characterized by multiple modernities, where Western liberal modernity, with its models of economic development and governance, is just one of several options. In this context, the multiplex world is defined by interconnections and interdependencies, not by a single global order – liberal or otherwise – but by a complex web of overlapping or competing international orders and globalisms (Acharya 2017).
In any case, what is increasingly clear is that a single Western-centric vision of world order no longer prevails. This vision, which dominated the post-World War II era and is generally referred to as the Liberal International Order, is now undergoing a profound transformation. The emerging global order of the future will necessarily need to incorporate this growing plurality of perspectives. Since this phenomenon is recent and essentially shakes the international system to its core, emerging powers are often portrayed as a challenge or threat to the established order. Yet this is not entirely accurate (Chan and Hu 2025). In reality, it seems more appropriate to say that the Western world is not yet ready to embrace this “longue durée” process, as Fernand Braudel (1949) would define it – i.e. a transition that will bring significant, radical and lasting transformative effects.
Traditional IR theories often frame EU–BRICS relations as a clash between liberal and illiberal governance. In contrast, post-Western and Global South scholarship emphasizes hybrid governance, where Western and non-Western norms intersect. This offers a more effective lens to understand how both actors may co-shape global norms and institutions. As we will see in the studies examined below, hybrid governance is emerging as both a theoretical and practical response to the crisis of the liberal-universalist model. Rather than promoting uniform or hierarchical approaches, it reflects a dynamic process of normative co-production among diverse actors – states, international organizations, civil societies, and epistemic communities – with differing worldviews and priorities.
Among the key thinkers within this post-Western perspective is the aforementioned Amitav Acharya, a leading voice behind the Global International Relations (Global IR) paradigm (Acharya 2014). According to Acharya, international institutions and norms are not simply exports of Western models, but rather the result of a co-constructive logic between the “center” and the “peripheries” of the international system. A central concept in his analysis is “norm localization”, through which global norms are reinterpreted and adapted in local contexts, generating forms of governance that combine liberal elements with indigenous normative visions. A notable example of this could be China’s promotion of “ecological civilization” (shengtai wenming), a holistic view of environmental sustainability rooted in Confucian and Taoist values, which contrasts with the Western conception based on technocracy and green growth.
This perspective is echoed by Bhupinder Chimni (Anghie and Chimni 2003), one of the leading figures of the TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) movement. Chimni critiques the structurally unequal nature of international law and global institutions, which, he argues, are the legacy of a postcolonial order that has perpetuated power asymmetries between the Global North and South. He proposes a postcolonial and pluralistic approach, where the normative contributions of the Global South are not only welcomed but recognized as co-foundational to the international system. For Chimni, a truly hybrid global governance must be contextual, multi-level, and oriented toward global justice – breaking away from the impersonal technocracy of dominant institutions and embracing alternative practices rooted in local realities.
For her part, Shirin Rai (2008) expands the discourse on hybrid governance by introducing a critical gender dimension. Her proposal emphasizes how global governance processes are not only Westernized but also deeply masculinized and technocratic. Rai highlights the importance of rethinking global governance from historically marginalized experiences, promoting participatory and inclusive practices that value knowledge produced by women, local communities, and social movements from the Global South.
Finally, recent publications (Cooper and Rewizorski 2025) have analyzed how the Global South is influencing global governance, not only through the BRICS but also through the growing role of middle powers. More specifically, by analyzing the Global South’s response to key events such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 2008 financial crisis, these scholars have shown how the Global South offers an alternative interpretation of the international order. In this sense, the continuity of the current governance system – dominated by Western values and institutions – is being questioned, and a multipolar, post-Western vision is being advanced. Through new alliances, the Global South demands greater agency and promotes a more inclusive transformation, recognizing the fluidity of identities and the need for broader epistemic dialogue in the field of International Relations.
These perspectives converge in proposing a vision of global governance no longer as a unilateral imposition of normative standards, but as a plural, dialogical space open to encounters among different traditions, cultures, and worldviews. Hybrid governance thus becomes not only a strategy to adapt to the challenges of global complexity, but also a political project aimed at epistemic justice and the construction of a more equitable and representative international order.
