Domestic Illiberal Challengers within the European Parliament: the Case of EU-China Relations
Unai Gómez-Hernández examines support for China’s more illiberal approach to international relations by radical right populist parties (RRPPs) in the European Parliament. He finds mixed evidence of such support, though both are hostile to the liberal international order. This text is part of a forthcoming e-book by the Global Governance Research Group of the UNA Europa network, entitled ‘The European Union in an Illiberal World’.
Introduction: the new world emerging in the wake of the crisis of the Liberal International Order
The crisis of the Liberal International Order (LIO) (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999) has recently been exacerbated by the emergence of new illiberal actors all around the world, including in Europe (Laruelle 2022). Since 2017, radical right populist parties (RRPPs) (Mudde 2007) have repeatedly won elections, particularly in the European Parliament (EP). For example, during the Ninth European Parliament (EP9) from 2019 to 2024, RRPPs accounted for approximately 18% of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) elected to the chamber. With their strong nationalistic focus, RRPPs oppose positions in favour of the key tenets of the LIO: free trade, respect for human rights, and a multilateral security order.
Meanwhile, another illiberal actor has emerged on the global stage: China. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, Beijing has expanded its economic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and attempted to assume the role of an international leader. During the EP9, the hemicycle repeatedly took positions on China, with up to 29 proceedings relating to Beijing, compared to 32 on the US and 47 on Russia. This trend of China’s growing relevance, paralleled by the rise of the RRRPs, could be cause for concern if the latter begin to influence the EP on matters relating to the former. Against this backdrop, this research examines the position of illiberal actors within the EP in EU–China relations.
To this end, the rest of the chapter proceeds in three steps. First, the theoretical basis of the research is established by delving deeper into the nature of the LIO framework for understanding international relations, as well as the key concept of “illiberalism”. Second, the research design section explains the methods used: qualitative content analysis through the coding of various EP documents (Richards 2015), quantitative analysis of roll call votes, as well as quantitative assessment of references to China found in the selected texts. Third, the results focus on the three topics within broader EU-China relations that have been chosen as proxies for the tenets of the LIO: i) EU-China economic relations for free trade; ii) various abuses in Xinjiang of the respect for human rights; and iii) the situation in Taiwan for a multilateral security order.
The Liberal International Order as a structural framework
Deudney and Ikenberry coined the term “'Liberal International Order” to describe the power structures of international warfare following the end of the Cold War (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, p. 181). According to them, the LIO is based on three distinct principles: free trade, respect for human rights, and support for a multilateral security order.
In this sense, Deudney and Ikenberry’s theory is a structural liberal theory that bridges the gap in international relations (IR) studies between traditional realism and liberalism. It is based on Ikenberry's work, as recalled in his seminal book After Victory (Ikenberry 2019), which examines how victorious powers have managed their victories and the international systems created afterwards. Indeed, choosing the LIO as a theory of international relations is useful for understanding how powers within the West conduct their foreign policy, as in the case of EU–China relations. Similarly, LIO helps this research to fulfil its aim of bringing the international and the national into contact, by linking them at the level of the European Parliament. To some extent, Ikenberry already achieves this by connecting IR and comparative politics as Fioretos (2019, p. 23) points out: “After Victory conceptually and empirically bridges comparative and international politics to provide an integrated understanding of the generative role of institutions in the development of twentieth-century politics”.
The selection of the LIO as a theoretical framework also provides an additional benefit: it sharply contrasts with the ideology that RRPPs have (Mudde 2007). These parties are highly critical of the liberal order and are clearly situated opposite to the liberal actors and the EU in the Green-Alternative-Libertarian vs Traditionalist-Authoritarian-Nationalist (GAL/TAN) cleavage (Hooghe and Marks 2018). In this dichotomy, the EU and liberal actors would stand on the GAL side, whereas populist parties would stand on the TAN side of the cleavage. Likewise, China being at the opposite side of the liberal-illiberal divide to the LIO helps situate the debate of this chapter and identify in which situations both these non-LIO actors, the RRPPs and China, may find common ground in the EP.
