Can the European Union Save the International Legal Order?
This is the first chapter for a forthcoming e-book by the Global Governance Research Group of the UNA Europa network, entitled “The European Union in a Illiberal World.” Jan Wouters sets out the mechanisms, inconsistencies and limits of the EU’s efforts to uphold the international legal order.
The international legal order, often also referred to as the “international rules-based order,” is seriously under threat. The evidence is ample: the resurgence of interstate wars, such as Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the recent Israel – Iran conflict; the crises afflicting many multilateral organizations, from the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva to the United Nations (UN) in New York; increased polarization among the permanent members of the Security Council; and a decreasing willingness of states to enter into new treaty obligations in various fields, or even to comply with existing treaty commitments (Wouters 2024). Added to this are the severe blows dealt to the international legal order by President Trump’s second administration, notably through the unilateral imposition of tariffs, trade wars, withdrawal from international institutions and treaties, sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC), and threats of economic pressure or even the use of force to achieve certain objectives (Wouters 2025).
Can the European Union (‘EU’ or ‘Union’) save the international legal order? The EU has positioned itself as a steadfast, self-declared defender of “a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core” (High Representative 2016). The Union’s commitment to international law and multilateral cooperation—especially within the framework of the UN—is deeply rooted and is expressed both in numerous policy documents and in its founding Treaties. Yet it may be asked how profound and consistent the EU’s commitment to international law and multilateralism really is, and how effectively it is addressing the above-mentioned challenges to the international legal order. In this short contribution we analyze briefly the EU’s actions in the face of recent wars, of the Trump II administration and the crisis of multilateralism. We will also highlight some recent unilateral actions by the EU and what this means for its status as an international actor.
The EU’s actions in the face of recent wars
The EU has been described as a “peace project,” but in the face of the threat posed by an aggressive Russia some have called for it become a “war project,” or at least for prioritizing defense and security in the years to come (Leonard 2022; Michel 2024).
In the face of Russia’s large-scale military aggression against Ukraine, the Union has shown a reasonable degree of cohesiveness and action. Two weeks after the start of the invasion the European heads of state and government adopted the “Versailles Declaration” of 10–11 March 2022, which inter alia stated that “Russia and its accomplice, Belarus, bear full responsibility for this war of aggression, and those responsible will be held accountable for their crimes, including for indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure” (Versailles Declaration 2022). On 20 June 2022, the Council adopted a strong “Declaration by the European Union and its Member States on Upholding and Promoting International Law, Including the Principles of the United Nations Charter” (Council 2022b).
While the Union has remained consistent in its statements, its impact on the ground has been limited. To this day, more than three years into the war, Russia continues to carry out large-scale military offensives on Ukrainian territory, resulting in widespread destruction and countless casualties. Nevertheless, the EU has taken significant action. Over the past three years, it has adopted no fewer than seventeen unprecedentedly broad and deep “sanctions packages” against Russia (an eighteenth package is currently in preparation). These sanctions add to the measures already imposed by the EU in 2014 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. They include targeted restrictive measures (individual sanctions), economic sanctions, diplomatic measures, and visa-related measures. The economic sanctions are intended to severely impact Russia’s ability to sustain its military efforts and to stymie its war of aggression. It is, however, disputed how effective they are in reaching this aim, as Russia’s economy has proven to be more resilient than expected and the sanctions are being widely circumvented (Fenton and Kolyander 2025).
Another important line of action has been the coordinated efforts of EU Member States within multilateral organizations, where they have not only launched numerous initiatives to unanimously condemn Russia’s military aggression but also sought to isolate Russia within these organizations (Council 2022a). Such actions have notably given rise to Russia’s expulsion from the Council of Europe and its suspension in the UN Human Rights Council. The exclusion from these two prominent human rights institutions was seen as “important symbolic reaffirmations of the rules-based international order” (Bischoff 2023).
Remarkable as well has been the EU and its Member States’ coordinated actions vis-à-vis the international courts in The Hague. For the first time ever, 26 of the 27 Member States intervened before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), more specifically in the case brought by Ukraine against Russia under the 1948 Genocide Convention. This followed two joint statements of more than 40 States in May and July 2022 (Joint Statement 2022a; Joint Statement 2022b). Interestingly, most EU Member States’ submissions were based on a common template developed by the European External Action Service (EEAS) (Hoffmeister & Wouters, 2025).