Hybrid governance in practice: toward a convergence between the EU and the BRICS?
A binary (EU–BRICS) lens, on global governance overlooks its complexity and evolving nature, limiting holistic and epistemically just understandings (Sousa Santos de, 2014). This potential process of hybridization can be observed in various contexts. This article thus explores potential hybridization processes through selected examples, focusing on global institutions – such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – and on climate-related governance.
The realm of global institutional reform, including changes to the UN and the IMF, also represents a potential arena for hybridization. The BRICS have consistently advocated for greater inclusivity and representation, calling for reforms such as the expansion of the UN Security Council and a more equitable redistribution of voting power within the IMF (Petrone 2021). While cautious in some respects, the EU has demonstrated openness to procedural reforms that enhance the role of regional and sub-regional organizations, including the African Union and ASEAN (European External Action Service 2020; Ki-moon 2014). Thus, in this area, there is potential for convergence toward more representative governance models. Hybridization, therefore, becomes a key process for understanding current transformations and for building more effective and inclusive global institutions. For the EU, this implies the need to preserve its normative identity while remaining open to alternative perspectives. Recognizing and integrating visions emerging from the BRICS and the broader Global South can enhance not only the legitimacy of global institutions but also their capacity to address complex challenges such as sustainable development, climate change, and multilateral reform. Furthermore, the evolving interaction between the EU and the BRICS suggests that 21st-century governance will not result from the imposition of one model over another, but rather from the co-construction of hybrid frameworks capable of reflecting the diversity of a multiplex world.
Similar dynamics can be observed in the field of climate governance. A prime example is the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB), founded by the BRICS in 2015. Dedicated to financing sustainable development projects, the NDB represents a significant opportunity for the EU to develop partnerships and joint initiatives in the area of climate policy. The NDB incorporates selected Western standards – such as transparency and sustainability metrics – and prioritizes South–South cooperation, local ownership, and non-conditionality, thereby embodying a hybrid institutional logic (New Development Bank 2025). This approach reflects a distinct vision of development and international assistance – one rooted in solidarity and the autonomy of recipient countries. As such, it offers the EU a strategic opportunity to engage with the NDB in support of sustainable development in the Global South.
In this regard, China’s initiative through the South–South Climate Cooperation Fund is particularly noteworthy. Launched to provide technical and financial assistance to developing countries, this fund promotes a model based on voluntary technology transfers, tailored support, and principles of solidarity (South–South Climate Cooperation Fund, 2025). While this approach differs from the European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) – an instrument designed to support EU member states in implementing climate and digital transitions through a combination of grants and loans – the two mechanisms represent complementary logics of governance. Should the RRF be extended or made permanent beyond its current 2026 end date, and should it be reoriented specifically toward climate projects and opened to cooperation with external partners, it could become an effective tool for implementing joint initiatives with other green financing instruments, such as the South–South Cooperation Fund. Their pragmatic interaction could foster new opportunities for cooperation in areas such as co-financing, technology transfer, and joint pilot programs. This convergence reflects a shared objective: to foster resilience, reduce environmental vulnerabilities, and promote inclusive development – while also safeguarding prosperity, social cohesion, and democratic values (Recovery and Resilience Facility 2025). In sum, such interaction illustrates the potential of a more flexible, pluralistic, and multi-level approach to environmental governance.
Despite their differing approaches, the EU and BRICS share a fundamental interest in addressing climate change while ensuring economic growth and energy security. A hybrid governance perspective suggests that rather than promoting its own model, the EU could engage constructively with BRICS-led initiatives through pragmatic cooperative mechanisms. Climate governance could thus become a dynamic space for EU–BRICS cooperation. While the EU has traditionally positioned itself as a normative leader in global climate negotiations, BRICS countries – particularly China and India – have promoted alternative governance models grounded in principles such as equity, common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), and sustainable development (Hussein 2024).
