Poland and the Problems of Preparation against Russia
As Europe arms, problems abound. Marek M. Jaros and Robert Schuett argue that Poland’s headline rearmament shows that speed, not scarcity, may be Europe’s greatest liability.
In the crisp, biting cold of north-eastern Ukraine, the din of cannon heralded the end of the pax neoliberalis that arose from the ruins of a divided Europe. That is the story in Western Europe. In most Eastern European nations, the outlines of the present Russian war in Ukraine has been visible for a long time. Those same countries looked on with abject shock and chagrin as bullet-points and bilaterals were all that the illustrious western alliance systems could offer to a hail of Russian bullets and bombs raining on the houses and hamlets of Ukraine.
Of the nations most disenchanted by the uninspiring western response was Poland. Having the benefit of historical memory, Poland engaged preparing the material and legal implements necessary to resist conventional and hybrid incursions. It was among the first – and certainly most energetic - to do so. While military preparations can be traced to 2014, much of the necessary civilian infrastructure was constructed beginning in 2005. As As the whole of Europe recognizes the import of defense capabilities, the progress and problems of the Polish case can act as a guide. Every European nation is subject to the challenges discussed herein, whether in part or in whole. This analysis completes the task begun earlier this month where we considered the challenges of Poland’s foreign policy.
The domestic security policy of Poland comprises of two major elements: industrial preparation for conventional war and coordination to address hybrid attacks. The policy, largely outlined by the Polish National Security Strategy documents issued in 2020 and 2025 focus on four pillars: independence, the international order, national identity, and development. The domestic aspect of these policies can be generally condensed into two areas – seeing as they are most responsible for reacting to and preventing attacks and invasion.
Polish defense industrial strategy suffers from theoretical and practical problems. On the one hand, Poland needs arms now. There are already instances of Russian sabotage in Poland and tensions are only going to rise. On the other hand, creating a defense industrial base capable of the mass manufacture of modern weapons requires time, capital, and complex supply chains. Already there is a conflict between these two goals. The present strategy appears to revolve around partial on-shoring, whereby anything that can be manufactured in Poland is. However, this too is not without issue. Should an invasion occur, these industrial sites would be subject to rather quick targeting by Russian bombs and their productive capacity would be null, that is if sabotage does not knock them offline first.
The practical difficulty with Polish industrial policy revolves around the foundational problem of modern conflict – logistics. In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland went on a purchasing spree of mythic proportions. In just the purview of Polish armor, Poland purchased 266 US Abrams (M1A1 & M1A2) tanks, and 180 South Korean K2 tanks, in addition the receipt of long delayed modernized German Leopard II tanks. Each one of these tanks has different engines, requires different parts, training, and technical support – not to mention the global supply chains of each. What was once a single supply chain must now be tripled to maintain tanks, let alone support their operations. This complication will prove additionally troublesome during any future conflict when stockpiles only provide limited supplies of essential parts – a fact underscored by the inability of western stockpiles to keep up with supplying Ukraine in a modern conflict. This needless complexity has been introduced in each of the Polish armed services, resulting in a logistical Gordion knot of sorts.
There are reasons for the diversity of arms purchased by Poland, and integration is possible. Due consideration must be given to the level of exposure Poland had to contend with in the early days of the Russian invasion. Arms were needed immediately, and almost all of it’s fleet of Soviet tanks was donated to Ukraine. It is possible to integrate these systems, but it remains to be seen whether or not Polish military engineers and scientific advisors are given the resources and time to do so.
Logistical complexity also imposes a high political cost. Already, Poland is one of the highest defense spenders per GDP. The Polish budget is strained by an aging population, a strong safety net, and now a sprawling military. Each additional level of complexity will incur additional maintenance costs, even in peacetime. They will raise the fixed expenditure on the Polish armed forces, even in the hopeful event no conflict emerges. Moreover, should Poland experience a sustained economic downturn it may prove difficult to maintain an expensive expansive military when citizens struggle with subsistence.
This last point may seem rather remote given Poland’s blistering economic growth as of late – but pandemics were also once seen as remote events, as were 2008 style economic cataclysms. It would be wise not to hedge the continued existence of the state on the continued growth of an economy, especially in a system of cyclical growth and contraction.
Intergovernmental cooperative strategies can be extremely effective methods of countering hybrid attacks - but they can only bear fruit if the different levels of government actually cooperate with each other. Part of the Polish NSS initiative is to involve major political figures in the national defense system, as well as state and local governments. This may appear prudent, yet there is a problem.
Poland has one of the more fractured political environments in Europe. The last two presidential elections have been decided by less than two percentage points and no party has held an outright majority in parliament this century. Local and provincial divisions can be even more complex and tenuous. Additionally, Poland is still divided roughly along the 1796 partition line in most elections, a phenomenon that leads to additional regional tribalism in national politics.
The Polish left and right focus on different perceived enemies. The center and left generally identify Russia as the greatest threat to Poland. The right argues that the European Union’s encroachment on Polish sovereignty and Germany pose a far greater threat. Given the seeming mutual exclusivity of these two goals, bi-partisan cooperation is rather difficult. Both recognize the opposite threat but believe that it is less presssing than other. Even where opportunities arise, the razor-thin margins in Polish politics and limited resources often make opposition and grandstanding preferable to effective cooperation.
There is no solution to diverging viewpoints as they are an inherent aspect of representative democracy. Either one must behave in a manner undemocratic to fix the problem at hand or act democratically and potentially worsen it. Only a common worldview held by both parts of the political spectrum can produce an effective response. This phenomenon was recently demonstrated when Russian drones invaded Polish airspace. The coalition government (PO-PSL-P2050-Lewica) and PiS both responded with denunciations and discussions of invoking defense covenants. Meanwhile, the libertarian-conservative Konfederacja and hard-right KKP of Grzegorz Braun responded with criticism of the cost of defensive measures employed to shoot down the drones and denunciations of Ukraine for causing such an incursion, respectively. Coordination works only where goals coincide – here they do not.
Polish national security policy has been among the most advanced on the continent. While others have begun the slow, and often painful, process of rearmament, Poland is in the implementing stage rather than planning. Once widely accused of Russophobia, it is now recognized for its foresight. That is not to say it is perfect; the above two parts of the policy provide potentially significant flaws. Other nations also face them, such in the case of political gridlock in France or of disagreements over joint fighter programs in Germany, England, and France. These issues must be addressed in a manner appropriate for each nation and its situation. Not addressing them risks lives in the future and preparation in the present.
Marek M. Jaros is currently a Masters student at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna and an alumnus of Michigan State University’s James Madison College. His research focus is on Eurasian geopolitics, with a particular expertise on Poland’s strategic position and its domestic politics.
Dr. Robert Schuett is co-founder and managing partner at STK Powerhouse, a global risk advisory firm. A former Defense civil servant, he also serves as Chairman of the Austrian Political Science Association and is a long-standing Honorary Fellow at Durham University.
Photo by SHOX art