But why does the role of the RRPPs matter from a domestic perspective? The narrative that the LIO is in crisis can also be seen as an intentional decline caused not only by structural or external factors, but also by internal ones. In this sense, Adler-Nisser and Zarakol point out that:
both veins of discontent [international and domestic] are driven by resentment toward the LIO’s status hierarchy, rather than simply by economic grievances. […and] we show that there are two strains of recognition struggles against the LIO: one in the core of the West, driven by populist politicians and their voters, and one on the semiperiphery, fuelled by competitively authoritarian governments and their supporters. At this particular moment in history, these struggles are […] interconnected in their criticism of LIO institutions, amplifying each other. The LIO is thus being hollowed out from within at a time when it is also facing some of its greatest external challenges (2021, p. 611).
This is precisely the working hypothesis of the chapter, namely that illiberal actors will side with China against the EU when an illiberal course of action is available.
EU-China relations at the European Parliament
The EP is the best polity in which to test that hypothesis and answer the research question. The Parliament is not usually considered the main player in foreign policy or the EU’s external action, with other institutions such as the Commission or the Council playing a more prominent role (Gstöhl and Schunz 2022). However, this research does not evaluate the competence of a given institution in EU external action, but rather the degree of illiberalism present within that institution. Considering that only three Member States were governed by the radical right during the EP9, and that the Commission and the Council must act neutrally regardless of the nationality or ideology of their officials, the EP is the most suitable body for this research.
As the only EU institution that is directly democratically elected, the EP examines different legislative and non-legislative issues, depending on the competences that the Treaties guarantee to the co-legislator in a variety of policy areas. The following three proceedings were selected from the proxies chosen for this research: i) a regulation on an “international public procurement instrument” as a proxy for free trade; ii) a resolution on “the situation of the Uyghurs in China” representing respect for human rights; and iii) a resolution on “the situation in the Strait of Taiwan” as an indicator of support for a multilateral security order. Depending on whether RRPPs support or oppose these proceedings, the research will be able to confirm or reject the internal hollowing of the LIO hypothesis posited above.
Each text offers a different type of information. The free trade proceeding, for instance, is linked to the ordinary legislative procedure, in which the EP acts as a co-legislator alongside the Council. Hence, it offers different data points from the other two proceedings that belong to the emergency resolution category. Regardless of the available information, the content coding process has followed two cycles. First, preliminary coding has been conducted on all final documents, and certain themes linked to the actors and norms related to the three tenets of the LIO have been extracted. These were then grouped under the three proxies utilised by this research as bases of the LIO. Secondly, these themes were analysed in relation to the position that the RRPPs took on each of them. The empirical analysis focuses on the voting behaviour of two groups in the European Parliament: i) the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Group, which is a national-conservative and anti-federalist group founded in 2009; and ii) the Identity and Democracy (ID) Group, which was a far-right group in EP9 (2019-2024), but which then broke up. The analysis does not, therefore, consider the non-attached radical right MEPs. Table 1 below shows the availability of information per proceeding.
It should be noted that, due to the size and scope of the contribution, the results presented below are based on the secondary coding cycle and voting pattern analysis of the most relevant resolutions for answering the research question. Similarly, the analysed texts do not exhaust the available sources of information: other data points would help understand the decision-making process better, but are not accessible to the general public.
Results
1. The Strait of Taiwan as a key to a multilateral security order
The European Parliament’s resolution on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan firmly condemns the Chinese government's attempts to exert military pressure on the island. It also highlights the EP's support for Taiwanese democracy and places it in the broader context of democratic versus non-democratic countries in Southeast Asia. In this way, the resolution repeatedly refers to like-minded allies, such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, the Philippines and India. This broadly resembles the liberal versus illiberal division that helps frame this chapter. From this perspective, the LIO framework is therefore useful in determining whether China takes illiberal actions towards Taiwan. Furthermore, there is a direct connection between the security tenet represented by this resolution and the free trade tenet. This is evident from the text's numerous references to economic instruments, such as sanctions, economic coercion, global supply chains, and trade representations in Taiwan. Overall, the expectations based on the above-discussed hypothesis are that the RRPPs would propose a diverging resolution and notably vote against the EP’s resolution. However, a careful analysis of the resolution proposed by the ECR Group and their voting patterns, as well as those of the right-wing, populist ID Group (of the Ninth European Parliament), provides mixed results on this issue.