From a hybrid governance perspective, the interaction between EU and BRICS climate strategies offers an opportunity to foster a more inclusive and pluralistic system of global climate governance. One promising avenue lies in co-financing partnerships and knowledge sharing. This could include increasing high-level meetings, fostering academic collaboration, and launching joint initiatives. For instance, the EU could align elements of its Green Deal funding mechanisms with the BRICS’ South–South cooperation efforts, co-financing sustainable infrastructure projects in the Global South. Furthermore, stronger engagement with the NDB could facilitate joint investments in green technologies, circular economies, and climate resilience strategies that align with both EU climate priorities and BRICS development goals. Such engagement could also serve as a strategic step toward strengthening the EU’s role in global governance. At a time when the EU’s leadership position appears weakened and its influence in international affairs uncertain, building closer ties with countries of the Global South may offer a renewed path forward. This shift would not only diversify the EU’s partnerships – especially in light of growing tensions with its traditional ally, the United States – but also position the EU as a more inclusive and responsive actor in addressing today’s global challenges.
In this context, multilateral institutions such as the United Nations are under increasing pressure. On the one hand, they remain central spaces of global legitimacy; on the other, they are still perceived by many as embodiments of Western universalism – a vision now widely contested. This tension contributes to the growing fragmentation of global governance while simultaneously opening a window of opportunity to rethink the international normative architecture along more inclusive and pluralistic lines.
Conclusions
The international order is undergoing transformation. This historical moment could be described as a phase of “interregnum” – a transition toward a new and different order that has yet to fully materialize. In this time of global uncertainty – marked, however, by urgent challenges that demand swift and decisive responses – it would be wise to seek points of convergence.
At the same time, the world has become de facto multipolar: there is no longer a single hegemonic center of power, as was the case during the “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer 2002) when the US and its European partners shaped the rules of globalization through the support of Bretton Woods institutions (IMF, World Bank, and WTO).
Therefore, convergence must now be found within a broader and more inclusive context, no longer limited to a select group of countries. The rise of the BRICS exemplifies this transformation. Moreover, the group is expanding to new members through the so-called BRICS Plus strategy, reflecting a different vision – a holistic approach to international issues. As previously mentioned, the BRICS offer an alternative perspective to traditional global governance, including that promoted by the EU. Indeed, the EU advocates for a rules-based global governance model, firmly committed to multilateralism, human rights, environmental sustainability, and the central role of traditional international institutions such as the UN and the IMF. Its vision reflects liberal values and a normative approach to the international order.
The BRICS, for their part, support a more multipolar and inclusive model of global governance – one that better reflects the current balance of power and gives greater voice to the Global South. They criticize the Western-dominated international order and call for reform of global institutions to enhance the representation of emerging economies. At the same time, they promote the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and diversity of development models (De Bruyn and Keukeleire 2017).
This different vision of global governance has often been interpreted as a direct opposition between a liberal model (the EU) and an illiberal one (the BRICS). However, this dichotomy only obstructs a true understanding of global mechanisms and, more importantly, prevents effective responses to pressing global issues. Therefore, there is a need to build hybrid governance as a means of finding common ground despite differing visions. In essence, it is increasingly necessary to move beyond dichotomies and instead identify shared mechanisms in strategic areas.
The results of the analysis here suggest that, rather than reinforcing rigid liberal norms, the EU could adopt a more flexible and pragmatic approach. Engagement with the governance models promoted by the BRICS does not necessarily imply compromising core values – it represents an opportunity to contribute to the construction of new institutional pathways.
The EU’s ability to strategically adapt to emerging multilateral frameworks will determine the extent of its continued influence in global governance. More broadly, this adaptability could strengthen the EU’s resilience in the face of current and future challenges.
Francesco Petrone is Lecturer in International Relations at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya and Professor of Global History and History of Philosophy in Italy. His work focuses on global governance, international institutions, and BRICS studies, with several publications including three books.
Photo by Mikhail Nilov
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