The EU has also acted more or less uniformly—though with some caveats—in supporting the investigation by the ICC. In March 2022, 43 States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, including all Member States, requested the ICC Prosecutor to open an investigation into the situation in Ukraine. On 4 March 2022, the Justice and Home Affairs Council requested Eurojust to support investigations by national courts and the ICC into war crimes and crimes against humanity. Eurojust established a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) composed of Ukraine, six EU Member States, the ICC, and Europol. In 2023 it also set up a database for evidence of core international crimes (“Core International Crimes Evidence Database,” CICED). On 8 June 2022, the European Commission announced an allocation of €7.25 million to the ICC to support its investigative capacities. On 2 February 2023 Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced the setting up of the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine (ICPA) in The Hague (Commission 2023, Brière 2025).
Meanwhile, the ICC has found itself at the center of a storm, facing an existential threat from new sanctions imposed by the Trump II administration, particularly in response to the arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Galant. To safeguard its operations, the ICC is looking to the EU, hoping it will activate its so-called Blocking Statute, which for the time being does not seem assured, in spite of expressions of support (Van den Berg & Van Campenhout 2025). European unity was also abruptly disrupted in early April 2025 when Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán hosted Benjamin Netanyahu for an official visit to Hungary—despite the aforementioned arrest warrant—and announced that Hungary would withdraw from the Rome Statute. This represents a serious blow to the credibility of the Union as a guarantor of the international rules-based order (Ovadek 2025).
A special mention should be made of the work done by the legal services of the European Commission and of the EEAS together with the Council of Europe, Ukraine, and 37 States for the creation of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, which is about to be adopted on the basis of an agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe (Lviv Statement 2025).
In stark contrast to the unity shown by the EU and its Member States regarding the war in Ukraine, there is deep division over the renewed conflict that has erupted in the Middle East between Israel and Hamas following the brutal and large-scale terrorist attack by Hamas fighters on Israeli territory on 7 October 2023, and over the recent outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Iran. The Union has proven to be deeply split over these conflicts, as reflected, among other things, in divergent voting behavior within the UN General Assembly. Observers have strongly criticized the EU for this: the latter is said to be inconsistent in its approach to respect for international humanitarian law, which undermines its credibility as guarantor of the international legal order (ECDPM 2024). At its meeting of 20 March 2025, the European Council did not get much further than calling for “unimpeded access and sustained distribution of humanitarian assistance at scale into and throughout Gaza” and restating its longstanding firm commitment “to a lasting and sustainable peace based on the two-state solution,” for which it pledged to “continue to work with regional and international partners” (European Council 2025).
The EU’s actions in the face of the Trump II administration
Upon assuming his second term, President Donald Trump has taken a great number of decisions and initiatives which significantly impact upon the international legal order. On his first day in office, he signed several Executive Orders, including orders to withdraw from the WHO, to restructure US foreign aid, and to immediately withdraw from the Paris Agreement and all obligations (including financial) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Subsequent orders have included withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council, cessation of all funding to UNRWA, and a review within 180 days of US participation in all international organizations and treaties to which the US is a party, as well as the aforementioned sanctions against the ICC. After announcing on 10 February 2025 that tariffs on steel and aluminum would be raised, President Trump signed an Executive Order on 2 April 2025 (dubbed “Liberation Day”), imposing substantial tariffs on 90 countries, including the EU—though he suspended their application for 90 days on 9 April. Additionally, the President repeatedly made statements about regaining control over the Panama Canal, the possible annexation of Greenland, and the accession of Canada to the United States, encouraged by US economic pressure.
The Union has not responded comprehensively to these measures and initiatives. For instance, the threats with regard to Greenland, of which President Trump asserted publicly that “we’re going to get it, one way or another” in March 2025 (Starcevic 2025), did not trigger any EU reaction. In January various European leaders had individually reacted to Trump’s earlier assertions, including Andrius Kubilius, the European Commissioner for Defence (declaring “We are ready to defend our member state, Denmark”) and High Representative Kaja Kallas (stressing “we are not negotiating on Greenland. We are supporting our member state, Denmark, and its autonomous region”), but the issue has seemingly never been on the agenda of the institutions (Liboreiro 2025).
On the trade front, Commission President von der Leyen indicated that the EU is prepared to adopt countermeasures but is keeping the door open for negotiations. She also acknowledged that “the global trading system has serious deficiencies” and “agree[d] with President Trump, that others are taking unfair advantage of the current rules,” expressing her readiness “to support any efforts to make the global trading system fit for the realities of the global economy” (Von der Leyen 2025). Apart from this, the EU has accelerated the negotiation of deep and comprehensive trade agreements with other international partners (see, e.g., for Japan, Yoshimatsu 2020), as it did during the first Trump administration.
In the field of security and defense, the actions and words of the new US administration have accelerated efforts toward greater European autonomy, notably with the release of the White Paper “European Defence - Readiness 2030” on 19 March 2025 (Commission and High Representative 2025).