Indeed, the alternative text tabled by the ECR was relatively close to the text finally approved, contradicting the hypothesis of this chapter with regard to the multilateral security order. However, despite the apparent similarity of the ECR and ID positions, the alternative resolution contains more references to the Chinese Communist Party and Xi Jinping than the final resolution, which may be linked to the ECR's strong anti-communist stance in the EP. Conversely, the alternative text is more critical of the EU, stating that it has failed to uphold its commitments to promote dialogue across the Strait of Taiwan, as agreed in 2016. Beyond these similarities, there is less affirmation of international alliances with the aforementioned democracies. Moreover, the ID did not table its own text, making a direct comparison of its positions impossible. But the two radical right groups (ERC and ID) would likely have differed in their evaluation of US House of Representatives Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, as well as in their view of the relationship between Russia and China. Indeed, ECR might have adopted a “eurorealist” position closer to the US’ interests (Steven 2024).
The analysis of the roll call vote (RCV) in these proceedings provides further insight into the stance of RRPPs regarding the Strait of Taiwan. The resolution was passed by a large majority in the plenary. However, there were some abstentions. These were mainly from the Left group and ID. Yet some ID members also voted in favour of the resolution, indicating a clear division within the political group. These voting patterns, alongside the content analysis of the alternative resolution, suggest that, contrary to expectations, many RRPPs voted in favour despite the notably “liberal” nature of the proceedings.
2. The situation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang
The proceedings on the Uyghurs are the most critical ones concerning China of the three under scrutiny in this chapter. They strongly condemn the Chinese government for events in the eastern province of Xinjiang, citing mass human rights violations and disregard for Muslim and Turkic religious minorities. There are also links to the economic aspects of EU–China relations by regarding the success of the BRI as being linked to an increase in control strategies against the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang (Cho and Turner 2021).
The alternative text tabled by the ECR group follows the general lines of the final text in strongly condemning human rights abuses, but departs from it on two essential points. In both the contextual and dispositive parts of the resolution, the ECR group focuses less on violations of freedom of religion and the fact that those prevented from exercising this right are predominantly Muslim. It could be argued that this lesser focus is linked to the shorter length of the text tabled by the ECR than the final text. However, this would not explain why the ECR group deviates from one of its key talking points regarding China: religious freedom, as seen through the lens of Christian persecution (Sallux 2024). From a LIO perspective, freedom of religion should be upheld regardless of the religion in question. However, these parties have strong nationalistic tendencies, which sometimes portray the Muslim faith negatively. There is also a difference in the proposals made in the alternative tabled text. Notably, the ECR text does not mention the Magnitsky regime, which allows states to impose sanctions on those who violate human rights. This could be a way of rejecting the interventionist nature of the LIO, a topic closely linked to state sovereignty and therefore of interest to RRPPs.
The RCV for these proceedings does not indicate any divisions between the ECR and ID. In this case, both groups voted in favour of the resolution, except for the French ID delegation, which abstained, and one German AfD MEP (Maximilian Krah), who voted against the text. The abstention of the French ID delegation was linked to previous issues with Muslim minorities, with their MEP Dominique Bilde explaining her vote by saying “[o]ur natural support for human rights cannot conceal the proven infiltration of radical Islam within China's Muslim minority, nor the question of China's territorial integrity in the face of militant Islamo-nationalism” (Bilde 2019). This position only applies to the French delegation, since the rest of the ID group voted in favour of the resolution. Similarly, they also expressed a strong criticism of China’s action in the region during the debate via the ID’s Italian representative, MEP Anna Bonfrisco (Bonfrisco 2019). These results are more in line with the expectations of this chapter than the ones found in the previous resolution.
