Industrial Policy in the Global Climate-Trade Nexus

Qingxiu Bu looks at how the fragmentation of global trade in response to China’s dominant position in green technologies risks derailing the energy transition, and puts forward ways to prevent it. This text is part of a forthcoming e-book by the Global Governance Research Group of the UNA Europa network, entitled ‘The European Union in an Illiberal World’. 

The convergence of economic, geopolitical, and environmental imperatives has elevated industrial policy as a pivotal instrument for advancing clean energy transitions. Climate change, an existential threat, demands urgent action, with renewable energy technologies serving as the cornerstone for achieving net-zero emissions by mid-century. However, competing national priorities, particularly among the United States (US), China, and the EU, are creating complex trade-offs between fostering domestic industrial growth and ensuring global decarbonisation (Fang, 2025). China's dominance in solar energy, electric vehicles (EVs), and batteries, collectively termed as the “New Three”, has significantly lowered the costs of clean technologies, benefiting global markets but raising concerns about overcapacity and market distortions. In response, Western policies such as the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA 2022) and the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) aim to enhance domestic resilience and competitiveness, but risk fragmenting the global trading system through protectionist measures (Rasool, Reinsch and Denamiel, 2024).

This chapter explores how industrial policy can be designed to drive decarbonisation while aligning with international trade rules and climate commitments. It argues that a reformed multilateral framework, integrating climate and trade objectives, is essential to harmonise national strategies, prevent trade wars, and ensure a just and equitable global energy transition. The analysis is structured as follows: it first examines China’s role in the climate-trade nexus, then evaluates Western responses through the lens of US and EU policies, assesses the compatibility of these policies with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, explores geopolitical and economic dynamics, and concludes with recommendations for a cooperative multilateral approach.

China’s role in the climate-trade nexus: the “New Three" and global decarbonisation

China’s industrial policy, notably through initiatives like "Made in China 2025," has positioned the nation as a global leader in clean energy technologies, particularly in the "New Three." China controls over 80% of global solar panel manufacturing capacity and dominates the processing of critical minerals essential for battery production (Garnaut, 2024). This dominance is underpinned by substantial state subsidies, which accounted for 1.73% of China’s GDP in 2019, enabling economies of scale that have significantly reduced the costs of clean technologies (Webster, 2023). For instance, the global price of solar modules has decreased by nearly 80% since 2010, largely due to Chinese production efficiencies (McBride, 2024).

While these advancements have accelerated global decarbonisation by making renewable technologies more affordable, they have also led to overcapacity. Excess production has resulted in low-cost exports, which Western nations, particularly the US and EU, accuse of distorting markets and undermining domestic industries (Pearson, 2019). China’s approach raises a critical question: does its industrial strategy generate positive spillovers for global decarbonisation, or does it exploit gaps in global trade governance to secure economic dominance? The answer lies in balancing the benefits of affordable clean technologies with the need to diversify supply chains to reduce dependency and enhance resilience.

Indeed, China’s affordable clean technologies have been instrumental in supporting energy transitions in developing countries, where cost barriers often hinder renewable energy adoption. For instance, low-cost Chinese solar panels have enabled countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to expand off-grid solar systems, improving energy access for millions (Baskaran and Coste, 2024). A similar process has unfolded in the electric vehicle (EV) sector, where Chinese manufacturers have become highly competitive, posing a threat to producers in the US and Europe. In response, both regions have imposed substantial tariffs on Chinese EVs, up to 100% in the United States and up to 38.1% in the European Union, respectively (Kennedy, 2024).

The state-driven nature of China’s industrial policy has therefore raised strong concerns about unfair competition, prompting calls in the West for "de-risking" supply chains to reduce reliance on Chinese exports (Lincicome, 2021). Over-reliance on China also poses economic and geopolitical risks, as disruptions in its supply chains could jeopardise global access to critical technologies. Excluding China entirely, nevertheless, would slow the global clean energy transition by increasing costs and limiting access to affordable technologies. A balanced approach is needed, one that leverages China’s contributions to decarbonisation while addressing market distortions through international cooperation. This requires transparent trade practices and multilateral agreements that ensure fair competition without sacrificing climate goals.

