UK’s Proscription of Palestine Action and its Implications
Kodili Henry Chukwuma argues that the decision could serve broader political functions in relation to the ongoing war in Gaza.
The decision by the Home Secretary to proscribe Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation draws attention, once again, to anti-terrorism laws and security practices in the United Kingdom, which have repeatedly come under intense scrutiny in academic research and wider public discourse. Proscription is a counter-terrorism tool that allows the government to ban certain groups, individuals or entities deemed to fall within the category of ‘terrorism’. This means that the exercise of this power is enabled by, and works hand-in-hand with, various legislative instruments, security policies, and political priorities, such as the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 and the Prevent Duty.
Recent public response to unfolding events in the UK and beyond, most notably the war in Gaza, but also reactions to the attacks in Southport, through protests and collective demands for accountability, provides a pretext for the use and expansion of such counter-terrorism tools to discipline or control protests, as had been repeatedly warned by activists and critical scholars. The decision to proscribe Palestine Action, according to the Home Secretary, is due to several claims about the group’s activities which has seemingly ‘caused serious damage to property with the aim of progressing its political cause and influencing the government.’ Activists from the group spray-painted two military planes in the RAF Brize Norton base in Oxfordshire, which the Home Secretary has described as ‘disgraceful’.
These acts seem to meet some of the threshold outlined in the statutory test for proscribing terrorist organisations in the UK. However, the same could be said about just any direct-action protests; they are usually disruptive and seek to achieve certain political goals or influence government decision on a particular issue. The group describes itself as a pro-Palestine protest network that seeks to disrupt the arms industry in the UK through direct action. According to the Armed forces minister, Luke Pollard, the incident at the RAF base are ‘not only stupid, but also constitutes a direct attack on the UK’s national security.’ Similarly, Yvette Cooper states that the group’s long history of criminality and the significant increase and severity of its actions since 2024 pose formidable threats to national security. Statements as these reinvoke familiar discursive moves by state elites to draw attention to a particular issue of concern, thereby generating momentum to treat such issues as a security problem.
This brings back the fuzziness associated with the terrorism label, which is inevitably shaped by political considerations and decisions. The definition of terrorism in the UK’s Terrorism Act is nebulous, thus leaving a huge chunk of the decision in the hands of the Home Secretary. According to Jarvis and Legrand, proscription is a heavy power which has serious societal and political consequences, notwithstanding judicial and legislative oversights. There is a long, as well as recent, history of banning opposing groups, including trade unions, activists, and resistance movements in the UK, who employ non-violent tactics to pursue certain political or ideological goals. Recent examples include the banning of environmental activist group, extinction rebellion by the police in 2020, and the proscription of Hizb ut Tahrir in 2023 by the Home Secretary in relation to attacks carried out by Hamas against Israel on October 7th.
Moreover, the move to proscribe Palestine Action is preceded by a slew of laws that increased police powers to restrict and shut down protests. This has led to increased encroachment on civic spaces and university campuses, as well as the securitization of certain behaviours or ideas deemed to be ‘extreme’, that is, opposed to certain prevailing or expected normality. As the research on proscription has shown, there are huge costs directly associated with the unbridled exercise of such powers, which is also true in the recent case of Palestine Action, such as the targeting of non-violent groups and undermining democratic rights and freedom (including the right to protest).
As noted in the response by Amnesty International, ordinary criminal law, accompanied by necessary human rights protections, is more than sufficient for handling incidence resulting from direct action protests. In addition to the symbolic and material consequences of proscription, which transverse different aspects of criminality, ex-communication and outlawry, this decision to proscribe Palestine Action could serve other broader political functions in relation to the ongoing war in Gaza. Most notably, it could aid in stifling public voices and discipling dissenting views, while attempting to shape or distort collective narrative about the conflict. Contrary to several commentaries, this decision is neither unprecedented nor exceptional, but a growing pattern of the use of anti-terrorism laws and practices to target opposition or suppress dissent.
Kodili Henry Chukwuma is an Assistant Professor of International Security. Kodili's PhD was awarded by the University of East Anglia in 2022, following which he joined the School of Government and International Affairs in Durham University. Kodili's research focuses on the politics of security, terrorism and counter-terrorism. Kodili's research also has a regional focus on Africa, as well as interests in (the politics of) time and space of (in)security. His research has been published in leading journals such as Security Dialogue, International Political Sociology, Critical Studies on Terrorism, and African Security.
Photo by Ömer Faruk Yıldız