3. The international public procurement instrument
As a regulation, the text has a direct effect on the Member States, which must implement it fully. However, extracting the political implications of such regulations is more complex since they are, in principle, aimed at any country in the world and not a specific one. Yet, as with the foreign direct investment screening mechanism some years before, the international public procurement instrument can be regarded as a geoeconomic tool aimed at containing China (Gómez-Hernández 2024). Similarly, content analysis of the regulation has not produced meaningful results regarding the implications of the proceedings for the LIO. This also explains why analysing the amendments tabled yields no results since there is no direct mention of Beijing. This is why we need to turn to analysing the debate that took place when the regulation was approved.
During that debate, different MEPs from various groups made references to China on 18 occasions. Despite the neutrality of the regulation itself, this result proves that regulations with an impact on the EU’s external action are sometimes aimed at a specific country. Indeed, this has also been evidenced a posteriori, when in 2025, the first case opened under the international procurement instrument was against China (Euronews 2025). Following the hypothesis of the chapter, we would expect that the ECR and ID groups would vote in favour. Here, the explanation for this expectation is more complex, since being against globalist interests within the wider GAL/TAN cleavage does not automatically imply being against restricting access to foreign actors in national markets. However, from the perspective of the LIO, illiberal actors are nationalistic and therefore adamantly defend their national sovereignty in economic terms (Hartlapp 2025). If this principle is applied by RRPPs, they would be expected to stand in favour of defending their national markets from the potential interference of the Chinese market via this instrument. Indeed, the only intervention during the debate made by a RRPP representative (the French ID member Virginie Joron) supported this idea: “you are telling us [in reference to the rest of the EP] that Brussels is going to demand reciprocity and the opening up of public procurement markets in non-European countries. Hear, hear! It's not a moment too soon, and we will be voting in favour of this text.” (Joron 2022). However, she also took the chance to attack British and American companies winning domestic European contracts. Here, it can be seen how ID shows a strong anti-Atlanticist and anti-LIO sentiment, considering the predominant position of the US and the UK in the LIO. By contrast, the ECR remained silent on the issue.
Overall, the analysis of the text confirms the author’s expectations regarding the behaviour of RRPPs in relation to free trade: they act in an economically nationalistic manner. It is also interesting to note that even liberal actors, such as the EU, can act in a manner that contradicts their international discourse. However, the lack of data for the ECR group prevents further generalisation of this trend.
4. Not pro-China but certainly illiberal
The analysis of the three proceedings in this chapter has provided mixed results that do not allow the author to fully confirm the initial expectation that RRPPs would act in favour of Chinese interests, given that they share a similar worldview. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind these parties' votes and interventions in plenary debates at the EP is undoubtedly illiberal. The fact that they occasionally vote alongside mainstream political groups in the EP does not mean that they are motivated by the same factors. Indeed, their political decisions align with the illiberal perspectives outlined at the beginning of the chapter.
Another factor not included among the expectations derived from the theory is intra-RRPP competition. The fact that these parties are organised into two main political groups explains the divisions encountered among them. Ultimately, MEPs are accountable to their constituents in their respective Member States, and if they wish to secure re-election, they must demonstrate differentiation from their political rivals, even if some of these share a similar ideology. This dynamic of political rivalry is only present in states with two or more RRPPs represented in the EP. For example, France had both Rassemblement National in the ID group and Eric Zemmour’s Reconquête! in the ECR group in EP9.