Western responses: the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA 2022) and the EU’s industrial policies

The US Inflation Reduction Act (enacted by the Biden administration in 2022) represents a landmark industrial policy allocating up to $1 trillion by 2032 to subsidise domestic clean energy production, including the New Three (Muro, 2023). The IRA includes local content requirements, such as mandating that a significant portion of EV components be sourced domestically, and imposes tariffs, like the duties on Chinese EVs, to protect US industries. While the Trump administration has attempted to undermine key IRA programmes through funding freezes and rollbacks, it has not repealed or legally dismantled the IRA, at least, a full repeal is highly unlikely especially given the IRA’s embedded economic and political support base. Courts have begun reinstating paused funding, and, after all, overall repeal would require Congressional approval. These measures under the IRA 2022 aim to foster economic resilience and create domestic jobs but risk violating WTO rules on non-discrimination, potentially inviting trade disputes (Mehling and Ritz, 2023). While the IRA has spurred investments in US clean energy manufacturing, its protectionist elements could increase the cost of decarbonisation by limiting access to affordable imports (Leonelli, 2025). For instance, excluding low-cost Chinese batteries may raise EV prices, slowing consumer adoption. Moreover, the IRA’s subsidies could trigger a global subsidy race, as other nations respond with similar measures, potentially fragmenting clean technology markets and undermining global climate efforts (Clausing and Wolfram, 2023).

The European Union’s response to the climate-trade nexus is embodied in its Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) and Net-Zero Industry Act (NZIA), which aim to meet 40% of the EU’s net-zero technology needs by 2030 (Leonelli and Clora, 2024). Complementing these efforts, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), introduced in 2023, imposes tariffs on carbon-intensive imports to align trade with the EU’s climate goals (Perdana, Vielle, and Oliveira, 2023). By pricing carbon emissions embedded in imports, CBAM seeks to level the playing field for European producers subject to stringent environmental regulations. While innovative, CBAM and NZIA face challenges (WTO, 2025). CBAM’s carbon tariffs may violate WTO rules by discriminating against imports from countries with less stringent climate policies, prompting legal scrutiny (GATT Article III:4). The EU’s strategy prioritising emissions pricing over protectionist tariffs differs from the US approach, yet it still adds to global trade tensions. Its heavy reliance on subsidies under the Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP) risks trade distortions and retaliatory measures from China (Bickenbach and Dohse, 2024). 

Geopolitical and economic dynamics

It is prudent for all stakeholders to strike a balance between lawfully protecting their domestic industries and advancing the broader public good of global climate governance. A positive sign is that, rather than pursuing wholesale economic decoupling, policymakers are prioritising supply chain diversification through strategies such as friend-shoring.

1. De-risking and Friend-shoring

The West’s "friend-shoring" strategy seeks to diversify supply chains by relocating production to allied nations, reducing reliance on China (Cha, 2023). Initiatives like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) of the Group of Seven (G7) and the EU’s Global Gateway support this shift by financing clean energy projects in partner countries. However, complete decoupling from China is neither feasible nor desirable, given its integral role in global supply chains. For instance, China processes over 90% of the world’s lithium and cobalt, critical for EV batteries (Doe and Smith, 2024). Disrupting these supply chains could lead to shortages and price spikes, slowing the global energy transition. A de-risking strategy that prioritises diversified sourcing and greater transparency presents a more balanced alternative. By strengthening supply chain resilience without isolating China, it helps preserve affordability while addressing both economic and geopolitical vulnerabilities. Collaborative mechanisms, such as joint technology development and international standard-setting, can further ease tensions and support sustainable growth.

2. Protectionism vis-à-vis global Cooperation

The protectionist measures adopted by the US and EU, driven by concerns over China’s dominance in clean energy markets, risk undermining global climate goals (Mazzocco, 2024). Tariffs and local content requirements increase the cost of clean technologies, particularly in developing countries where affordability is critical. For example, US tariffs on Chinese solar panels have raised installation costs, slowing renewable energy deployment in emerging markets (Abrahams, 2025). While China’s overcapacity improves affordability, it also distorts global markets and exacerbates trade tensions by leading to the dumping of subsidised goods. A zero-sum approach, exemplified by escalating U.S.-China tariffs, could lead to a "race to the bottom" raising trade barriers as national interests supersede global welfare (Kamin and Kysar, 2023). This dynamic threatens to fragment clean technology markets, delay decarbonisation, and exacerbate geopolitical rivalries. 