The EU and the crisis of the multilateral system
Based on its founding Treaties and longstanding policy choices, the EU has a strong commitment to multilateralism and the UN in particular. The European Council reiterated that commitment at its meeting of 20 March 2025, when it was already clear the UN and the UN family greatly suffered from the unilateral withdrawals and financial cancelations of the Trump II administration: “The European Union will remain a predictable, reliable, and credible partner and welcomes the opportunity to work together in a changing environment with all its partners, as well as with the United Nations and its agencies in driving forward the internal reform process – the UN80 initiative – to ensure that the United Nations remains effective, cost-efficient and responsive. The European Union is committed to the Pact for the Future, which is a crucial step towards revitalising the United Nations, achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, and reforming the international financial architecture” (European Council 2025). However, it is clear that the $60 billion funding gap left by the termination of USAID funding is not going to be filled by “Team Europe,” i.e. the EU and its Member States collectively (European Parliament 2025).
EU unilateral actions
In spite of the EU’s commitment to multilateralism, recent years have seen a significant development towards more autonomous—i.e., unilateral—action in the EU discourse, as well as in policy and legal documents. A joint communication of 2021 bluntly states that “[t]he EU […] can best help steer globalization in the right direction by choosing a multilateral approach whenever possible, and acting autonomously where necessary” (European Commission & High Representative 2021). This pursuit of “open strategic autonomy” has only increased with the arrival of the Trump II administration. It is a subject of debate whether all of these autonomous actions “strictly observe” international law, to which the Union is committed pursuant to Article 3(5) of the Treaty on European Union. Indeed, some of the recent EU initiatives in the area of international economic and environmental law have been criticized for not being fully consistent with international law. This applies especially to the new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): it is still unclear whether this mechanism is fully compatible with WTO rules and the Paris Climate Agreement. The EU Deforestation Regulation even caused so much controversy that the implementation date was postponed to December 30, 2025, a year later than originally planned. Finally, the increasing “weaponization” of the EU’s trade policy and the recent development of several unilateral trade instruments are walking a fine line regarding their compatibility with international and WTO law (for example, the Anti-Coercion Instrument, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation, and the Enforcement Regulation).
Additionally, the Union has recently adopted several other unilateral instruments to protect its interests or uphold its values regarding what it considers violations of international law committed elsewhere in the world. This includes the EU Magnitsky Act, an instrument to sanction human rights violations and perpetrators, the instrument allowing restrictive measures against cyberattacks threatening the Union or its Member States, and, last but not least, the European Peace Facility. It has been operational since July 2021, with commitments now amounting to €11.1 billion to support Ukraine. Although the Union seeks to avoid violating its international legal obligations, it has been noted that the fact that it is currently developing so many unilateral instruments may damage its credibility in continuing to promote a multilateral rules-based international order (Wouters 2024).
Concluding remarks
This contribution asks whether the EU can save the international legal order from the severe challenges it is currently undergoing, from renewed armed conflicts to the crisis of multilateralism and the actions of the Trump II administration. While the Union has reaffirmed its “steadfast commitment to effective multilateralism and to the rules-based international order with the United Nations at its core” (European Council 2025), it is far from certain whether the aforementioned question can be answered positively. The EU’s record in responding to recent wars is, if anything, not fully convincing. While the Union has kept relative unity in dealing with Russia’s full-fledged military aggression against Ukraine, its impact on Russia’s behavior and the course of the war has been rather limited. In the face of renewed armed violence in the Middle East, the EU and its Member States have shown great divisions, a lack of resolve, and almost no impact on the ground. The Union’s lack of a consistent approach to the respect of international humanitarian law undermines its credibility as guarantor of the international legal order, especially in the eyes of the Global South. Apart from this, the EU’s response to the attacks of the Trump II administration on international institutions and agreements has been fairly timid, with only a more affirmative stance on trade. Although the Union remains committed to the UN, it is clearly not in a position to fill the important gap left in the field of development by the dismantling of USAID. Last but not least, in recent years, the Union has taken numerous unilateral initiatives and adopted various unilateral instruments of some which have been criticized for not fully complying with international law. If the Union is genuinely committed to saving the international rules-based order, it will need to considerably step up its diplomatic and foreign policy initiatives.
Jan Wouters is Full Professor of International Law and International Organizations, Jean Monnet Chair ad personam, Director, Institute for International Law and Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Administrator, America Europe Fund, KU Leuven. Visiting Professor, College of Europe and Université Panthéon-Assas. Member, Belgian Royal Academy; Of Counsel, Omega Law. He has published widely on international and EU law, international organizations and global governance. He recently coordinated the Horizon 2020 Project RECONNECT and frequently advises and trains international organizations and governments.
Photo de Maël BALLAND
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