Conclusions
This chapter has paved the way for future research into illiberal actors within the EU by signalling three distinct pathways. Firstly, there is the option of conducting similar research and changing the policy area. Whether the chosen area is one of foreign affairs or an internal policy with an external impact, expanding the themes analysed would provide a clearer picture of how illiberal actors engage with the international arena. Secondly, the focus could be deepened on EU-China relations. Including other levels of analysis, such as the actions that RRPPs take at the Member State level, would help to understand these relations and the illiberal component within them. Finally, an inter-institutional comparison could also be beneficial, factoring in the positions of the Council and the Commission on the matter, to identify the degrees of illiberalism present in these institutions.
Looking forward, there are two ways in which the research could be improved. Firstly, more proceedings could be included. Having more RCVs and debate interventions would make the parties' overall position on the three tenets of the LIO clearer. Similarly, incorporating informal dynamics, such as communications on social media or in the written press, as well as MEP attendance at events, would capture information that is usually relevant to the policy process, but not always included in this type of study.
All in all, this chapter has demonstrated the importance of researching domestic illiberal actors to understand EU-China relations. The analysis partially confirmed the initial expectation that RRPPs behave against liberal interests in EU-China relations, while also shedding light on another potential explanation for their behaviour: political competition. The coming decades will be pivotal in determining whether the LIO survives its multiple crises, mutates into a different system, or disappears. Regardless of what happens next, illiberal actors such as the RRPPs and China will play a central role in these changes.
Unai Gómez-Hernández is a joint PhD candidate at the University of Edinburgh and KU Leuven. His research interests revolve around EU-China relations, radical right populist parties, the European Parliament, and geoeconomics.
Photo by Suzy Hazelwood
References
Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Ayse Zarakol, 2021. Struggles for Recognition: The Liberal International Order and the Merger of Its Discontents. International Organisations 75, 611–634. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000454.
Bilde, Dominique, 2019. Verbatim report of proceedings - Situation of the Uyghur in China (China-cables) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2019-12-19-ITM-007-02_EN.html.
Bonfrisco, Anna, 2019. Verbatim report of proceedings - Situation of the Uyghur in China (China-cables) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2019-12-18-ITM-019_EN.html.
Cho, Sungmin, and Joshua Turner, 2021. The Economics of Repression. The Belt and Road Initiative, COVID-19, and the Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 92-96.
Deudney, Daniel, and John G. Ikenberry, 1999. The nature and sources of liberal international order. Rev. Int. Stud. 25, 179–196. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599001795.
Euronews, 2025. EU finds evidence of discrimination against medtech firms in China. euronews.
Fioretos, Orfeo, 2019. The syncopated history of the liberal international order. Br. J. Polit. Int. Relat. 21, 20–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118791415.
Gómez-Hernández, Unai, 2024. The European Union and China’s geoeconomic tools in a multipolar world. Glob. Policy 15, 30–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13414.
Gstöhl, Sieglinde, and Simon Schunz, 2022. Insights for Foreign Policy Analysis from European Union External Action Studies. Foreign Policy Anal. 19, orac033. https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac033.
Hartlapp, Miriam, 2025. Beyond ‘economic nationalism’? The (limited) influence of populist parties on public procurement in France and Germany. J. Eur. Public Policy 32, 1197–1223. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2336130.
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks, 2018. Cleavage theory meets Europe’s crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transnational cleavage. J. Eur. Public Policy 25, 109–135. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1310279.
Ikenberry, John G., 2019. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars, New Edition. Princeton University Press.
Joron, Veronique, 2022. Verbatim report of proceedings - International procurement instrument (debate) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/CRE-9-2022-06-08-ITM-020_EN.html.
Laruelle, Marlene, 2022. Illiberalism: a conceptual introduction. East Eur. Polit. 38, 303–327. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2022.2037079.
Mudde, Cas, 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Richards, Lyn, 2015. Handling Qualitative Data - A Practical Guide, Third. ed. SAGE, London.
Sallux, 2024. Towards an effective strategy for freedom of religion. https://sallux.eu/news/towards-an-effective-strategy-for-freedom-of-religion.html.
Steven, Martin, 2024. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR): ‘Eurorealism’ in the ninth European Parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 31, 384-398. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2024.2448933.