A cooperative, multilateral approach, prioritising collective agreements over unilateral actions, is crucial to balancing economic resilience with global climate objectives. To this end, limiting trade-distortive measures such as excessive tariffs and restrictive local content requirements is imperative to preserve the affordability and accessibility of clean technologies, especially for developing countries. The WTO urges reviewing and rebalancing such tariffs to make clean technologies more affordable and accessible, thereby advancing the green transition (Sutton, Hill, Moezinia and O’Brien, 2025). Striking this balance will not only promote international cooperation but also accelerate the widespread deployment of sustainable energy solutions worldwide. 

Toward a multilateral framework: integrating climate and trade policies

1. Challenges to WTO Rules

Both the EU and US tariffs on electric vehicles (EVs), along with similar surcharges on clean energy imports, have triggered significant trade tensions, even as the WTO continues to advocate for tariff reform and climate-sensitive trade policies. In August 2024, China filed a WTO complaint against the EU’s provisional anti-subsidy tariffs on Chinese EVs, arguing that the measures violate WTO rules, pose risks to fairness, and could undermine global climate cooperation (WTO, 2024).

The WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) restricts subsidies that cause adverse effects on trade, such as those tied to local content requirements (ASCM Art. 2). Both the IRA’s provisions and the EU’s subsidies under the GDIP may violate these rules, as evidenced by China’s 2023 WTO complaint against the IRA (China, 2024). The ASCM, designed primarily to address economic distortions, lacks provisions explicitly recognizing climate-focused subsidies as legitimate tools for addressing environmental market failures (Shadikhodjaev, 2021). The WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX provides limited exemptions for measures protecting human, animal, or plant life, but its scope is insufficient to accommodate modern climate policies (Trachtman, 2017). This misalignment between trade rules and climate objectives creates a governance gap that fuels dispute and undermines global cooperation.

2. Reform WTO Rules to Support Climate Objectives

Achieving coherence between trade rules and climate goals requires meaningful reform of the WTO. The ASCM urgently requires modernisation to explicitly accommodate climate-related exemptions. Recognising subsidies aimed at correcting environmental market failures as legitimate policy tools will enhance the WTO’s relevance in the context of the global climate agenda. In particular, expanding Article XX to encompass green sourcing requirements and facilitating tariff reductions on clean technologies will improve affordability and promote broader adoption of sustainable innovations. The targeted revision of GATT Article XX to expressly include climate exceptions would provide a legal basis for measures like carbon border adjustments and environmentally focused subsidies, provided they are implemented in a non-discriminatory and proportionate manner. Meanwhile, expanding carve-outs in the ASCM for subsidies addressing environmental market failures could reduce trade barriers for clean technologies (Leonelli and Clora, 2024). Furthermore, a revitalised Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), stalled since 2016, would facilitate tariff-free trade in green goods, fostering global access to clean energy technologies (Young and Clough, 2023). Such reforms would require consensus among WTO members, a challenging but necessary step to harmonise trade and climate goals.

Given the dysfunction within the WTO dispute settlement system, it may be more pragmatic to pursue bilateral negotiations among major powers. In this context, China and the EU have deepened their climate cooperation as the US retreats from global leadership. Through joint dialogues, they have focused on equitable access to green technologies, clean energy deployment, and easing trade tensions over EVs. They reaffirmed their commitment to a just energy transition, pledging to expand affordable, high-quality green tech and strengthen energy security through mechanisms such as the EU–China Energy Cooperation Platform (ECECP) and China–EU Energy Investment Platform (CEEI). A potential price undertaking is also under discussion to replace provisional tariffs on Chinese EVs with a minimum-price scheme (Taylor, 2025). This evolving partnership not only fills a climate governance gap but also signals growing EU–China alignment ahead of COP30, despite ongoing EU concerns over reliance on Chinese solar technologies and critical minerals.

Facilitating multilateral initiatives

Incorporating climate provisions within regional trade agreements, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between China, Japan, the Asean countries, Australia and New Zealand) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), will be instrumental in facilitating technology transfer and mobilising financial resources for decarbonisation in emerging economies. This approach ensures a more just and equitable transition by enabling developing countries to actively participate in the global energy transformation. Harmonising trade and climate policies necessitates the integration of climate-related provisions into major trade agreements, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the RCEP, and the AfCFTA (Kuhlmann and Agutu, 2020). These agreements should reduce tariffs on green goods and align with the Paris Agreement’s nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to ensure coherence between trade and climate commitments (Rajamani, 2024). 

In addition, an establishment of a formal dialogue platform between the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the WTO would enhance policy coherence by aligning trade and climate frameworks. The joint forum could facilitate dialogue, ensuring that subsidies and trade policies support global decarbonisation without distorting markets (Pauw, Castro, Pickering and Bhasin, 2019). Such cooperation is essential to promote transparency, fairness, and predictability within the evolving green economy.

China’s role as a major supplier of clean technologies makes its participation in such frameworks critical. A UNFCCC-WTO forum should serve as a venue for sustained engagement among major economies and encourage active participation from China in international standards-setting processes. However, China must commit to transparency in its subsidy programs and adhere to sustainability standards to build trust among trading partners. For instance, collaborative initiatives, such as the U.S.-China Science and Technology Agreement (STA), can promote data sharing and joint research, reducing geopolitical frictions and advancing climate innovation (Gilbert and Mallapaty, 2024).

To reconcile global trade governance with climate imperatives and promote sustainable economic development effectively, a comprehensive and multifaceted strategy is essential. Multilateralism offers a more effective path than protectionism for addressing the global climate crisis, enabling coordinated action, equitable technology access, and resilient clean energy supply chains. The WTO’s Structured Discussions on Trade and Environmental Sustainability (TESSD), launched in 2020, provides a platform to prioritise climate-focused trade policies (WTO, 2021). The US and EU must lead negotiations for a renewed Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA), incorporating provisions for clean energy technologies and critical minerals. China, as a key stakeholder, should engage as a responsible global partner, aligning its industrial policies with international standards. Regional initiatives, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, can complement WTO efforts by promoting green trade corridors and technology transfers. Similarly, the G7 and G20 can drive consensus on climate-trade integration, leveraging their economic influence to set global standards. These multilateral efforts must prioritise the needs of developing countries, ensuring equitable access to clean technologies and financing for decarbonization.

Conclusion

Industrial policy is a vital driver of the global clean energy transition but poses challenges to the multilateral trading system. China’s dominance in key clean technologies advances decarbonisation yet intensifies trade tensions, while US and EU policies risk fostering protectionism. A reformed WTO that integrates climate and trade objectives is essential to balance economic resilience with global decarbonisation goals. Through cooperative multilateral frameworks grounded in transparency and inclusivity, nations can harness industrial policy to enable a just, equitable, and sustainable transition to net-zero emissions without fracturing global trade.

These approaches carry important implications for policymakers aiming to align trade and climate agendas within a framework of sustainable economic growth. Reforming WTO rules to explicitly recognise climate-related subsidies and permit tariff reductions will provide legal clarity for proactive industrial strategies, reducing trade conflicts. Establishing a UNFCCC-WTO forum could strengthen governance coherence by facilitating dialogue among major economies and mitigating fragmented policy approaches. Furthermore, prioritising de-risking over decoupling is critical to maintaining resilient global supply chains, ensuring stable access to essential clean technologies and avoiding price volatility. Incorporating climate provisions into regional trade agreements will direct technology transfer and financing to developing countries, supporting equitable participation in the energy transition. Simultaneously, limiting trade-distortive measures, such as excessive tariffs and local content rules, will preserve affordability and accessibility of clean technologies worldwide. Collectively, these measures underscore the urgent need for integrated, multilateral policies that align trade governance with environmental imperatives. Policymakers must collaborate to craft mechanisms that protect domestic economic interests while advancing global sustainability.

Qingxiu Bu is Reader in Global Law at the School of Law, Politics and Sociology at the University of Sussex, and is currently also a Senior Fellow (Winter Term 2025/26) at the College for Social Sciences and Humanities, UA Ruhr | Research Alliance, in Essen, Germany. He has published widely in a variety of areas of law, many of which are themed around law and global challenges, with a particular focus on the development of legal infrastructures in transnational law and global governance. He has previously been a lecturer in law at Cardiff Law School, Cardiff University (2007-08) and the School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast (2008-13), during which he taught Transnational Business Law at Centre of Transnational Legal Studies (CTLS), and at Georgetown University as Adjunct Professor. Qingxiu was also appointed as Li Kashing Professor of Practice at Faculty of Law, McGill University in 2019. He has held visiting posts at various institutions, including Lund University, Sweden, University College Dublin, Ireland, Tel Aviv University, Israel and the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Germany. He worked also as a Docent at the Institute of Global Law and Policy (IGLP), Harvard Law School, in January 2013 and 2014. Qingxiu has completed four projects funded respectively by the British Academy, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS), Newton Fund, and British Council (PMI) during the past years.

Image: DeepMind via Pexels

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